Problems of COMMUNISM

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The "Cold War" on the Literary Front

Part I: The Writers' Underground

By David Burg

THE (OVERALL) TITLE OF THIS PIECE is quoted directly from a Soviet publication.[1] As clichés, go it reflects fairly accurately the political and psychological atmosphere in Soviet literary circles today.

There are indeed two camps now opposed to each other in the literary arena of the Soviet Union. On one hand are "the liberals," a motley group who are forever at odds among themselves and who range in character and viewpoint over a wide spectrum—from the "liberalizing" members of the Central Committee, like the poet A. Tvardovski, to extreme radicals or "leftists," as they are called in Russia, who openly defy Soviet laws and publish abroad under their own names (*e.g.*, A. Yesenin-Volpin). Three things, however, unite all of them: their yearning for real change, their recognition in principle of the right to differences, and their firm conviction that even with the right kind of ideas, without artistic quality there is no art. The parallel with "Western" thinking, in the broadest sense of the term, suggests itself.

On the other hand, there are the conservatives. If there is any diversity within their midst, it is not known to the outside world. Their platform is quite simple—"a feeling for the continuity of the periods of our development" [2]—that is, support for the traditions of Stalinism; a longing for the lost "identity of opinions," together with active measures for its restoration; and the promotion through literature of the basic tasks of "educating the builder of communism." Is this not orthodox totalitarianism?

The surface resemblance between the struggle of these opposing forces and the "great" cold war can be perceived at a glance. One might even go further and say that the similarity is not accidental. The conservatives are in fact classic totalitarians, and the liberals in fact do have something in common with the West. But to extend the comparison would be senseless. Neither the relative stances of the two camps nor the positions of various "liberals" on the "literary front" are strictly parallel to the lines of the world ideological conflict—indeed the situation could not be otherwise. For, some propaganda to the contrary, the schism in literature is not due to external factors—that is, to the influence of "foreign," bourgeois ideology on the liberals—nor conversely to the alleged devotion of the conservatives to communism. No, the basis of the schism is a deep inner conflict in a huge country still isolated from the outer world in many ways. In recent months even official literary administrators have begun to recognize this.[3]

Moreover, this conflict—which broadly speaking relates to the whole future of Russia—is focused with particular sharpness in literary conflict, in keeping with a century and a half of Russian tradition. Literary controversies have thus become first of all a reflection of political differences. In this lies their principal differ-

[1] N. Gribachev, "Stikhi, rosy i rozgi" (Verses, Dew and Birches), *Literaturnaia gazeta,* March 27, 1962.

[2] V. Ivanov, "Zametki o nekotorykh literaturnykh sporakh" (Remarks on Certain Literary Arguments), *Kommunist,* No. 4 (April), 1962, p. 59. Italics in original.

[3] See, for example, B. Polevoi, "Novoe, nebyvaloe" (Something New and Unusual), *Literaturnaia gazeta,* April 19, 1962.

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ence from esthetic polemics in the West, in which political factors nowadays play a secondary role, or often, none at all.

Paraphrasing Pokrovski's famous saying, we can state that under totalitarian conditions literary discussion is above all political controversy, spilling over into art. It would, of course, be foolish to seek hidden politics in every esthetic pronouncement, but generally the political overtones are present. One explanation of this phenomenon is the fact that Soviet totalitarianism does not recognize autonomy from politics; thus critics and writers, whether they wish it or not, are confronted by the fact that their judgment or work will be interpreted from a political point of view by both the cultural authorities and to a lesser degree the "opposition." The political coloration of literature has, secondly, much earlier roots in the Russian past: controversy over politics and the way of life in general has been customarily expressed in the guise of discussion about literature and art. While Soviet policies have greatly enhanced and entrenched this tradition, its sources go back not only to such "leftwing" thinkers as Belinski and Chernyshevski, but to Tolstoi and Dostoevski (recall, *e.g.,* Tolstoi's "What is Art" and Dostoyevski's speech on Pushkin). Thus there is much precedence in the past for the literary controversies to be described here.

The Heritage of Stalinism

In the first postwar year the Soviet Union was dominated by one feeling—the expectation of change, and especially of greater freedom. That this is so is acknowledged by such diverse literary figures as the "internal emigrant"—the lyric poet Pasternak (see the epilogue to *Doctor Zhivago*); the oppositionist but still "accepted" writer Ilya Ehrenburg (witness his recent declaration[4]); and the completely orthodox novelist Fyodor Panfyorov.[5]

Stalin's answer to this popular expectation was the Zhdanov purge. The postwar reaction was, of course, not merely a cultural phenomenon. In the countryside it led to the razing of the village "as though the Tatar khan went over it with his horde," to quote Khrushchev. In the nation as a whole, what resulted was no less than the submission of all human activity to the goals of the omnipotent Leader and Government—under threat of death and the concentration camp. Yet it is characteristic that the "freezing" of the country took the form of the destruction of art. Where economics and science had long before surrendered unconditionally, art resisted. From Stalin's point of view, something atavistic was preserved in it—expressed in the persistence of an independent, critical view of society (Zoshchenko and the critics-cosmopolitans), pure lyricism (Akhmatova), experimentation without instructions from above (music). The taming of art was to become the symbol of the final subjugation of the country.

For biographic notes on some of the writers mentioned in this article, see pp. 13-14.

As always, Stalin won. But it was the most ephemeral of his many ephemeral successes—the last one he achieved, and the first one changed by subsequent history. For the thaw came first of all in literature. The question is why.

Let us imagine Soviet literature as an iceberg. Only part of it is above the surface. The rest—well out of sight—is writings penned for the eyes of an author's friends, manuscripts kept in the locked drawers of desks, incompleted plans for future works. Salt water pushes up icebergs but they sink down in fresh water. In the last Stalinist years, the literary iceberg floated along a river. In outward appearance, all the claims of the party of literature were satisfied instantly and absolutely. Literary polemics became a pointless discussion about the "positive hero," a debate over whether—in the light of glorious Soviet "reality"—there was still a basis for a conflict between good and evil, or whether it was necessary to talk only about clashes between the good and the better.[6] Words poured forth; the party gave grades and awards, and everyone agreed with them[7]—but in spite of innumerable Stalin prizes there appeared neither books which were read nor books which were readable. The same was true of other literary *genres* such as playwriting. Not only from the point of view of the reader, but also from that of the Committee on Artistic Matters, literature was losing its right to exist: for the party, culture was first of all a means of propaganda, and what kind of propaganda was it when books were not opened and theaters were half empty?

[4] I. Ehrenburg, "Chuvstvo loktia" (The Feeling of an Elbow), *Pravda,* May 7, 1962.

[5] F. Panfyorov, "O cherepkakh i cherepushkakh" (On Bits of Pottery Large and Small), *Oktiabr,* No. 5, 1946, pp. 151-62.

[6] See, *e.g.,* A. Surkov, "Zametki o dramaturgii" (Notes on Dramaturgy), *Sovetskoe iskusstvo,* March 12, 1952; and N. Virta, "Budem govorit otkrovenno" (We Shall Speak Openly), *ibid.,* March 29, 1952.

[7] See "Preodolet otstavavanie dramaturgii" (To Overcome the Shortcomings in Dramaturgy), *Pravda,* April 7, 1952.

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Outwardly, literature appeared to have come to an end. Actually, it reverted to what had been during the Inquisition, or what it was before Gutenberg invented printing. Even during the harshest years of ideological purity and artistic anemia, literature still passed from hand to hand—writings by Pasternak, Tsvetaeva, Akhmatova, a poetic exchange of opinions between Ehrenburg and Aliger on the fate of the Jews, anonymous inflammatory poetry about "the last night of the regime," and other unsigned verse: all this work was copied by hand, at best on a typewriter. Not only the Pasternaks and various anonymous writers, but even true defenders of the faith, members of the highest courts of orthodoxy, secretly carried on the heresy. Aleksei Surkov, one of the leading secretaries of literature, by his own testimony composed verses during all this period that were full of un-"social-realistic" bitterness. A dumbfounded world found out about this when, ten years later, after many thaws, he decided to publish them.

Slowly and unnoticed, the underwater life of the iceberg continued. It sank deeper, but it did not melt away. It is this that explains the rapid resurrection of Soviet literature. In 1953 the iceberg was carried to the delta, and in saltier water more and more of its surface gradually came to light; the "new literature" included rehabilitated Soviet writers, some emigrants, unpublished works, early works by "above-water" writers which had not been circulated for decades—along with a completely new poetry and prose, created both by older writers imbued with a fresh spirit and by newly-emergent young talents which had previously been ignored.

Yet even today a great deal of Soviet literature still remains invisible. The iceberg is still at the mouth of the river: time will show whether it is destined to float on into the brinier water of the ocean.

The Changing Underground

In surveying the "cold war" on the literary front, let us move from left to right in the Soviet meaning of these words. The "left"—that is, the extreme underground—is a natural starting place for several reasons. First, what goes on underground has a crucial if hidden influence on the literary debates and clashes that are carried on publicly. Secondly, if literary life continues to move in the direction of greater freedom, in line with the developments of recent years, then the literature that is officially *verboten* today might well become the "open" literature of tomorrow. Thirdly, if on the other hand reaction wins out, what is now considered illicit literary activity will not cease, will not be swallowed into the earth, but will merge with an underground tradition—and it is important to understand exactly what kind. Finally, the goal of the Soviet liberals themselves is to bring to light what is now hidden; since a significant part of their thinking and creative work belongs to the underground, a knowledge of the hidden literature should help to clarify many of the controversies being carried on in the press. The elements of this literature include both past and present works; let us look first at the former.

"Whoever governs the past governs the future," the Orwellian totalitarians felt. In the Stalin era writers were denied the right to choose their heritage, to base themselves on one tradition or another, which is one of the main elements of literary freedom and of spiritual freedom in general. Matters never progressed to the point where a "desirable" past completely replaced the actual past, as was the case in *1984*. But the tendency to erase "dissonant" works and ideas out of existence was a marked one during the Stalin years. The extent to which different elements of the literary heritage were suppressed depended on how "dangerous" they were judged to be. Most 20th-century modernism was completely banned, as was everything produced by post-revolutionary émigrés or "counterrevolutionaries," and all the works of writers destroyed by Soviet terror (from the ideologically entirely alien Pilnyak to the ideologically acceptable but executed Sergey Tretyakov). Also under strictest prohibition was a significant part of Soviet literature of the 1920's, the reading of which could lead to undesirable thoughts about the abyss separating the original ideals of the revolution from the practice of totalitarianism. The blacklisting of such writings meant that they not only were not published but were not circulated in public libraries, discussed, taught, or indeed mentioned in public. Even having them in one's home or speaking of them with one's friends was considered a sign of unreliability, sufficient grounds for Komsomol or party denunciation and sometimes even for arrest.

Another large portion of literature was under "limited" prohibition. Included in this category were Dostoyevski and the whole Russian conservative-religious tradition, certain "erroneous" works of otherwise approved writers (such as Leonov's *The Thief* and Ilya Ehrenburg's *Julio Jurenito*), almost all the works of Sergey Yesenin, most Soviet satire, and much other literature. Semi-prohibited works were taken out of general circulation, eliminated from school and most college curricula, removed from ordinary libraries (although not from university or scholarly libraries) and

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from republishing schedules. However, it was permissible to have this literature at home, to read it, and to mention it publicly in a condemnatory way (completely banned literature was in fact declared "unliterature"). Positive or simply objective views of it immediately subjected one to suspicion.

Since the temptation of forbidden fruit is the most powerful and ancient of all temptations, it is not surprising that these bans and semi-bans were sometimes ignored. Yesenin was transcribed by hand, Gumilev was learned by heart. Nevertheless, isolation from the undesirable past was sufficiently real.

Rehabilitation—with Reservations

In the nine years since Stalin's death, many of the barriers which the *Vozhd* erected around the past have fallen down—but many still remain. Almost everything which was semi-prohibited a decade ago has been reintroduced into circulation. Suspicion has finally been lifted from readers of Dostoyevski, Yesenin, or Ilf and Petrov. There is no way of telling, of course, whether this step is an irreversible one, and it has its limitations: school curricula, for instance, are still mostly chained to the past.

A more complicated situation exists concerning literature that was absolutely forbidden in the Stalin years. The greater part of what was published abroad by émigrés remains under strict prohibition. On the other hand, some works by so-called "realist" émigrés, particularly Shmelyev and Bunin, are being published, no doubt in part because their fame was established before the Revolution. The fate of Bunin's legacy in particular reflects the contrary aspects of the current Soviet scene—that is, both the broadening of freedom in comparison with the Stalinist period and the extreme limitations that still persist. For while some of Bunin has been approved for publication, any of his writing having an "anti-Soviet" accent remains hidden from the reader; and when the magazine *Moskva* considered itself duty-bound finally to publish "The Life of Arseniev," the *chef-d'oeuvre* that won Bunin the Nobel Prize in 1933, the editors published it in a disgracefully mutilated form, discarding nearly all "dissonant," religious and philosophical speculations (see p. 5).[8]

Russian modernism also presents a mixed picture. Such poets as Marina Tsvetaeva, Velemir Khlebnikov, Innokenti Annenski and even Boris Pasternak are being reprinted—generally on a selective basis. On the other hand, Ossip Mandelstamm and Andrei Beli are not republished. Why, one may ask, Pasternak and not Beli? The answer lies not in any matter of principle or logic, but in the fact that the conservatives, retreating, conduct rearguard battles over each writer, and some of the battles are not yet decided. For example, the counter-revolutionary Gumilev, who was shot by the Bolsheviks in 1921, still remains under strict prohibition—yet recently the liberal writer Aksenov seems to have issued a first challenge against this ban by quoting Gumilev without naming him.[9]

The attitude toward writers who were shot or who perished in concentration camps remains strictly differentiated according to their political past. From a civic standpoint they have all been rehabilitated. But former "faithful sons of the party" like Mikhail Koltsov—one of the chief creators of the "personality cult," who was later himself devoured by it—have been elevated anew to a high pedestal. Writers who were not directly hostile to the regime, such as Isaac Babel or Artem Vesely, are tolerated: that is, they are republished but only in careful selections and with notations in the preface about their "errors" and "contradictions." Quite a different attitude prevails toward such writers as Boris Pilnyak, remembered for his view of the Russian Revolution as an elemental peasant movement and for his severe criticism of the inhumanity of industrialization (he perished in a concentration camp); or Evgeni Zamiatin, who won fame for his prophetic portrayal of totalitarianism in the novel *We* (he died in exile). The magazine *Kommunist* pointed out in 1957 that in spite of the civic rehabilitation of these writers, there could be no talk of republishing their "slanderous writings."[10] So the situation remains to the present.

Insofar as the literary past is concerned, then, a considerable portion of the Russian heritage has been restored to legitimacy, and the continuity of literary tradition interrupted by Stalin thus largely reestablished. The "permitted" classics have always exerted "subversive" influence on the intelligentsia, destroying the partys' monolithic picture of the world and history as an inexorable movement toward communism. But the literature and poetry which lately has shown profoundest impact—especially on young Soviet intellectuals—

[8] *Moskva,* Nos. 7, 8, and 11, 1961.

[9] V. Aksenov, "Zvezdyi bilet" (Ticket to the Stars), *Yunost,* No. 6, 1961. According to *Literaturnaia gazeta,* May 17, 1962, the price for second-hand Gumilev volumes soared to 25 new rubles ($22.50) in state shops: "Just to put an end to this legalized black marketing, if for no other reason, Gumilev's selected poetry should be republished," the author of the article writes.

[10] "Vyshe znamia marksistko-leninskoy ideologii" (Raise the Banner of Marxist-Leninist Ideology), *Kommunist,* No. 1, 1957.

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Soviet Censors at Work

For many years the works of Ivan Bunin, distinguished Russian author and 1933 winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, were verboten *in the Soviet Union. Lately, however, the authorities have been allowing his somber and haunting novels, novelettes, and verses to be reintroduced to his countrymen. Yet, how qualified this revival has been may be seen from the following excerpt from the first installment (Chapter I) of Bunin's novel,* The Life of Arseniev, *as republished in the magazine* Moskva *(No. 7, 1961, p. 149), presumably from the 1952 New York Russian-language edition. The lines set in bold-face type were deleted altogether in the Soviet version, but have been reinserted here from the English-language edition (*The Well of Days, *Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1934, pp. 3-5)—leaving out, however, some words and passages which Bunin himself excised in the 1952 New York edition. By their "abridgment" of Bunin's text (as* Moskva's *announcement of republication phrased it), the Soviet censors completely distorted it: instead of the author's expressed pride in his noble ancestry, we find scorn and contempt; instead of his religious ruminations on life and death, we are presented with something reminiscent of Soviet "optimism" and "love of life." Not that the censors have succeeded in distorting the sense of the entire book to the same degree as they did that of Chapter I, but the deletions made in the ensuing installments do attest that "socialist realism" lives on—even retroactively.*—D. B.

SUCH THINGS and deeds as are not written down are covered with darkness, and given over to the sepulchre of oblivion, whilst those that are written down are like unto animate ones. . . .

I was born half-a-century ago in Central Russia, in the country, on my father's manor.

We are devoid of a sense of our beginning and end. And it is a great pity that I was told when exactly I was born. Had I not been told, I should have no idea of my age—the more so as I do not as yet at all feel its burden—and should therefore be spared the thought that I must needs die in ten or in twenty years time. And had I been born and lived on a desert island, I should not have suspected even the existence of death. "What luck that would have been!" I am tempted to add. Yet who knows? Perhaps, a great misfortune. Besides, is it really true that I should not have suspected it? Are we not born with the sense of death? and if not, if I had not suspected it, should I be so fond of life as I am, and as I used to be?

Of the Arseniev stock and its origin, I really know nothing. What after all do we know? I only know that in the Armorial our family is included among those "whose origins are lost in the mists of time." I know that our family is "noble though impoverished" . . . **and that all my life I was aware of that nobility, feeling proud and glad that I am not one of those who have neither kith nor kin. On the day dedicated to the Holy Ghost, the Church invites us at Mass to "do homage to the memory of all who died since time began." It offers up on that day a beautiful prayer full of deep meaning:**

"O Lord, let all Thy servants rest within Thy courts and in Abraham's bosom—from Adam even to those among our fathers and brethren, friends and kinsmen, who have served Thee this day in purity!"

Is it accidental that service is here mentioned? Is it not a joy to feel one's connection, one's communion, with "our fathers and brethren, friends and kinsmen" who have sometime done that service? Our remotest ancestors, too, believed in the doctrine of the "pure, continual Path of the father of all that is," handed on from mortal parents to mortal offspring through immortal "continual" life; they believed that it was commanded by the will of the Lamb to keep the purity, the continuity of blood and stock, in order to prevent the desecration of that Path; they believed that every birth must further purify the blood of those born, and enhance the closeness of their kinship with Him Who is the sole father of all that is.

Among my ancestors there were probably many bad men too. And yet from generation to generation my ancestors enjoined one another to remember and observe their blood: Be worthy of your nobility. And how shall I express the emotions with which I sometimes look at our family crest? A knight's armour, coat of mail and helmet with ostrich feathers; and beneath, a shield, and on its azure field, in the middle—a ring, emblem of loyalty and eternity, towards which, from above and below, point three rapiers with cross-shaped hilts. . . .

In the country which for me has replaced my native land, there are many towns like the one which gave me refuge, towns once glorious but now decayed, poor, living out their humdrum everyday life. And yet over that life there always reigns—and not in vain—some grey tower of the Crusaders' times, the vast mass of a cathedral with its glorious portal guarded by an immemorial guard of sacred carven figures, a cock perched high up on the cross, God's exalted herald calling towards the celestial City. . . .

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is prerevolutionary modernism. Many of the modernists are still under ban, but some poets, particularly of the "silver age" of symbolism, are now being published in part. The orthodox critic V. Pertsov recently admitted: "To many young poets of the latest crop A. Blok is extremely dear. They have a sharpened attention for the creative work of such poets as Innokenti Annenski, O. Mandelstamm, N. Gumilev." [11] While these poets came to represent different strains of modernism, all played a part in making the prerevolutionary "silver age" the epitome of creative experimentation, a revolution against the confines of nineteenth-century artistic realism, and above all an era of individualism. Among the poets enjoying greatest popularity today, virtually all who lived to see the triumph of Bolshevism found themselves alienated by its purpose and premises, and many were destroyed by it. The fact that today's youthful intelligentsia takes greater interest in this prerevolutionary heritage than in the poets captivated by the revolution—for example, Mayakovski, Bagritski, and Tikhonov—can be fairly interpreted as a reflection of current disenchantment with "Soviet civilization." And as familiarity with prerevolutionary modernism has grown, it has in turn intensified such disenchantment, given it a definite shape and directed it along a path which is absolutely alien to the official ideology and policy.

Pressures from the Liberals

Since this development has its dangers for the regime, what explains the change in official practice which has allowed a good many of the works previously prohibited to reappear in legitimate editions? The change can be viewed mainly as a victory of the liberal element among editors, writers and critics. The role of editors in the Soviet publishing business is enormous: they bear the main responsibility for the conformity of literature with party and state policy, thus uniting the editorial and censorial functions. During the period of mass terror, none of them were willing to risk their necks. Now, however, the nature of the risk in sponsoring questionable works has changed, involving party or job demerits, reprimands, dismissal, or in extreme cases, exclusion from the party. A number of bolder editors of a liberal bent have proved ready to accept such risks and have shown increasing willingness to revive old (as well as to publish new) unorthodox writers.

[11] V. Pertsov, "Poiski novovo i velikiie traditsii" (The Search for New and Great Traditions), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, February 27, 1962.

The task of liberal critics and writers has been to prepare the way ideologically and pyschologically for such publishing. The most radical supporters of a freer publications policy—Ehrenburg, for example—base their demand for the restoration of writers of the past squarely on the argument that the people have a right to be acquainted with the Russian literary heritage *in toto* (this view reflects attitudes "from below").[12] A more moderate and more common argument is one seemingly directed to the conservatives, based on practical reasoning. One of its spokesmen is the cautiously liberal Lev Ozerov who, in speaking of poetry, has defended "showing the entire process of development of Russian verse." He complains, among other things, against the practice of attacking a "negative" poet on the basis of a few lines of quotation, when the artist's fuller work is not officially available:

> **It is only from quotations in abusive passages of textbooks and "aids" to literature of the 20th century that our youth becomes acquainted with unfamiliar names. The text is abusive, but very often the verses do not corroborate this. . . , Confusion results. Instead of aversion being inculcated for some poet, the reader feels: something is wrong here.**

In short, unsubstantiated abuse of disapproved poets merely undermines confidence in official literary criticism and propaganda. As for the ban on publishing the work of such poets, Ozerov comments:

> **Not to publish them is by no means the best method of polemics. To whom do we leave the legacy of some of them—*to emigrants, manuscript fans* and quasi-literary ladies? No these poets must be shown to the readers. The reader should receive *at first hand* editions that are well arranged, with commentaries and detailed prefaces.**

The words italicized (by this author) clearly refer to the underground circulation of emigrant editions and handwritten copies, making publishing bans futile under present conditions. Therefore, Ozerov tells the conservatives, it is better to publish—with appropriate commentaries—that which is widely read in any event, without the commentaries. Tacitly implied here is the aforementioned logic of "forbidden fruit": work that is published will attract less attention than work that is withheld from publication.[13]

[12] I. Ehrenburg, "Ludi, gody, zhizn" (People, Years, Life), *Novyi mir*, Nos. 4 and 5, 1962.

[13] L. Ozerov, "Strana russkoi poesii" (The Land of Russian Poetry), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 28, 1961. Another article by Ozerev in *ibid.*, June 12, 1962, indicates that he received widespread support from the reading public on the proposals described here, though some letter writers accused him of timidity.

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Such an argument in many cases achieves its aim. The conservatives retreat. Yet the tempo of their retreat does not suit the most radical element of the intelligentsia, especially the youth. At a meeting at Moscow University on April 20 of this year, for example, the students indignantly demanded the immediate publication of Mandelstamm and the republication of Ehrenburg's *Julio Jurenito*.[14] The appetite grows with eating. The liberals are winning the dispute over Russia's artistic heritage—but paradoxically the nearness of victory merely intensifies dissatisfaction. If Tsvetaeva is permissible, then why not Mandelstamm; if certain works are published, then why not others?

From this point there is only one step to the question: if every kind of literary experimentation was permissible in the past, then why is it not permissible now? We come to the issue of current literary output—which, as will be shown, is burdened with far more prohibitions than the literature resurrected from the past.

Underground Radicalism

We are, of course, acquainted with only an insignificant part of contemporary underground literature. Probably only one person on earth has a more or less complete idea of its extent and content, and that is the chief of the relevant section or branch of the Committee of State Security. Nevertheless, a number of insights are afforded to the outsider. In the first place, there are the underground works which have been smuggled to the West: works published under the pseudonyms A. Tertz, I. Ivanov, N. Arzak, as well as a number of anonymous verses[15]; poems and a philosophic treatise by A. Yesenin-Volpin, and a tale by M. Narits (Narymov), authors whose identity is known to us in contrast to the first group[16]; finally, certain unpublished manuscripts made accessible to the present writer. In the second place, the Soviet press itself in recent years has occasionally mentioned underground literature, offering some clues for analysis. What, then, are the characteristics of underground creative work?

First of all, it is its marked trend toward philosophical, political and esthetic radicalism—or more exactly radical skepticism and doubt—along with fundamental mistrust of all authorities. The writers of the underground reject the very fundamentals of the Soviet world outlook. For what reason? Not in the name of traditional liberal ideals of culture, civilization and the "good society"—and certainly not in the name, on the other hand, of traditional conservative conceptions of religion, of family, and of an "organic national life."[17] If one had to characterize the world outlook of the "undergrounders" in a single phrase, one could call it an affinity, realized or unrealized, with existentialism in the spirit of the "postwar" Sartre and Heidegger—although reducing it to such a common denominator coarsens and oversimplifies the complicated, delicate, and deeply individual ideas and moods that have been expressed. Let us look at some of the writers separately.

For A. Yesenin-Volpin, "only one objective is clear, an unreasonable objective—freedom!," which he interprets as "the possibility of choice, certainly not because it pleases us to choose (the necessity is sometimes frightening and almost always unpleasant!), but because we want to choose without compulsion." Quite consistently he takes arms against all monisms and all faiths—Christian, Communist, even faith in reason—as inescapably bound up with compulsion. But for Yesenin-Volpin the denial of faith in reason does not mean anti-intellectualism. "It is not necessary *to believe* in reason. For a thinking person it is sufficient to be reasonable," he writes. He is against faith and for free thought; yet nowhere does he show any inclination to join the hearty, sporting liberalism which views everything as a "competition of ideas" and proclaims "let the strongest win." He sees the social trend toward monism as inexorable, "with the exception, perhaps, of the latest Western and also Indian culture"; consequently, he perceives a permanent, tragic contradiction

[14] Reported by M. Tatu, "Le désir de progrès et d'air frais anime les jeunes soviétiqes," *Le Monde* (Paris), April 21, 1962. Indicative of the same spirit, a commentary by K. Demin in *Novyi mir*, No. 5, 1962, quotes an article by Lenin's wife, N. K. Krupskaya, in which she had advocated the publication of all works of literary value without regard to politics. Demin remarks that the article has never been included in any of her collected works or even mentioned in published bibliographies.

[15] A. Tertz, *On Socialist Realism*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1960; also *Fantasticheskiie povesti* (Fantastic Tales), Institut literacki, 1961. I. Ivanov, *Est-li zhizn na Marse?* (Is There Life on Mars?), Paris, Institut literacki, 1961. N. Arzak, *Govorit Moskva* (This is Moscow Speaking), to be published later this year by the Institut literacki. Anonymous verses published in English translation under the title, "Poems from the Underground," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May-June), 1961.

[16] A. Yesenin-Volpin, *A Leaf of Spring* (containing both his verses and his treatise), New York, F. A. Praeger, 1961. M. Naritsa (Narymov), "Neokonchennaia pesn" (The Unfinished Song) *Grani* (Frankfurt-am-Main), No. 48, 1961.

[17] The words "liberal" and "conservative" are used here not in the sense in which they are generally used in this article but in the traditional Western and Russian prerevolutionary sense.

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between freedom of thought and the demands of life. Not denying to others the right to side up with practical life, which "consists in the search for the useful," Yesenin-Volpin resolutely dedicates himself to "thinking which consists in the search for truth."[18]

A. Tertz is more nihilistic than Yesenin-Volpin. In his story, "The Trial Begins," all activities and ends—from revolution and political plotting to beauty and faithfulness—turn into a game, an empty but at the same time a tragic game because people cannot help playing it. Tertz is also against monisms, ideologies, and religions. They may begin with good premises, but in his opinion, in imposing themselves on life they all unavoidably use means which turn them into their own opposites and lead to tyranny. Indeed, "good premises" is a turn of speech to which he very likely would object. For—at least in "The Trial Begins"—Tertz treats everything in the world with equally profound irony, including "the freedom of original thinking" which Yesenin-Volpin respects.[19] According to Tertz, not only "ideological" but all other objectives are unattainable. There are no victories, only defeats. It is useless to rise in rebellion against this fundamental fact. The only answer to futile striving and inevitable defeat—if one is to avoid going insane—is all-embracing irony. Yet for some reason people do not see this and continue to bustle restlessly, without suspecting how ludicrous they are. In some of his other works Tertz excludes certain things from his all-absorbing irony: in *On Social Realism,* there is a new "phantasmagoric" art and in "Sleet" it is love. But on the whole, his outlook is a reflection of that irreversible collapse of hope into disillusionment brought about by Stalinism in Russia.

M. Narymov is an older writer of an entirely different mentality, a serious, stolid, heavyish and dullish epigone of traditional realism. Neither artistically nor philosophically does he set himself such ambitious tasks as do Tertz and Yesenin-Volpin. But in one sense he is just as radical as they. The main theme of his story is the overcoming by Soviet society of the belief in universal utopia. For Tertz and Yesenin-Volpin unbelief is a fact, something that goes without saying. The heroes of Narymov, on the contrary, move from belief to disbelief through personal suffering.

The same note of disbelief, painfully arrived at, resounds in the verses of an anonymous poet: "Horses eat oats and hay! /No, not true. A lie. Propaganda./ Everything is propaganda. The whole world is propaganda."[20] Here we can discern the difference in generations. The generation of Narymov and, as his verses make clear, of the anonymous poet started out believing "all slogans to the very end." The next generation, which took form during Stalinism, from the first regarded the world in the light of tragic irony. The youngest generation simply laughs at slogans and at the absurd life which grew out of them. The present writer has before him the unpublished verses of some very young Soviet poets. And though, as poets, they differ one from another, they are united by a Heine smile: everything "important" and tragic—from hypocrisy to deep personal humiliation, from spy-mania to space progress—is treated in these verses as farce. One of them writes: "Interplanetary ships/ engage the minds of the scholars./ As a patriot of the Earth,/ I am depressed by their scholarship . . . Interplanetary flyabouts/ will one fine day start off for the far away places./ They will be given food/ so they will not have to fly about hungry/ . . . And this fairy tale is what is called by a metallic sounding word, 'progress.' " On the entirely different subject of "American espionage," a favorite of the Soviet propagandists, another poet writes in ironic vein (after the U-2 affair): "When a spy is born in America/ in a lawyer's or politician's family,/ our border is awakened disturbed/ and the wind howls over it." There follows a long tongue-in-cheek description of the careful preparation the future spy receives from grade school onward, and of the parallel strengthening of Soviet border defenses. The poem ends with these words: "And when the time for diversion arrives/ he, faced with the fact of border fortification/ and having weighed all 'pro' and 'contra,'/ stays at home."

Political and Esthetic Trends

Thus, radical skepticism is the banner of underground literature. It is important to note that this attitude is not merely an affectation of a part of the literary elite but a reflection of a wider popular mood in the country. There are very many confirmations of this fact, but let us cite here only one—the words of L. Ilyichev, chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Divison of the CPSU Central Committee, who is responsible for the state of mind of the entire Union[21]: "A characteristic feature of a certain element among

[18] Yesenin-Volpin, *op. cit.* Quotations are from pp. 48, 134, 170, 146, and 138.

[19] Tertz, *Fantasticheskiie povesti,* pp. 176-77, 185 (and generally all episodes with Karlinsky in "The Trial Begins").

[20] From the poem titled "Propaganda," in "Poems from the Underground," *loc. cit.,* p. 6.

[21] L. Ilyichev, "Moshchny faktor stroitelstva kommunizma" (Mighty Factor of the Construction of Communism), *Kommunist,* No. 1 (January), 1962, p. 36.

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young people is skepticism . . . a skepticism which casts doubt on everything in the world."

Such radical skepticism in outlook as a rule is inseparably linked with political radicalism. This link has been expressed most precisely by Yesenin-Volpin: "There is a limit to impatience, and then one takes up either Voltaire or the bomb and axe." Yesenin-Volpin, who has been arrested and imprisoned on several occasions, writes that he has been consoled by the thought that if he was shot, at least he "would not be buried by mistake at the same cemetery with Communists."[22] In similar vein, Tertz writes: "Yes, we live under communism. It is no closer to our hopes than the Middle Ages were to the Christian ideal."[23] And in Saratov a certain L. Kraval has been accused of writing "malignant" verses—a term unfailingly used by Soviet propagandists in reference to direct attacks on the regime.[24]

As for esthetic attitudes, the underground literature is extremely intolerant of official dogma, and in most cases —though not always—is in the vanguard of literary thought and experimentation (a notable exception is Narymov). A. Tertz' critical treatise against socialist realism and his defense of "phantasmagoric art" is widely known. Less known is the widespread tendency toward *avante-garde* modes among the Soviet literary youth in general. The Soviet press—while revealing very little of a specific nature about the mood and content of works which it attacks—nevertheless makes clear that such works, especially by young writers, are as a rule irreconcilably in the vanguard and often for this very reason have not been published. We are told that complaints are directed against the demand "to write in imitation of Pushkin"[25] and also against "all these Tvardovskis and Svetlovs"[26]—that is, against the Soviet literary tradition. This apparently does not mean that the young *literati* put Pushkin on the same level with the fourth-grade versifier Svetlov. But they do resent being forced into the style of one *or* the other. They are attracted first of all by the linguistic experiments of Beli and Khlebnikov, and generally by Russian futurism, with its attention to sound as the basis of poetry; next by the symbolism of the "silver age"; and apparently too by the irony of Western surrealism.[27]

The New Moralism

In sum, underground literature is skeptical almost to the point of complete nihilism in the philosophical and political spheres, while in esthetics it is guided by principles which are wholly offensive to the Soviet conservatives (and indeed strange to other shades of artistic taste). Yet in one respect this literature is strict, traditional, and almost rigorous—and that is in the morals it preaches. The term "morals" has nothing to do with the relations between sexes. Here the underground writers—throwing a challenge to hypocritical Soviet Victorianism—are more than free and "modern." What they mean by "morals" has been best expressed by Yesenin-Volpin: "First of all, it is important to be honest. This means: not to lie and not to become a traitor. Sometimes this demands courage, which one must possess. The rest will be given." Sensing that these words do not quite jibe with the rest of his philosophy, he justifies himself: "I am against moralist norms perceived as dogmas—whatever they may consist of. But there are natural norms, a groundless deviation

[22] Yesenin-Volpin, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 and 74.
[23] Tertz, *On Socialist Realism*, p. 39.
[24] V. Khmara, "Pisma iz Saratovskovo Universiteta" (Letters from Saratov University), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, May 18 and 19, 1962.
[25] See, *e.g.*, V. Nikonov, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 25, 1957.
[26] A. Yelkin, "Kubarem s Parnasa" (Headlong from Parnassus), *Komsomolskaia pravda*, January 14, 1962.
[27] See Nikonov, *op. cit.*; Ozerov, *op. cit.*; and Yu. Ivashchenko, "Bezdelniki karabkaiutsia na Parnas" (The Loafers are Clambering over Parnassus), *Izvestia*, Sept. 2, 1960.

A Leaf of Spring

A leaf of spring, the gift of foul weather,
Burst, spinning wildly, through a prison window . . .
Was it not I who once affirmed that nature
Need live no longer than a day or two? . . .
Was it not I who once declared I wished
To love and live with novelty my urge?
Did I not once maintain I wished to suffer,
Having no use for all the flowering of spring?
. . . One day a cornflower fell into my hands;
I raised it to my nose, yet smelled no fragrance;
But then it dropped and agonizedly grew still,
Like some young girl that's murdered in the bushes . . .
Now I feel sorry for that flower! Its shame
And trouble are the very same I feel;
And here, in prison, I have grasped the awe
Men sense when faced with nature plain and simple!
But I'll prove cunning—and, when free again,
I'll trample down and tear the blissful flowers!
And I shall laugh and laugh again, because
Pain is the only beauty that I know.

August 22, 1950.

—From *A Leaf of Spring*—a collection of poems by Aleksander S. Yesenin-Volpin (now imprisoned), New York, F. Praeger, 1961, p. 69.

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from which makes me more or less revolt."[28] The moralism of Yesenin-Volpin may not seem to follow logically from his philosophy, but is nevertheless intimately related to it. For both are reactions to Stalinism: his philosophy reflects the downfall of idealism and the degradation of thought under Stalin; his moralism revolts against the substitution for personal morals of devotion to the state, with the ensuing orgy of treachery, the denunciation of parents by children and of children by parents, *etc.*[29]

We should ponder the striking words, "The rest will be given." Certainly the implication is that Yesenin-Volpin's verses and "The Treatise" are "the given"—*i.e.,* the moral revolt is the moving power of his work. Yesenin-Volpin is not alone in this passionate emphasis on honesty. The main basis of the irony in Tertz' works, "The Trial Begins" and *On Socialist Realism,* is the contrast between habitual false slogans on one hand and the reality of life and art on the other. Again, in the collection of anonymous verses published in *Problems of Communism,* about half are variations on the theme of truth and its betrayal. Typical is a poem addressed to "men of reason and scholars," which ends:

> **You have no reason to walk with a proud smile**
> **You who were repeatedly bought for a medal.**
> **What have you to say about wisdom and reason,**
> **You have repeatedly sold yourself for a phrase.**
>
> **I have been in various circumstances,**
> **But the immortal soul can be seen**
> **Only in the smile of a child**
> **Weak, and free from treachery.**[30]

The need to lie every minute, every hour, every day, the constant atmosphere of pretense—this more than anything else oppresses and amazes foreigners who get a first-hand view of Soviet life.[31] The people's self-defense against the corruption of lies is skepticism—a skepticism that is profound in the underground literature. Under Soviet conditions—and perhaps generally in the contemporary world—skepticism does not contradict moralism; on the contrary, it is a natural form of moralizing. In what other way can one think with honor and conscience, when the barbarism of history and the falsity of propaganda have ground into dust ideals that appeared so significant in the pre-totalitarian and pre-hydrogen age?

Such—in general outlines and to the extent we can tell from limited information—is the nature of underground literature. There remains the question of how and to what extent it reaches the public under Soviet conditions.

Problems of Communication

In Stalin's time the only means of disseminating what could not be published was passing about hand-copied works or reading them aloud in small circles of trusted friends. Participation in such activities, not to mention illegal authorship, was hazardous. Under the notorious Article 58 (Section 10) of the Criminal Code, punishment for illegal literature (equated with anti-Soviet propaganda) ranged from three months' imprisonment all the way to the death sentence under certain conditions. As earlier noted, Yesenin-Volpin was imprisoned under this law in 1949—"mainly," he writes, "for the verses 'I never took hold of a plough . . .' and 'The Raven' . . . . [about which] reports were sent to the state security organs."[32] The fear that dogged many people—even after Stalin's death—is illustrated by an incident the present writer recollects in 1954: an aged poet and translator, A. Lipskerov (now deceased), nearly went into hysterics from fright when young people who had gathered at his house, including the author, began to read aloud verses of an unorthodox though not directly political nature. Yet in spite of dangers, even in Stalin's time an amazing amount of work changed hands—mainly verses that could be written on a few short pages for surreptitious circulation among friends. Sometimes, too, copies were simply left on tables in places like the Lenin Library—on the off-chance that someone would pick them up. Only an insignificant number of them penetrated to the West.

The end of mass terror has considerably eased the conditions of existence for underground literature. Now it is comprised not only of verses but of fairly lengthy prose manuscripts, often though not always directly political in content. Dissemination is much freer, both in written and oral form; copied works are passed from group to group as well as from person to person. Not satisfied with this, literary people—especially the youth—search for new ways of evading censorship to reach the reader. Two means which have been used are wall newspapers and handwritten or typewritten journals.

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[28] Yesenin-Volpin, *op. cit.,* p. 164.

[29] The disintegrating influence of treachery on family relations and human relations generally is shown, for instance, in N. Ivanter's novel *Snova Avgust* (August Again), in *Novyi mir,* Nos. 8 and 9, 1959.

[30] From "Poem II" in "Poems from the Underground," *loc, cit.,* pp. 2-3.

[31] See, *e.g.,* S. Belfridge, *A Room in Moscow,* New York, Reynals & Co., 1958.

[32] Yesenin-Volpin, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

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The wall newspapers are semi-official organs produced under the aegis of local party and Komsomol bureaus, and especially prevalent in educational institutions. Despite party tutelage, "liberals" often find their way onto the editorial boards, for writers among the youth are as a rule liberals, and writers are, of course, needed for newspapers. As a result, editions suddenly appear on the walls containing sharply satirical sketches, articles on art expressing "unaccepted" views, or "pessimistic" and *avante-garde* poems and stories. An example of such papers is a literary sheet published for the Philological Faculty of Moscow University with the characteristic name, *Under the Headlights and in the Dark*. Another example is *Tribuna*, a paper with more of a political slant.[33] Such wall newspapers do not remain posted for long: within a few minutes or at most a few hours they are brought to the attention of the party bureau, and a representative quickly repairs to the scene to remove the seditious material. But news of a "sensational" edition travels fast, and as many students as possible gather around to read it. After such an episode the editors of the paper are removed and, along with the offending authors, receive an official reprimand. Then new editors are appointed—and after a few months the whold process starts over again.

Handwritten journals, in contrast to the wall newspapers, are entirely illegal organs. They were first officially reported about 1956, when *Komsomolskaia pravda* attacked a sheet called *Heresy* as a "rag full of clumsy imitations of the worst models of decadent literature."[34] In recent years the best-known has been a Leningrad literary journal with the markedly "formalistic" (*i.e.*, modernist) title of *Syntax*. This typewritten journal (rotary presses are prohibited for private use) was published, in the words of *Izvestia*, "not in two or three copies, but . . . for a very large circle of readers." In tone it was avant-gardist in the futuristic tradition. If we are to believe *Izvestia*, its chief characteristic was "subversion" and sharp criticism not only of the "die-hards" of Stalinism but of writers cautiously liberal in politics yet also staunchly conservative in art (such as Tvardovski and Simonov). The writers for *Syntax*, young and for the most part completely unknown, preached verbal experiment on the one hand, and implacable truth in facing life on the other, including "the description of every kind of dirt and filth."[35]

Among a few contributors to *Syntax* with some standing was the first wife of Ye. Yevtushenko, the poet B. Akhmadullina. Akhmadullina is of course not an "official" poet, but she is tolerated by the authorities. Her poems are sometimes published in the more liberal established journals, and this year her first book is finally coming out. At present she is enjoying exceptional popularity and gives readings from her poetry up to 250 times a year.[36]

In *Syntax* Akhmadullina apparently published something which could not "pass" in the censored press. Her case shows that writers cannot be divided strictly into underground and approved camps: the same writer can indulge at once in illegal and upon literary production. As far as we know, if contributors to underground journals refrain from writings which are "criminal" in a direct political sensee, they are not at present likely to suffer criminal penalties—though they are subjected to pressure from the Komsomol and the party. It is quite a different story for organizers. The editor-in-chief of *Syntax*, Alexander Ginzburg, for example, was sentenced to prison on the charge of "forging a graduation certificate."

Though perhaps the best known, *Syntax* is by no means the only journal which has attempted to carry uncensored literature beyond a small circle of friends to a wider public. The Soviet press has repeatedly mentioned publications of a similar nature.[37]

Protests in the Open

As for the oral dissemination of forbidden literature, prose, as before, remains within the confines of friendly circles, but during the past two or three years poetry has been trying to reach the public. The fact that Moscow poets have ventured public readings of their own verses at Mayakovski's monument has already received wide comment in the non-Communist world. But verse-reading in public is not merely a Moscow-Leningrad manifestation. It has become an all-Russian and mass phenomenon. Even in such provincial cities as Tambov and Saratov, for example, poetry meetings are held under the open sky.[38] In Tambov (population 170,000) over 200 people turned up to listen to the verses of a local poet, Gogin; there was, of course, no public announcement of his appearance but apparently word-of-mouth news of the meeting was enough to draw a crowd attracted by the free and unhampered expression of poetic feeling. As far as can be judged from

[33] *Trud*, January 8, 1957.
[34] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Dec. 28, 1956.
[35] Ivashchenko, *op. cit.*
[36] "Pop Poet," *The Guardian* (Manchester), May 10, 1962.
[37] One of the latest is mentioned in Yelkin, *op. cit.*
[38] See *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Oct. 1, 1961; and V. Khmara, *op. cit.*

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An Official Comment on Unofficial Poetry

Once we happened to witness a tumultuous scene. A group of teenagers was hissing at a young man with a goatee who, gesticulating with his hands, was reading something with a hoarse voice in front of the Mayakovski memorial.

Jeered by the passers-by, the goatee quickly withdrew from the scene exclaiming pathetically:

"Where is progress? Where is justice? . . ."

When an idler, a vulgarian or a Phillistine has his beloved corn stepped on, he immediately raises a heart-rending cry about equality and progress. Such cries, expressed in talentless verses and spiced with large doses of pornography, are dished up by these people as kind of a political program all their own. Komsomol members from the "Hammer and Sickle" plant who happened to be passing by the Mayakovski memorial when the reading of these foul rhymes was going on, denied the preachers of "complicated nothingness" the right to be the only proponents of truth, beauty, and progress. Hissed by Komsomols and passers-by alike, the latter had to take off in a hurry. A workingman has a sharp scent. The boys from the plant realized at once that they were offered the filthy moral of a swamp. Deprived of a podium, the self-proclaimed poets and their buddies began unpacking, palming off and distributing their verses and other nonsense in the hope that some illiterate would swallow the bait. . . .

. . . A swamp has its own smell no matter where it is. It isn't surprising that the aforementioned "progressives" are being used by various sorts of malicious renegades. Such was the birth—unlike that of Aphrodite from the sea foam—of one U. Galanskov who was straining to play the part of a "theoretician". He himself didn't do any reading of the poems and recruited, for this purpose, some thoughtless fools obsessed with a mania for glory. Galanskov slandered our people and attempted to corrupt the inexperienced spiritually. It is very significant that such pitiful simpletons, afraid to come out into the open, are clambering over the ash cans in the back-yards of life.

This scum of society is not worth mentioning but the downfall of these people serves as a warning: wherever, instead of deep-rooted convictions and clear-cut ideals, one finds spiritual slush, mold is bound to appear. And the mold we have in mind is far from harmless.

—From "Tumbling Down from Parnassus," by A. Yelkin, Komsomolskaia pravda, January 14, 1962.

excerpts in the newspapers, that which is read in public does not differ in tone from that which is printed in underground journals. The verses are often experimental in form and always critically challenging in content, both with respect to the world and with respect to self. "Life! Your mien does not please me, though I am just a beast of genius!" a poet exclaims.[39] "The Lord will meet us at the gate and say: "Ta-ta-ta! To what extent the filthy rabble has taken root on earth," cries another.[40]

One can imagine how the party authorities and the official press react. The poetry meetings are forcibly dispersed by the "people's militia" and by special groups of activists sent to express the indignation of "ordinary people."[41] Poets are excluded from the Komsomol and from higher educational institutions for "not understanding the problems facing Soviet youth during the building of communism."[42] Attacks in the press are vehement, as suggested by such titles as "Headlong from Parnassus," "The Loafers are Clambering over Parnassus," *etc.*[43] The press tries to represent poets, especially those who lead a Bohemian life, as "parasites"—that is, social undesirables who under the latest "anti-parasitic" law of May 5, 1961, can be sentenced by administrative order to compulsory residence and manual labor at remote places for two to five years. Recently some poets have been attacked in terms verging close to accusations of "crimes against the state" (defined in new laws replacing the aforementioned Article 58). For example, *Komsomolskaia pravda* writes: "V. Nosov spewed contemptuously when he spoke of what is sacred to us. V. Bukovski spread gossip from the anti-Soviet foreign press. Yu. Galanskov slandered our people and tried to corrupt the inexperienced spiritually" (see box, p. 12).[44]

So far, however, severe penalties have not been common—and by the same token, so far the authorities have not been able to suppress poetry demonstrations completely. Continuing violations are explained in part by the fact that in the absence of mass terror, the "offender" adopts the risk psychology, "I won't be a victim." They are also explained by the fact that oppositionists like Ye. Yevtushenko and A. Voznesenski, who are tolerated and at the same time very popular, stand up for their underground colleagues—sometimes openly,[45]

[39] Quoted in Yelkin, *op. cit.*

[40] Quoted in Ivashchenko, *op. cit.*

[41] See A. Voznesenski, "My-Mai" (We Are May), *Literaturnaia gazeta,* May 1, 1962; also Yelkin, *op. cit.*

[42] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* Oct. 1, 1961.

[43] Respective titles of Yelkin, *op. cit.* and Ivashchenko, *op. cit.*

[44] Yelkin, *ibid.*

[45] See Voznesenski, *op. cit.*

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but more often behind the scenes. This sponsorship springs partly from a feeling of solidarity but also out of tactical considerations: for the existence of an illegal left protects the "legal opposition" from becoming the most exposed flank and allows it to maneuver more freely. The "law-abiding elements" themselves sometimes introduce underground literature in such officially organized gatherings as the "Day of Poetry," taking the dais to read forbidden works or passages which have been censored out of published works. For example, Yevtushenko on several occasions has read hitherto unpublished lines from "Babi Yar," his famous poem against anti-Semitism.[46]

It is easier to do this, of course, when a real underground exists which one can point to as extremist, representing oneself as being moderate. Here the difference between underground and open literature seems indistinct. But it does exist, and the borderline is basically rather well defined: the tolerated oppositionists are not merely a more tactful and successful variety of "undergrounders." In order to see exactly what constitutes the dividing line, it will be necessary to examine the literature now considered "legal" in the Soviet Union—to be the subject of discussion in the second part of this article.

[46] Reported by Peter Viereck, "The Split Personality of Soviet Literature," *The Reporter* (New York), March 5, 1962.

Some Biographic Notes

AKHMATOVA, ANNA (1888-), a lyrical poet, largely concerned with personal love. Founded, together with her late husband, the poet Nikolay Gumilev, the anti-symbolist Acmeist movement in 1912. Attacked by Zhdanov in 1946, she was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers and lost her right to publish. Now publishing again.

ALIGER, MARGARITA (1915-), a Soviet poet; popular both for her lyrical verse and longer poems dealing with various aspects of Soviet life.

ANNENSKI, INNOKENTI (1856-1909), a classical scholar and lyrical poet who influenced both Gumilev and Akhmatova.

BABEL, ISAAK (1894-1938?), one of the most talented short story writers of the early Soviet period. During the Civil War he joined the Bolsheviks and served as a political commissar in the Red Army. He disappeared in the Great Purge and was reportedly executed in 1938.

BAGRISTSKI, EDUARD (1895-1934), a Soviet poet formally continuing the sensual and "simple" tradition of the Acmeists and vacillating in his themes between glorification of the Revolution and idealization of the anarchic freedom of a lonely wanderer. Also translated Burns and Scott into Russian.

BELINSKI, VISSARION (1811-1848), a leading literary critic and political thinker. As a critic, he demanded that literature be practical, progressive in social tendency and natural in expression; his influence on the development of Russian criticism has found its expression in the now traditional heavy emphasis on moral, social and political values at the expense of esthetic standards. As a political thinker Belinski evolved from a conservative Hegelian who accepted tsarist absolutism into a Utopian Socialist with a faith in human progress.

BELI, ANDREI (1880-1934), a leading Russian symbolist poet and writer. At first greeted the 1917 Revolution as an ordeal which would nevertheless purify Russia, but then rejected Bolshevism and began to hope for a mystical rebirth of Russian spiritual culture. Emigrated in 1921, but returned to the USSR in 1923 to stay until his death.

BLOK, ALEXANDER (1880-1921), probably the greatest symbolist Russian poet; his powerful poem "The Twelve," celebrated the Bolshevik Revolution in mystical Christian terms.

CHERNYSHEVSKI, NIKOLAI (1829-1889), a leading political thinker and critic. Arrested as a radical leader in 1862, he was exiled to Siberia where he stayed for 20 years. As a critic, Chernyshevski was a follower of Belinski, but even less interested in esthetic values. Art to him was merely a reproduction of reality and literature could find justification only to the extent that it manifested a progressive social tendency. Materialist and positivist in philosophy and socialist in his politics, Chernyshevski was a forerunner of the radical Populist movement.

GUMILEV, NIKOLAI (1886-1921), poet and principal founder of Acmeist movement which emphasized a sensual perception of the world and was strongly influenced by Nietzscheanism. His poetry is striking for its cult of adventure and heroism, and for its description of exotic lands, mainly Ethiopia and Somaliland, where the poet had traveled. Openly anti-Bolshevik after the Revolution, Gumilev was arrested in 1921 for alleged (and never proven) complicity in an anti-Soviet conspiracy and executed.

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ILF, ILYA (1897-1937) and Petrov, Yevgeni (1903-1942), formed a literary partnership in 1927 and in the succeeding ten years produced several humorous books with much satirical comment on Soviet life. Their principal works are *Twelve Chairs* (1928) and its sequel, *The Little Golden Calf* (1931). Petrov was killed in the siege of Sevastopol in 1942.

KHLEBNIKOV, VIKTOR (Velemir) (1885-1922), poet and principal founder of Russion Futurism. He sought to reform the lexicon of poetry by creating his own poetic vocabulary. A mystic with Slavophile leanings, Khlebnikov dreamed of a pan-Russian culture free of Western elements.

LEONOV, LEONID (1899-), a leading Soviet novelist and playwright. He served in the Red Army during the Civil War, began writing poetry in the 1920's, but soon switched to prose. Deeply influenced by Dostoevski, he is best known for his novel *The Thief* (1927).

MANDELSTAMM, OSSIP (1892-1940), a poet and occasional prose writer who early in his career was associated with Acmeism. Laconic and classical in style and imagery, he imbued his verses with a mood of pessimism and cool detachment. Mandelstamm was deported in the early 1930's to a Soviet concentration camp, where he perished several years later.

MAYAKOVSKI, VLADIMIR (1893-1930), perhaps the most prominent poet of the Bolshevik Revolution and satirical playwright, joined the Futurist movement before World War I, called for a wholesale rejection of the old culture, and gave himself heart and soul to the Bolshevik cause. His muscular, loud, rhythmical poetry was to serve the Revolution. In the later 1920's Mayakovski became disillusioned with various aspects of Soviet life and his poetry became the target of frequent attacks by the more orthodox Communist critics. He committed suicide in April 1930.

PANFYOROV, FYODOR (1896-1961), Soviet novelist and playwright, known best for his long novel *Whetstones* (*Bruski*, 1928-1937), which spans the early and Stalinist periods of peasant life in Russia.

PILNYAK, BORIS (1894-1938?), a novelist of the 1920's and early 1930's, whose style (later dubbed "formalistic") and frequently subject matter brought him into trouble with the authorities. Arrested in 1938, he disappeared forever in a concentration camp.

TIKHONOV, NIKOLAI (1896-), a poet and novelist whose forceful verse full of baroque imagery was one of the great discoveries of the Russian 1920's. *Gleichgeschaltet* by Stalin, he has not written anything to match his early work for the last thirty years.

TRETIAKOV, SERGEY (1892-1937?), poet and playwright, was one of the leading Futurists after the Revolution and a theoretician of its organization, LEF. He perished during the purges of the 1930's.

TSVETAEVA, MARINA (1892-1941), a poet whose verses are distinguished by their verve, spontaneity, and complex sound effects. Emigrated in 1922, returned to the Soviet Union in 1939, and two years later committed suicide. She was a powerful influence on many Russian poets.

VESELY, ARTIOM (1899-1938?), a novelist who was fascinated with the bleak and destructive aspects of war, and whose ornamental style is very similar to Pilnyak's. Largely known for his *Russia Washed with Blood* (1927-28) and *Guliay-Volga* (*The Sporting Volga*, 1934).

YESENIN, SERGEI (1895-1925), a leading poet whose love of the Russian soil and the village way of life at first made him welcome the Revolution, in the hope that it would usher in a better life for the peasantry. Disillusioned by Soviet industrialization and proletarianization, he became progressively more bitter and turbulent, in his poetry as well as in his personal life, finally committing suicide in 1925. His works, popular with the masses, were denounced by the authorities for their rejection of the Bolshevik Revolution and their ostensible partiality to the "kulaks" (*i.e.*, well-to-do peasants).

ZAMIATIN, EVGENI (1884-1937), a unique and interesting novelist, one of the leaders of the Serapion Brothers, an organization of writers in the 1920's who opposed Communist regimentation and demanded more variety and independence in Soviet literature. His most famous novel, *We* (1924), a satire on a utopian totalitarian state (a forerunner of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *1984*), was not allowed to be published in the Soviet Union, but appeared in several languages in Europe, thus provoking the full wrath of the authorities. In 1931, Zamiatin was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for France, where he died six years later.

ZOSHCHENKO, MIKHAIL (1895-1958), a leading writer whose satirical stories are usually written in the vernacular of the "new" Soviet citizen. One of the most popular Soviet writers in the 1920's and 1930's, he was subjected to increasing public criticism, until in 1946 he was attacked together with Akhmatova by A. A. Zhdanov and expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers. He then lived in relative obscurity until his death.

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Literature in Ulbricht's Germany

By Peter Demetz

THE LITERARY LANDSCAPE of Ulbricht's Germany belongs to those uncharted regions which, on old geographical maps, used to be marked by the suggestive legend *hic sunt leones*—"here are lions." Our knowledge of intellectual life in this protestant country of steel mills and potato fields is a little more than fragmentary. Though nearly everybody seems to be aware of the dead lion Bertold Brecht, and a few have heard of the involvement of Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch in the political affairs of the German Democratic Republic, we evidently do not know much more.

This is a curious paradox because Ulbricht's Germany is, among the Soviet dependencies, the most easily accessible to our view. The widespread study of German makes the language barrier much less of a problem in research than is the case, say, regarding Albania. Moreover, inquisitive West German writers keep a close eye on developments affecting their East German colleagues, with whom they once shared publishers and Berlin *grisettes*. The constant flow of refugees until recently has also provided us with a surprising richness of data and insights.

It could be objected that literary life in Communist Germany offers too drab a spectacle to excite curiosity because its development so closely follows the Soviet temperature curve—the Stalinist winter, followed by the "thaw," followed by the new blasts of cold air since 1957—or because after Bertolt Brecht died (1956) no independent or interesting voices were heard. In the present writer's view, however, these are opinions derived from insufficient, or rather *unused,* information: In East Germany, without any doubt, a number of talents developed outside and beyond Brecht's sphere of influence; and it should certainly be a matter of some political interest that the literary trends of the GDR, despite much sterile output, reflect on close view the impact of the overpowering presence of the West German neighbor. Exuberant West German literary life is a constant challenge that both fascinates East German functionaries and writers and fills them with dread. Neither the Czechs nor the Hungarians have to compete with a rich literature in their own language and in their own tradition *next door*—geography has reserved this uneasy fate for the East Germans.

Early Postwar Hopes

For many German intellectuals, the spring of 1945 ushered in a period of great expectations. The Soviet army and the German Communist administrators returning from exile did nothing to discourage these hopes; for about four years (1945-49) it appeared that everybody was cooperating in an effort to revive the experimental art that had flourished brilliantly in the Weimar Republic.

On July 7, 1945, the *Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands* (Cultural Union for the Democratic Reconstruction of Germany) was established in the Soviet zone. Its declared purpose was "to gather all constructive forces in the cultural field" in one body, an aim which non-Communist as well as Communist intellectuals eagerly supported (if for different reasons). True, the new president of the *Kulturbund*—the writer Johannes R. Becher (born 1891)—was a Communist, but any doubts on this score were mitigated by Becher's well-remembered reputation as the boldest of the expressionist visionaries and experimentators of the early

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1920's; moreover, the incipient activities of the *Kulturbund* were praised by old Gerhart Hauptmann, and directed in Thuringia by Frau Ricarda Huch, a venerable humanist in the German idealist tradition. The latitude of tastes and the literary possibilities of the new cultural organization were clearly reflected in the pages of the *Aufbau* (Construction), its official periodical and one of the first literary magazines of liberated Germany: along with contributions by famous Communist critics such as the Hungarian Georg Lukács, there appeared essays by Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Paul Valéry, Hermann Broch, and Virginia Woolf; the art of James Joyce was interpreted to his new readers; and occasionally, to satisfy the insatiable German intellectuals, questions were discussed that were taboo in the Soviet Union, *e.g.,* the theatrical achievements of Alexander Tairov.

Not until 1948 did the term Socialist Realism emerge for the first time: it was introduced not by the Communists but rather by liberal skeptics, who put the question of Soviet cultural policy squarely before the party's functionaries. After a visit of Soviet poets in Berlin, the German writer August Scholtis complained in the U.S.-edited *Tagesspiegel* (Daily Mirror) that the Russian visitors were curiously unwilling to discuss the prevailing Soviet doctrine of esthetics. The official answer of the Communists was, in the Soviet-edited *Tägliche Rundschau* (Daily Survey) as well as in *Aufbau,* quiet and restrained;[1] it still seemed more important to the functionaries of the *Kulturbund* to discuss T. S. Eliot's new play than to expound on matters of doctrinal relevance at the wrong time. Perhaps it was rather easy (a few years after the armistice) to create a never-never land of intellectual catholicity, in which half the people pretended that they had forgotten about Socialist Realism while the other half never had a chance to hear about it.

Very few people inside Germany could know that during the war the exiled German Communist writers had fervently discussed the implications of Socialist Realism doctrine and that their ranks were almost split by opposing factions: only exiles would be aware that in 1939 the novelist Anna Seghers had raised her voice in protest against the attempt (made by Georg Lukács) to beat the exiled leftist writers into "realistic" submission; and hardly anybody inside Germany would remember that even Bertolt Brecht sided on this memorable occasion *with* Anna Seghers, *against* Georg Lukács, and defended a non-realist art of the left (including his own) in an incisive essay *Von der Weite und Vielfalt der realistischen Schreibweise* (Latitude and Variety of Realism). Within postwar Germany it was almost impossible to believe that any kind of realism could become a literary or political issue. Hitler had demanded of the German writers and artists a *Biedermeier* realism of blue eyes and blond braids; it seemed unthinkable that the returning enemies of Hitler were intent upon reviving a despised and absolete concept of art.

The Shackling of Culture

That, however, was precisely their intention. While permitting the discussion of Valéry and Eliot, the administration of the Soviet zone was making its own preparations for the eventual tightening of the screw on culture. Lt. Col. Dymshic, an unusually erudite Soviet army officer in charge of cultural affairs, saw to it that the non-Communist intellectuals were kept busy discussing the expressionist paintings of Carl Hofer (and sipping *real* coffee) in the Soviet-instituted *Club der Kulturschaffenden* (Cultural Club)—and at the same time made sure that they were firmly excluded from the key administrative positions in the press, the theater, and the schools.[2] The political machinery was soon in the hands of those who knew what inevitably was to come.

The transformation of the Soviet zone into a "German Democratic Republic" on October 7, 1949, put an end to tactical tolerance: as Soviet policy became more hostilely anti-Western, so in the cultural sphere the vestiges of "decadent bourgeois" culture came under attack. Early in 1950, the topic of Socialist Realism began to fill the papers and to dominate discussion in the cultural organizations. "We have not been able to stress the essential implications of the question, the functionaries complained;[3] the Soviet theory of literature should be studied as *quickly as possible* to overcome the deplorable isolation of the East German intellectuals. In the spring of 1951, the Central Committee of the SED adopted the expected resolution "Against Formalism, For a Progressive German Art" (March 15-17):[4] Socialist Realism was proclaimed the doctrine binding for all artists and writers, and a State Commission for Affairs of Art was instituted to control intellectual production (this much-hated body has re-

[1] Cf. *Aufbau* (East Berlin), Vol. 3 (1948), pp. 84-87.

[2] For an interesting personal account of this period see Lothar von Balluseck, *Kultura: Kunst und Literatur in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (Kultura: Art and Literature in the Soviet Occupation Zone), Köln, Weisse Bücher, 1952.

[3] *Aufbau,* Vol. 5 (1950), p. 11.

[4] Full text in *Einheit* (East Berlin), Vol. 6 (1961), pp. 579-92.

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mained in operation since, except for a short period during the "thaw"). The change of line was accompanied by a shift in administrative personnel. Johannes R. Becher now had ample time to devote to his diaries [5] and to complain about the bureaucrats persecuting true poets, while control over decisions concerning cultural policies passed to the hands of the organization-men—Wilhelm Girnus (b. 1906), Alexander Abusch (b. 1902), and Fritz Erpenbeck (b. 1897).[6] It was a time dangerous even to Bertolt Brecht, who had thought he could rely on the fruitful bargain he struck with the regime when he returned from Hollywood and Zurich to East Berlin in 1948 (on which more later). Brecht's productions were totally ignored or attacked as formalist; he had to rewrite his opera *Das Verhör des Lucullus* according to the demands of the administration; and his *Herrenburg Report* (a trashy anti-Adenauer cantata which should be prescribed reading for uncritical American Brecht enthusiasts) was a further humiliating price he had to pay for survival.

The dialectic of the situation, however, made it impossible for the regime to pursue its demands to the bitter end. West German intellectuals still had to be wooed and influenced; the regime had to arrange "shop-windows" and maintain some reserves of experimental art attractive to Western visitors. Thus, Brecht's *Theater am Kurfürstendamm* continued to function as an exhibition piece, though his plays were ignored by the other theaters of the Republic. The *Kulturbund,* originally established as a kind of all-German popular front organization, lost its importance, but a new German Academy of august, non-political scholars was founded to keep the lines of communication open to West German universities. Peter Huchel (b. 1903), one of Germany's most gifted poets, was asked to edit the literary magazine *Sinn und Form* (Meaning and Form), which continued to publish—mainly for West German consumption—European writing of the highest quality throughout the Stalinist "winter."

[5] Becher, *Auf andere Art so grosse Hoffnung* (A Hope So Great but of a Different Kind), Berlin, Aufbau Verlag, 1952.

[6] Biographies of the more important personalities are provided in Lothar von Balluseck, *Dichter im Dienst; Sozialistischer Realismus in der deutschen Literatur* (The Poet in Service: Socialist Realism in German Literature), Wiesbaden, Limes, 1956; and *Schriftsteller der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Writers in the German Democratic Republic), Leipzig, Verlag für Buch und Bibliothekswesen, 1961.

Isms: Some Differences of Opinion

FORMALISM. . .

All trends and concepts of art which separate art from life and aim at abstraction actively support the imperialists. Formalist art does not convey any knowledge of reality, isolates art from the people, leads to abstraction and thus objectively serves imperialism.

—From the resolution Against Formalism: For a Progressive German Culture *(March 1951).*

SCHEMATISM. . .

. . . is one of the most important shortcomings of our literature. Schematism . . . that means to consider the teachings and the directives *(Anweisungen)* of our party as if they were dogmatic concepts that are to be precisely followed in art. . . . Instead of thoroughly studying reality, the writer proceeds in reverse: he tires to find, within reality, those parts and principles that seem useful for an illustration of the inevitable dogma. He thinks: If I work that way nothing can happen to me. . . . This scholastic way of writing is poisonous even if it pretends to be super-Marxist . . . for it causes ossification instead of motion, laziness instead of initiative.

—From a speech by Anna Seghers at the Fourth Writers' Congress, Berlin 1956.

Advent of a New Spirit

This winter lingered on somewhat longer in the GDR than in the rest of the Soviet bloc. The East German workers' rising on June 13, 1953 may have been responsible, for it severely shook the East German administration and kept it on its guard. The Communist writers, however, were deeply disturbed when they discovered the extent to which working men had become estranged from the intellectuals. The Writers' Union building was in fact a target of attack when the workers took to the streets; the members had to barricade themselves inside, and at least one of them, the writer Stephan Heym (who had just arrived in the East from the United States) was beaten up by the insurgents.[7]

Slowly, however, the signs of "thaw" emerged. By early 1955, East German intellectuals were astir, and philosophers as well as writers began to formulate new ideas and demands. The philosopher Ernst Bloch (who had migrated from the West in 1948) and his many talented disciples at the University of Leipzig formed

[7] Cf. Jürgen Rühle's important if highly personal *Literatur und Revolution* (Literature and Revolution), Köln, Kiepenheuer, 1960, p. 306.

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one of the cores of resistance against orthodoxy. Bloch's Marxist but highly poetic anthropology impressed young intellectuals both by its wide horizon and its powerful prophetic language. His three lectures in East Berlin in 1955, "Differentiation of the Concept of Progress," "Freedom and Truth," and "Hegel and the Power of the System," articulated general restlessness in half-veiled terms. Soon the University's philosophical journal, the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* became the outlet for several brilliant if groping attempts of the younger generation to combine Marxism, existentialist ideas and the heritage of philosophical phenomenology.

The growing resistance of the poets and writers was reflected in the *Berliner Zeitung* and, often, in the editorials of *Neue Deutsche Literatur,* the monthly of the Writers' Union. At first, the writers hid behind quotations from Ilya Ehrenburg; later, issues were raised more directly and openly. Among the first to voice his protest forcefully and without Hegelian circumscriptions was the painter Fritz Cremer. In a published commentary he declared:

The artist is being confused and terrorized by the absolute power of demands and concepts like that of *Parteilichkeit* [party-consciousness]. To take sides against the war, the artist, damn it *[verflucht noch mal]*, does not have to be a socialist realist.[8]

The question of the respective merits of craftsmanship and ideology came to be widely discussed. While Wilhelm Girnus, as the party's spokesman, continued to defend the necessity of *Parteilichkeit,* he was for the first time openly contradicted. One challenger was Walter Victor, well known for his studies of Heine, who declared that *Meisterschaft* (mastery of language) was of transcendent importance.[9] In October 1955 the central committee of the SED made a half-hearted attempt to call the restive writers to order, but it was too late—the writers were busily organizing their own congress as a demonstration of independence and hope.

A Victory for the Intellectuals

The Fourth Writers' Congress in East Berlin (January 10-14, 1956) constituted a brief moment of glory that united the pre-Stalinist party functionaries and the intellectuals of the post-Stalinist generation against the oppressive restrictions of the Socialist Realist doctrine. It was not, as has been suggested, a demonstration of friends of representative democracy against communism; the most vigorous voices of protest raised were those of aging pre-Stalinist party members who well remembered the Bolshevik *avant-garde* and its brilliant achievements, ignored and destroyed by Stalin and Zhdanov.

The first to express his disgust with the administration of cultural matters was Willy Bredel (b. 1901), who had been a party man all his life: among past roles, he had been a member of the *Spartacus* (1917), one of the organizers of the Hamburg workers' revolt (1923), and a prominent functionary in the "Union of German Proletarian Writers," the German organization most closely corresponding to the RAPP in Soviet Russia. Bredel was immediately challenged by Wilhelm Girnus in such a vindictive manner that the writers present were infuriated and forced the party to apologize for Girnus' ill manners. "Girnus," an official commentator remarked, "made a mistake to answer condescendingly and to make his discussion partner [Bredel] ideologically suspect." [10]

The mood of the younger writers was echoed by such established though different voices as Anna Seghers and Georg Lukács, the grand old man of Communist esthetics. Frau Seghers passionately defended "the specific abilities of the artist," deplored the prevailing didacticism of *belles lettres* ("the explication of reality is not at all identical with artistic creation"), and bravely attacked the "schematism" of a literature that seemed to have lost all color, depth, and fragrance.[11] Was she perhaps thinking of her own novels too?

It is not without tragic irony that Georg Lukács, the honored Hungarian guest of the Congress, echoed Anna Seghers' complaints almost point by point. For years, Lukács had supported Stalinist cultural policies, indeed had defended Zhdanov's doctrines against Frau Seghers. Now Lukács too had come to change his mind; he too spoke of the dead abstractions of the New Communist novel, criticized the "transfixed and dogmatic concept of party-orientation," and—quoting Lenin—demanded that the writers rediscover the tragic dimensions of human life: *"an optimistic view of historical developments does not exclude individual tragedy. . . ."* [12] Was he, like Seghers, perhaps thinking of himself?

During the days of the Congress the writers, old and young, seem to have become so restive that the admin-

[8] *Neue Deutsche Literatur* (East Berlin), Vol. 4, (1956), pp. 574-87.

[9] Cf. *ibid.,* Vol. 3 (1955), pp. 111-12.

[10] *Ibid.,* Vol. 4 (1956), pp. 149-53 (comment by Alfred Kurella).

[11] The complete speech appears in Anna Seghers, *Die grosse Veränderung unserer Literatur* (The Great Transformation in Our Literature), Berlin, Aufbau Verlag, 1956.

[12] The entire text of Lukács' remarks is in *Literatursoziologie* (The Sociology of Literature), ed. Peter Judz, Neuwied, Luchterhand Verlag, 1961, pp. 254-60.

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istration had to call in Ulbricht himself to placate the "protestants." While the final resolution of the congress defined Socialist Realism in an extremely diffuse way, clear evidence of the victory of the writers was soon forthcoming: the SED, submitting to pressure, declared its retreat during the Third Party Conference (which closely followed upon the Writers' Congress). While insisting that "Socialist Realism offered the widest freedom for artistic achievements, and gave creative possibilities to all talents, personalities, and individual modes of style [*individuelle Stilarten*]," the resolution of the Conference suggested that the time for dogmatics and for scholasticism had passed and that writers "should not be afraid to take up artistic experimentation again." [13] Within a few weeks, the State Commission for Affairs of Art, now openly ridiculed by Brecht, was dissolved. The writers promptly continued to widen their demands: contacts with Western, above all with American, literature ought to be intensified, and the publishing houses of the Republic should be made independent of the state.

It is clear that the provinces were no less affected than East Berlin. During a convention of younger writers at the Saxon town of Chemnitz in the summer of 1956 two young poets, Heinz Kalau (b. 1931) and Jens Gerlach, (b. 1926) protested amidst general applause against the suppression of artistic independence.[14] If industrial Saxony (with its traditional Communist leanings) was restive again, the danger to the regime was real and immediate.

The Reaction

The foregoing developments were due in part, no doubt, to the impact of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. However, the Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet intervention put a swift end to the short "thaw" in East Germany. Compared with what was to follow, the first signs of a reaction were mere straws in the wind: as early as November 1956, the *Neue Deutsche Literatur* demonstrated its renewed submissiveness to the authorities in commenting on the fateful error of the Hungarian writers "who have unleashed forces they never intended to unleash." [15] About the same time, Kurella (soon to be Chairman of a reconstituted Commission for Affairs of Art) issued a rallying cry for Socialist Realism by engaging in polemics with its Polish critics. The reaction, however, was not to be merely a literary affair.[16] In its counteroffensive against the disobedient philosophers and writers, the SED was soon resorting in some cases to the terror tactics of arrest by the secret police, political trials, and harsh prison sentences.

The regime's harshest retaliation was directed against the philosophers, whom it considered particularly dangerous: the state police broke into the editorial offices of the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* impounded its manuscripts, and then arrested several of its contributors. Wolfgang Harich, the youthful editor in chief, was sentenced in March 1957 to ten years in prison. After the disciples, it was their teacher's turn: Ernst Bloch was forced to retire; his philosophical efforts were condemned by a swiftly convened *Theoretische Konferenz* in Leipzig; and his assistant, a World War II invalid, was sent to work in a factory (where a machine subsequently tore off his arm).

Other targets of attack were so-called "revisionist" literary critics, teachers of German literature, and estheticians. At a party-sponsored University Conference held to condemn literary "revisionism" (February 28-March 4, 1958) spokesmen went to such ridiculous extremes as to accuse Georg Lukács and Hans Mayer (Professor of Literature at the University of Leipzig) of having "*objectively* abetted the plans for the NATO-organization dominated by the American Capitalists." [17]

Against this background of arrests and condemnations, the writers themselves were herded into repeated meetings arranged to extract the ritual confession of sin and guilt. In February 1957, the delegates of the Writers' Union were forced publicly to condemn the Hungarian *National-kommunimus,* to declare their fervent love for the Soviet Union, and to confirm that "half a century of Socialist Realism from Gorki's *Mother* to Brecht's *Galilei* has brought light and hope into the world." [18] Later in the year (October 23-24), a Cultural Conference was convened to reaffirm the principle of *partijnost;* and the party-hacks used this chance to express their resentment of the more talented intellectuals who had dominated the scene during the "thaw."

During these months, many intellectuals and writers chose to escape to Western Germany; for the first time,

[13] *Neue Deutsche Literatur,* Vol. 4 (1956), p. 4.

[14] Cf. Günther Zehm, "Der Ulbrichtstaat und die jung Intelligenz" (The Ulbricht State and the Young Intelligentsia), *Deutsche Universitätszeitung* (Frankfurt), Vol. 16 (1961), pp. 23-27.

[15] *Neue Deutsche Literatur,* Vol. 4 (1956), p. 11.

[16] Rühle, *op. cit.,* pp. 335-36.

[17] C. Peter Demetz, "Geschichtsvision und Wissenschaft—Über einige Arbeiten Hans Mayers" (Visions of History and Scholarship—About Some Essays of Hans Mayers), *Merkur* (Munich), Vol. 15 (1961), pp. 677-87.

[18] *Neue Deutsche Literatur,* Vol. 5 (1957, p. 6.

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leftist writers in considerable numbers joined the stream of ordinary citizens leaving for the West. It was in West Germany, then, that the fascinating literature of the East German "thaw" made its appearance: Alfred Kantorowicz' *German Diary (Deutsches Tagebuch),* offering a merciless view of the political machinery; Gerhard Zwerenz' *Provocations (Ärgernisse)*, a bitter book of accusations against both East and West; Ernst Bloch's collected philosophical works; and Uwe Johnson's first novel *Conjectures Concerning Jakob (Mutmassungen um Jakob),* revealing an outstanding talent steeped in William Faulkner and the techniques of the Anglo-Saxon experimental novel.

The escape of some of the most talented intellectuals of the older and younger generation cannot have been lost on the regime; perhaps it is one of the factors that prevented the authorities from putting on the screws too tightly. This writer is inclined to believe that we are at present observing a strange and uneasy truce between the regime and the intellectuals. Cultural policies are more and more dominated by the party functionary Alfred Kurella, who tries (perhaps in fond memories of the Soviet 1920's) to organize proletarian "shock workers of the pen" to counteract the irresponsible intellectuals. And lately, the East Berlin *Kleines Theater unter den Linden* seems to be concentrating on the "realist method" to balance the potential dangers of the Brechtian *Theater am Schiffbauerdamm.* On the other hand, the literary critic Hans Mayer, though condemned by the functionaries, continues to lecture and to publish; the periodical *Sinn und Form* still gathers interesting writing; and cultural contacts with West Germany are sought as eagerly as before. To use a medical metaphor: the patient rests, listlessly, after the crisis and the great bloodletting—he may come through but he won't be his old (Socialist Realist) self again.

Nonconformist Conformity

In examining the course of East German literature, it is not enough to consider the vicissitudes of individual writers and poets. The literary structure itself—or rather the *genres*—reflect and, in different ways, react to the pressures of Communist doctrine.

The novel with its mass of social data and its didactic possibilities has always been the prime target of official censorship and supervision, and as a consequence has suffered the most. The decline of the narrative *genre* can be closely observed in the work of Anna Seghers (b. 1900), the most gifted prose writer of Ulbricht's Germany. A generation ago, Anna Seghers' first novel *Der Aufstand der Fischer von St. Barbara* (The Revolt of the Fishers of St. Barbara), a tightly organized work of almost mythological sweep and power, was praised as a decisive event of new German writing; during the war her novel *Das Siebte Kreuz* (The Seventh Cross), a convincing image of German resistance to Hitler, was an international best-seller. Unfortunately, Frau Seghers suffered, after she returned to East Germany from her Mexican exile, a fate similar to that of Bertolt Brecht. Her power seems spent or suppressed; and her recent book *Die Entscheidung,* (The Decision), a *quasi* Forsythe-saga of a steel mill, suffers from schematic characterization (the Nazi villains are invariably employed by the CIC) and curiously flat writing.

The situation of the theater differs from that of the novel. The reason is that the regime—with an eye to impressing the rest of Germany and the West in general—was more than glad to welcome back the famous Bertolt Brecht in 1948, and to allow him a certain leeway in his theatrical experimentation as a price. Thus the younger generation of playwrights could develop behind the protective shield of Brecht's epic theory toward a non-realistic, experimental, "formalist" theater. But the impact of Brecht upon his disciples has been both a blessing and a curse—a blessing because the young have been able to transcend the 19th-century limits of the "well-made" play à la Sardou (considered realistic); a curse because they have not gone beyond their great master, and their best efforts often resemble a Brecht-*pastiche.*

Among Brecht's younger disciples, Peter Hacks (who left the West for East Berlin as late as 1953) concentrates on historical plays. His *Volksbuch vom Herzog Ernst* (Chapbook of Duke Ernst) wittily debunks false and pseudo-romantic medievalism; his *Schlacht bei Lobositz* (The Battle of Lobositz) makes the rather ambivalent point that the soldier's real enemy is his own officer; and his *Eröffnung des indischen Zeitalters* (The Opening of the Indian Epoch) "unveils" the discovery of the Americas as inspired by greed—but unfortunately one does not know for long stretches whether Brecht's Galileo or Hack's Columbus speaks.[19]. Another of the younger playwrights, Günter Kunert (b. 1929), has written a funny anti-American comedy. *Der Kaiser von Hondu,* suggesting that Evelyn Waugh, *The Teahouse of the August Moon,* and Peter Ustinov's *Love of the Four Colonels* must be well known to the East German intellectuals—perhaps Kunert's wit (of the undergraduate variety at times) may one day discover

[19] Cf. Peter Hacks, *Theaterstücke* (Theater Pieces), Berlin, Aufbau Verlag, 1957.

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targets closer to home. Kunert's play as well as his poetry indicate that Brecht has transmitted to his disciples his own curious America: like Brecht in his *In the Swamp* and elsewhere, they too are constantly charmed by the image of an immense country that is brutal, virile, and wide "open"; hate and love are fused in a recurrent image of the United States that attracts and terrorizes their provincial souls.

The theory of Socialist Realism, which took its inspiration from the 19th century "realist" novel, never developed specific criteria for poetry. Thus, the poets have had more of a chance to develop their own idiom: the message of their poetry often conforms, but the structure and the language of their poems contradict the message. The verse of Franz Fühmann (b. 1922) betrays such a curiously divided loyalty; his mind belongs to the regime but his language to Hölderlin and the later Rilke. Fühmann, I believe, is a mystic who needs an absolute authority to adore—an opium to inspire his visions. His long poem *Die Fahrt nach Stalingrad* (The Voyage to Stalingrad) opens a rare view of World War II and marks him as one of the few Germans courageous enough to speak, in bold and burning metaphors, of the sins and sufferings of his own generation.

Johannes Bobrowski (b. 1917) is another poet who has been deservedly praised. It is perhaps a sign of changing times that Bobrowski continues to live and work in East Berlin but publishes his poetry (in spite of the Wall) in the Western part of Germany. Bobrowski's poetry conjures up childhood memories of East Prussia and Baltic landscapes; fields, forests, rivers are praised in a rhythmic chant suggestive of Dylan Thomas.[20] Bobrowski seems to be one of the few East German poets who has continued to study Valéry, Marino, and Lorca, and to make fruitful use of their conceits and metaphors.

Thus it seems that the literary *genres* have submitted to the pressures of doctrine, but they have done so in different degree. The novel inevitably has suffered, but the "epic" theater still offers a chance to talented writers to express themselves in a "formalist" way; and recent poetry, less vulnerable to the forced naïveté of Socialist Realism, surprises by its intensity and boldness. The finest web of words seems to have provided the greatest resiliency and resistance to political pressure.

* * *

These trends within the different *genres* reflect the peculiar problems and paradoxes that have marked the course of cultural development in the GDR. It is probably fair to say that of all the satellites in the Soviet bloc, East Germany has been the least affected by the de-Stalinization of the arts. And when, in the eyes of the Communists, the demand for greater freedom of expression got out of hand, the regime was quick to resort to repression and extreme harassment to restore "order." Today orthodox functionaries like Alfred Kurella continue to police the dissatified intelligentsia as strictly as they can.

Yet precisely the factor which impels the East German authorities to cling to a Stalinist course in other spheres of the national life affords the cultural sphere at least some defense against total suppression. That factor is the geographical and psychological vulnerability of the GDR *vis-à-vis* West Germany. The regime can build a concrete wall to inhibit defections, but it cannot prevent some interflow of ideas: it is forced to keep up the pretense of competing with West German intellectual life. Feeble as this pretense may be, it has afforded the frustrated intellectuals in Ulbricht's Germany at least some scope and outlet for self-expression, however great the adverse pressures of state and ideology.

[20] Johannes Bobrowski, *Sarmatische Zeit* (Sarmatian Time), Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1960.

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Communism in Africa: III

EDITORS' NOTE: The following article by Professor London surveying relations between Communist China and the newly emerging states of Black Africa represents the third part of our series dealing with Communist activity on the African continent. The preceding two sections appeared in the November-December 1961 and March-April 1962 issues of this journal. They dealt with Soviet strategy ("Moscow's First Steps," by David L. Morison), local Communist activities ("The West African Scene," by Walter Kolarz—both in the November-December 1961 issue), and with the relationship between Soviet propaganda and scholarship on Africa ("Soviet Views on Africa," by Lazar Pistrak, and "Scholarship and Propaganda," by Christopher Bird, in the March-April 1962 issue).

The Role of China

By Kurt London

WHEN THE COMMUNIST leaders gathered in Moscow in July 1920 for the Second World Congress of the Comintern, they faced a situation that was not to their liking. The revolution in Western Europe, forecast by Lenin, had not materialized. Nor had the "pauperization" of the working class, forecast by Marx, come about: on the contrary, the lot of the workers seemed to be steadily improving. Even the populations of the defeated Central Powers, which were in the throes of severe economic and political crises, seemed deaf to Communist exhortations to armed uprising. The few attempts that were staged (in Hungary and Germany) ended in failure.

What was to be done?

One answer was suggested by the Indian Communist Manabendra Nath Roy in his theses on the colonial question. Roy believed—and Lenin shared his view—that for the time being it would be wiser for the Communists to emphasize the "exploitation" of the colonial peoples, rather than that of the European proletariat.[1] To be sure, this was to be a temporary shift in tactics, but one that would benefit the cause of world revolution in the long run. The congress was fascinated by Roy's reasoning. If European capitalism (so the argument went) derives its principal resources from the colonies, surely these resources must be denied to it. If European overproduction can only be disposed of by selling to dependent areas, these markets must be closed. At the same time, the capitalist exploitation of hundreds

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[1] Branko Lazitch, *L'Afrique et les leçons de l'expérience communiste,* Edimpro Editeur, Paris 1961, p. 145. See also Fritz Schatten, *Afrika—Schwarz-oder Rot,* R. Piper & Co., Munich, 1961, p. 162 ff.

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of millions of Asians and Africans must be ended. If these three objectives could be implemented, capitalism in Europe would be mortally wounded. With the loss of markets and natural resources in the colonies, chaos and destruction would come to the imperialists, and the door would then be open to proletarian revolution.

Roy further suggested that movements of a bourgeois, democratic and nationalist character in the colonial countries should be opposed. Instead of helping the establishment of a bourgeois order, the Comintern should help the workers and landless peasants to develop revolutionary cadres. Here Lenin disagreed. He knew that in the colonies a long period of transition would be required before a revolutionary situation materialized, and that for a long time communism could not become a force to be reckoned with in such areas; he therefore considered the exploitation of nationalism the chief tactical weapon. As a result, there emerged at the First Conference of the Peoples of the East, convened at Baku in September 1920, the doctrine of "national revolution"—which in turn evolved into the currently familiar concept of "national liberation movements" in colonial countries.

Stalin adopted the same line of reasoning in his 1924 lectures on the "Foundations of Leninism," when he proclaimed as anti-revolutionary the view that the victory of the proletariat in Europe could be achieved without cooperation with the liberation movement in the colonies. Again, one year later, Stalin coined the term "national bourgeoisie" to define the elements which, in certain colonial and semi-colonial countries, would be natural allies to the Communist movement, provided that they had not allied themselves with imperialism or reaction.

The colonial debate reached its culmination at the Sixth Comintern Congress (July-September 1926), which propounded the doctrine that the proletarian revolution must not be regarded as a single process but as a series of different actions over a protracted period of time. Distinctions must be made, it was then stated, between revolutions of a pure proletarian character and bourgeois-democratic types which would grow into proletarian revolutions, between national wars of liberation and colonial revolutions. All of these phases are interdependent, the congress held, and the world triumph of the proletarian revolution cannot be completed unless all phases have been won.

Thereafter, Stalin's consolidation of power in the USSR, the purges, and the growing threat of war absorbed Communist energies. Attention focused on anti-fascist rather than anti-colonial problems,[2] and the colonial debate subsided. During World War II, Moscow was careful not to antagonize its allies by engaging in anti-colonial propaganda. Only after the war did Stalin dust off the colonial doctrine he had propounded in *Foundations of Leninism.* (This work is still regarded by Soviet authorities as a highly important exegesis of Marxist-Leninist theory.)[3]

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II battered, but a world power. No longer the single, isolated "socialist" state, it became the leader of what Khrushchev's theoreticians call the "world socialist system" or "socialist commonwealth." When the Mao regime took over China in 1949, additional weight was added to the "system," and at the same time the disintegration of the traditional colonial empires reached its final stage. The emancipation of former colonies and semi-colonies and their elevation to independent status did not satisfy the Communists, however. Imperialists, they continue asserting, do not surrender their possessions voluntarily, and if they have been forced in various parts of the world to free the colonies, they have done so with the intention of continuing to dominate the economic and political life of the newly emerged states. Thus the notion of "neo-colonialism" was born.

Still, despite the campaign against neo-colonialism, the leading Soviet Africanist, Ivan Potekhin,[4] had to admit in 1955 that "the establishment of national governments in the Gold Coast, Nigeria and the Sudan, while not amounting to true independence, represented 'concessions by the colonialists' which must not be underestimated."[5] The Chinese Communist leaders, however, were not in the least inclined to subscribe to such a charitable view.

Peking's View of Colonial Revolution

This becomes evident when the development of Peking's position regarding colonial areas is traced. Shortly after the Communist conquest of the China mainland, Liu Shao-ch'i proclaimed the guiding principle of Mao's policy toward colonial areas: "The pattern of the revolutionary struggle in China should be applied

[2] Schatten, *op. cit.* p. 173.

[3] L. F. Ilyichev, "The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Tasks of Ideological Work." Speech to the All-Union Ideological Conference on December 25, 1961. *Pravda,* December 26, 1961.

[4] Potekhin is director of the Moscow African Institute and chairman of the Soviet Society for the Promotion of Friendship with the Afro-Asian Peoples.

[5] David L. Morison, "Communism in Africa: Moscow's First Steps," *Problems of Communism,* Nov.-Dec. 1961, quoting from *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie,* November 2, 1955, p. 62.

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to colonial and semi-colonial countries." [6] This meant "war of liberation," which Moscow has sanctioned in principle but usually sought to avoid in practice. It also meant fomenting "class struggle" in areas, such as most of Africa, where significant class differentiation had not as yet developed. The Chinese Communists thus chose to disregard the orthodox Marxist view that it is impossible to proceed from a feudal to a socialist society without the bourgeois *interregnum*. They were loath to wait, and in their revolutionary fervor they clamored for speedier action, claiming that due to African backwardness "social transformation" could take place more quickly by skipping the bourgeois stage in the process of achieving socialism.

Moscow agreed that it was possible to omit the bourgeois stage in primitive countries, but Khrushchev, unlike Lenin and Stalin, held that only after the colonial countries had become independent "national democracies" could the class struggle be initiated. This position has never been accepted by Mao; in his view, "national democracies," especially when ruled by a "national bourgeoisie," are basically suspect, un-Communist and perhaps even anti-Communist.

Mao, of course, has some cause to be wary of cooperating with the "national bourgeoisie." He remembers well that Stalin, who had adopted Lenin's view on this matter, pushed the Chinese Communists into collaboration with the Kuomintang between the years 1924 and 1928. This turned out to be bad advice, and the cooperation ended in disaster. A much tougher line was then adopted by Mao toward the "national bourgeoisie," and the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928 upheld him by stating that basic revolutionary tendencies had been temporarily crippled "by the treachery of the national bourgeoisie in colonial and semi-colonial countries." It is true that in the course of his struggle against Chiang, Mao eventually decided to enlist the help of the Chinese bourgeoisie for the revolutionary cause and that he theoretically justified this policy in his book, *On New Democracy* (1940). Nevertheless, the temporary desirability of united front tactics did not dispel his deepseated distrust of the "national bourgeoisie."

While this animus precluded Mao from taking Khrushchev's view of the colonial problem, there seems to be, in effect, at least tacit Sino-Soviet agreement on a number of principles involving Communist policy on the African continent: namely, that the Western powers must be driven out of Africa, that Africans must be indoctrinated with an anti-Western attitude, and that the campaign against "neo-colonialism" (characterized at the Second Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity conference in Conakry as "a device of the imperialists by which they make a show of 'giving' freedom and go out by the front door only to return by the back door") [7] must be carried forward.

The Chinese view of political problems in the underdeveloped world, and in Africa in particular, is further colored by their conviction that there are special bonds of kinship that bind them to the populations of the former colonial empires. They believe, first of all, that being members of a non-white race—a distinction the Russians do not enjoy—and having themselves suffered discrimination and semi-colonial exploitation at the hands of the Europeans, they share with many Asians and Africans common experiences and a common hatred of Western imperialism. They further point out that with most of Africa they share the common heritage of centuries-long stagnation and economic backwardness, that like the Africans, they are impatient and eager to make up for lost time. In this respect too, the Chinese believe, their condition approximates the realities of African life more closely than the relatively advanced stage of development achieved in the Soviet Union, and they expect therefore that the Africans will accept their more radical views on economic and social reconstruction.

These general assumptions have found expression in official Chinese statements from the time of the Communist victory in mainland China. As early as November 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i stated before the Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Peking: "The classical type of revolution in imperialist countries (*i.e.* in capitalist states) is the Soviet October Revolution. The classical type of revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese Revolution whose experiences are of inestimable value for the peoples of these countries." And again, in January 1950, Liu wrote: "The road taken by the Chinese people to beat imperialism and its lackeys and to establish the Chinese People's Republic should be followed by all peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries so that they may achieve their independence and a people's democracy." [8]

The Chinese appeal to Africans was summed up in the Peking *People's Daily* [9] in a comment on the estab-

[6] Ho Wei-yang, "Die Politik der Chinesen in Afrika" (Chinese Policy in Africa), *Aussenpolitik* (Stuttgart), March 1961.

[7] For a full definition of "neo-colonialism" See "The Freedom Struggle in Africa and the Dangers of Neo-Colonialism," Report of the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Conakry, April 11-15, 1960, pp. 51-52.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace, For a Peoples' Democracy* (Cominform Journal, Bucharest), January 1950.

[9] October 5, 1959.

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lishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and Conakry:

The Chinese people, who have experienced a fate similar to the African people's, fully understand and deeply sympathize with the plight of millions of African people under colonial rule and firmly support their heroic struggle for independence and freedom. With great elation we have seen how the people of African countries, like the people of Asia, have arisen in the past few years. Anti-colonial flames have lit up the entire "dark continent."

Chinese Contacts with Africa

Despite the aggressive interest of the Chinese in the African continent and their faith in the political appeal of the Chinese model to Africans, the establishment of official relations between Peking and the new African states has proceeded at a rather slow pace. The first direct personal contacts between the Chinese Communists and African nationalist leaders took place at the Bandung Conference of 1955, where the Peking delegation, led by Chou En-lai, met with the official representatives of four African states and with unofficial delegates of some 25 other African countries, most of them now independent. It took another three years, however, before the first Chinese Communist embassy in Black Africa was established—in Khartoum in 1958. Thereafter, diplomatic missions were opened in Conakry (1959), Accra (1960), Bamako and Mogadiscio (1961), and Dar-es-Salaam (1962). Nigeria is also reported ready to establish diplomatic relations with Peking.

It must be emphasized, however, that these few diplomatic missions in no way represent the extent of Chinese Communist involvement in Black Africa. To make up for the lack of permanent representation in many African countries, Peking spares no effort to stimulate a live and constant exchange of visiting delegations. As soon as official recognition of a newly independent state is extended—the Peking Foreign Office is very quick to cable it, sometimes on the very eve of independence—the road for exchange visits is open. Thus, apart from occasional official political missions, there has developed between China and Africa a considerable traffic in trade and cultural delegations, trade unionist groups, and student and youth organization representatives. A typical and frequent form of exchange consists of dispatching Chinese technicians to Africa and extending scholarships for the education of African students in China. (According to returnees from the Cameroun and Nigeria, the training has in certain cases included courses in sabotage and guerrilla warfare.) [10]

Another important channel of Communist Chinese propaganda in Africa is provided by the various "Afro-Asian solidarity" organizations which began proliferating after the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in Cairo in 1958. At that time, the Peking regime felt flushed with success: it had consolidated its position on the mainland: its Korean war adventure had ended in a draw and seemed to confirm before the world the Communist regime's staying power; the disintegration of French rule in Indochina promised new opportunities for revolutionary action in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the Bandung Conference, while providing valuable new contacts with the Africans, had not turned out to be a political success from Peking's standpoint. The *Panch Shila,* the famous "Five Principles" of international behavior adopted by the conference, had nothing like a revolutionary impact anywhere in the world, and Communist efforts to exploit Bandung at subsequent international meetings [11] proved unsuccessful. The Chinese Communists therefore eagerly grasped the opportunity to participate in a new set of Afro-Asian institutions within which they could promote their political interests in Asia and in Africa.

The 1958 Cairo conference was sponsored by the Nasser regime, but the Communists, represented by the Chinese and Soviet Central Asia delegates, succeeded in dominating the meeting. What is more, it soon became evident that one of the principal Communist purposes at the conference was to encroach upon the process of African emancipation and influence its direction.[12] The Asian element merely served as a suitable bridge.

If this was apparent in Cairo, it became even more obvious at the second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Conakry (1960), where the strengthening of the African solidarity movement was one of the items on the agenda, and where Communist direction of the proceedings was hardly concealed. On that occasion also a permanent Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization was founded, and the Chinese Communists, as members of the organization, set up a National Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Peking to coordinate and organize Sino-African contacts. In addition, they established the Sino-African Friendship Association—to promote cultural and economic exchanges, enhance friendship between China and the African states and support the African peoples' "struggles against imperialism and colonialism"—and a Chinese Institute of Afri-

[10] "Peking Training Young Africans in Terrorism," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), July 23, 1961.

[11] New Delhi Meeting of Asian Writers, December 1956; Afro-Asian Conference of Jurists, Damascus, November 1957.

[12] See Schatten, *op. cit.,* p. 336.

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can Affairs, the precise tasks of which are not clear. Even more important, a special committee for Africa was reportedly created within the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China, probably to take charge of mapping Peking's political offensive on the African continent.[13] Finally, in Conakry, an Afro-Asian Solidarity Foundation was set up under Communist sponsorship, its charter stating that it will render "material and financial assistance" to organizations and individuals struggling against "imperialism, colonialism and racial discrimination." [14]

Another important propaganda weapon of the Peking regime in Africa is the New China News Agency (NCNA) and its adjunct, Peking radio. The latter has been increasing its output beamed exclusively to Africa —although, contrary to some reports, it has not yet topped Radio Moscow's volume of African broadcasts. In terms of programs exclusively beamed to Africa, Soviet transmitters began the year 1961 with 41 hours weekly and ended it with 73½ hours. The East European Soviet satellites increased their African programs from 19 hours to 63½ hours during the same year. Radio Peking in the same period boosted its weekly broadcasting time to Africa from 35 to 63 hours. Altogether then, the combined broadcasts of the Communist camp designed exclusively for Africa amount to some 200 hours per week. The Soviets use English, French, Portuguese, Amharic and Swahili in their programs; the Chinese broadcast in English, French, Portuguese, Swahili and Cantonese. Since the Soviets presumably have more transmitters at their disposal than the Chinese, broadcasting time alone cannot give a very clear-cut idea of Sino-Soviet competition in this field, but it can safely be assumed that the Chinese are increasing the power ratio of their transmitters as well as the volume of their broadcasting hours.[15]

As to content, Chinese propaganda centers on five major themes: colonial oppression of African peoples; the anti-colonial struggle in Africa; Peking's support of the African peoples' struggle against colonialism; Communist China, the model for oppressed nations; peaceful and friendly relations between Communist China and Africa. A mere enumeration of the topics fails to reveal, however, the belligerent tone in which the themes are applied. The following excerpt from an article in the Peking *People's Daily* of December 10, 1961, is illustrative of the tenor and intent of Chinese propaganda:

> **All oppressed nations and peoples will sooner or later rise in revolution, and this is precisely why revolutionary experience and theories will naturally gain currency among these nations and peoples and go deep to their hearts.**
>
> **That is why pamphlets introducing guerrilla warfare in China have such a wide circulation in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and are looked upon as precious things even after they are worn and come apart and the print has become illegible through rubbing. The influence of ideas knows no state boundaries. No one can prevent the dissemination among the people of what they need.**

Does this mean that Communist strategy in Africa is aimed at an early takeover based on existing or developing indigenous Communist parties or their political fronts? Not even Peking could expect such a contingency in the near future. Such Communist parties as exist in Black Africa are far too insignificant politically to risk Communist *coups d'état.* [16] Their potential must be judged in the light of their ideological and economic weaknesses, their isolation from the mainstream of African tribal life, and the reluctance of most Africans to collaborate with a movement which is built on premises that do not exist.

Peking's Prospects in Black Africa

The new African states are preoccupied with establishing their national identity; with reconciling their tribal social organization with the requirements of modern statehood. And while many of them believe that they cannot afford liberal democracy in the Western sense and that their further development requires authoritarian leadership, they are equally loath to adopt Marxism-Leninism—Chinese-style or Soviet—as a remedy for their social, political and economic ills. Neither Touré nor Nkrumah, despite their professed affinities for the Communist bloc, are willing to go as far as Castro. They are not at this time inclined to become part of any orbit except their own.

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[13] "La Pénétration Chinoise en Afrique" (editorial), *Le Monde* (Paris), December 9, 1960.

[14] See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. XIII, No. 42, November 15, 1961, p. 18 (translated quote from *Azia i Afrika sevodnia,* No. 5, May 1961, pp. 57-59.)

[15] *Cf. World Radio TV Handbook,* Broadcasting Television, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1962 (information as of November 1961). The writer obtained corroborating information from the U. S. Information Agency.

[16] While Communist party enrollments may have grown somewhat in recent years, mainly in North and South Africa, the claims that the Soviets have made about membership gains are clearly exaggerated. See L. N. Chernov, *"Kommunisty stran Azii i Afriki—avangarde bôrby za svobodu i natsionalnuiu nezavisimost,"* (Communists in the Countries of Asia and Africa—Vanguard of the Struggle for Freedom and National Independence), *Narody Azii i Afriki,* (Moscow), No. 5, September-October 1961, pp. 15-31.

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Moscow and Peking surely realize these facts, and they can hardly look forward to the formation of African satellites at this time. What they are trying to achieve is, first and foremost, the erosion of Western influence and the substitution of their own; they therefore advocate not only inedependence for the Africans, but also active opposition to "neo-colonialism," so as to gradually reduce to a minimum all forms of contact between the Western nations and the former colonies.

The question arises whether in trying to achieve this objective Communist China and the Soviet Union are working at cross-purposes in Black Africa. While it is still difficult to find a conclusive answer to this question, it is evident that there are significant differences in attitude and emphasis between Peking and Moscow. Thus, in spite of occasional letups in Chinese aggressiveness, Peking's representatives do seem bent on fomenting unrest wherever a chance presents itself. (The outlawed Cameroon People's Union is but one example.) Underlying this policy is the vigorous Chinese exploitation of the Leninist concept of "war of national liberation." The Soviets, to be sure, have never ceased professing their acceptance of this formula for justifying politically desirable wars, but they have been far less enthusiastic about activating the doctrine into a major policy instrument; they are more sensitive than their Chinese counterparts to the dangers of a local war developing into a worldwide conflict. A sharp debate on this point, epitomizing the Sino-Soviet disagreements on the importance of "peaceful coexistence," took place early this year at the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo.

In any event, competition between Moscow and Peking for African favors is intense. What Peking lacks in economic and technical aid potential compared to Moscow and its East European satellites, it tries to make up for by anti-colonial fervor and a careful selection of targets in its propaganda activities. Unlike the Soviets, who strive primarily for close state-to-state relations in Africa, the Chinese Communists actively seek contacts with accessible groups of Africans below the state level.[17] Policy differences such as these may aggravate the existing friction between Moscow and Peking, but it would be a mistake to conclude that the mere fact of competition between the two Communist powers on the African continent must necessarily be detrimental to the cause of the Communist movement there. Only a complete break and open hostility between China and the USSR would justify such a conclusion.

The push of the Chinese Communists into Black Africa is only beginning, and it is too early to tell how successful they will be in furthering their particular interests in the nationalist African revolutions. It would be safe to predict, however, that if the extreme doctrinaire attitude of the Chinese prevents them from adjusting to the exigencies and tastes of African politics, they will find themselves unable to counteract the very real challenge presented by the Western—and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet—ability to supply sorely needed economic and technological aid. What is more, they might lose the psychological advantages they now seem to hold.

[17] See Howard L. Boorman, "Peking in World Affairs," *Pacific Affairs*, No. 3, 1961, pp. 234-236.

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Soviet Books in English

By Ronald Hingley

TO WHAT EXTENT has Soviet literature been made available to the American and British public in English translation? Soviet cultural spokesmen claim that it has been rationed out most grudgingly. Thus Alexander Chakovsky, editor of the Moscow magazine *Inostrannaia literatura* (Foreign Literature) wrote in the New York *Saturday Review* of April 2, 1960:

> **Americans are deprived of the opportunity of reading Soviet books in their own language. . . . American publishers are downright tendentious in selecting Soviet books for translation. . . . As a rule the only modern works that are widely printed and popularized in your country are books like *Doctor Zhivago*, which can serve as subject matter for vicious attacks on our social system.[1]**

British publishing policy has also been the subject of such attacks, which have now become part of the regular patter of Soviet cultural warriors in their campaign to show themselves "more cultural-exchange-minded than thou."

Is it really true that the English-speaking reader has been kept on a starvation diet of tendentiously-selected translated Soviet literature? In considering this we shall be more concerned with the number and range of titles made available in English, and with the standard of editing, selection and translation, than with the mere size of editions. By suggesting in the quotation given above that Soviet works are not as a rule "widely printed" in the West, Mr. Chakovsky is confusing the issue. At least this is certainly so if he seeks to imply that Western publishers have deliberately brought out Soviet works in small editions in order to prevent dangerous ideas from reaching the masses. Such a policy is characteristic of Soviet, not of Western, publishing policy. No one who has had dealings with Western publishers would imagine for a moment that they ever deliberately restricted the size of an edition for any such non-commercial reason. When they print small editions it is because they have reckoned on a small demand.

For an idea of the range of translated Soviet literature, it is helpful to turn first to the comprehensive bibliography of translations given in Professor Gleb Struve's *Soviet Russian Literature: 1917-1950*.[2] This gives a picture of the position at the end of the 1940's, and even a brief glance is enough to show that very little of real importance published during the first thirty years of Soviet literature had escaped translation into English at that time. Most of the big names are well represented, including Ehrenburg, the later Gorky, Leonov, Sholokhov and A. N. Tolstoy, few important works by any of these authors having been neglected.

The dragnet had also taken in many of the more purely "devotional" works of Soviet literature (such as Furmanov's *Chapayev*, Gladkov's *Cement*, N. Ostrovsky's *How the Steel was Tempered* and V. Katayev's *Time, Forward!*); anthologies of prose, verse and drama; extensive samples of humor, fantasy and World War II fiction (Ilf and Petrov, Zoshchenko, V. Grossman, Simonov, *etc.*). Nor had near-rubbish—*e.g.*, Panfyorov's *Bruski*—been by any means overlooked. Altogether the eleven pages of Struve's bibliography include the titles of some two hundred translated works.

Thus the literary pond had been fairly thoroughly dredged. But one or two big fish had got away all

[1] Quoted in "Cultural Exchange: How Reciprocal?", by Maurice Friedberg, *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1961, p. 56. The present article owes several suggestions and lines of thought to this valuable contribution of Mr. Friedberg's.

[2] University of Oklahoma Press, 1951, pp. 389-400.

Mr. Hingley, whose widely-acclaimed article on Soviet vranyo, *"That's No Lie, Comrade," appeared in the March-April 1962 issue of this journal, lectures on Russian language and literature at Oxford University and is the author of* Under Soviet Skins *(London, 1961) and numerous other works.*

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the same. They included Konstantin Fedin, none of whose novels had been made available up to 1950. The omission is surprising in view of the importance ascribed to these works by both Soviet and non-Soviet literary critics, but perhaps does credit to the good taste of English-speaking publishers and translators, if the present writer is correct in regarding Fedin as far and away the dullest and least talented among the big names in Soviet fiction. Incidentally, Fedin is now represented in English by what is probably his least tedious novel, *Early Joys* (translated by G. Kazanina; New York, Vintage Books, 1960).

A more regrettable omission was Yesenin, who certainly merited greater attention than he was given by the inclusion of odd poems in anthologies of translated Russian verse. But Russian poetry does not on the whole translate well into English, and it is therefore inevitable that prose writers should be more adequately represented than poets.

Perhaps the most surprising work to have escaped attention was Pilnyak's *Mahogany*. Some other works of Pilnyak, including *The Naked Year*, had appeared. But what makes the omission of *Mahogany* so interesting is that it had become an important scandal-work, on the basis of which its author (together with Ye. Zamiatin, author of the novel *We*) was made in 1929 the victim of the first literary frame-up staged in Soviet Russia. *Mahogany* had been published in Berlin earlier in the same year. Not to this day, however, has it been produced for Soviet readers. Nor was it available to English-speaking readers until 1961, when it appeared in an issue of *Partisan Review* entitled *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature* (entire issue No. 3-4, edited by Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, New York, 1961; the introduction by Hayward also reviews the history of Pilnyak's clash with the Soviet authorities). The episode shows how politically insensitive Western readers and publishers were in the 1930's, as compared with the present-day situation, when any Soviet work of comparable scandal-value to *Mahogany* quickly finds publication in English, even if it is of dubious literary merit.

It is of course no secret that the 1930's and early 1940's represented a period when Western intellectuals entertained strong political sympathy for Soviet Russia, combined with intense and in many cases willful ignorance of the large-scale atrocities which were being perpetrated in that country. The abundance of Soviet literary works translated during this period is undoubtedly in part a reflection of the pro-Soviet sentiment that existed in the West. As sympathy began to filter away after the Second World War, so the number of translated works began to dry up. But the English reader did not suffer greatly by being kept on short commons in this respect in the late 1940's, for this was the period of Zhdanov's dictatorship over Soviet letters, when little worthwhile writing could appear.

NOW, HOWEVER, we are faced with an entirely different situation, marked by a massive revival of interest in Soviet writing. This revival, which has received its most recent boost from Soviet excursions into space, began slowly—at first as a reaction to events in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and to the phase of somewhat mitigated illiberalism which followed. The earliest relaxations, those of 1953-54, had little echo in the West outside "Sovietological" circles, but Ilya Ehrenburg's significant novel *The Thaw* appeared in English translation in 1955 and had some impact (the translation of Part II of the novel was published separately six years later under the title *The Spring*). The next, and more impressive, wave of relaxation—that of 1956—aroused greater interest in the West, interest which centered round V. Dudintsev's notable scandal-novel *Not by Bread Alone* (translated by Edith Bone; London, Hutchinson; New York, Dutton; 1957). As the response to these publications showed, the English-speaking public was now learning the new sophistication of reading some Soviet literary works for their interest as sociological and political documents. This is probably the only reasonable way to read *The Thaw* or *Not by Bread Alone*, neither of which can seriously be regarded as more than a mediocre work of art.

Recently the events of 1956 have given rise to an American publication which is in many ways typical of the best in the current "documentary" strain of translated Soviet works. This is *The Year of Protest, 1956* (translated and edited by Hugh McLean and Walter N. Vickery; New York, Vintage, 1961). The editors themselves do not pretend that their collection consists of literary gems, but offer it for its paraliterary interest: it contains such key "protest" works as A. Yashin's story "Levers" and K. Paustovsky's important speech, "The Drozdovs," suppressed in the Soviet press.

The Year of Protest is typical of the new wave of translated Soviet works, and indeed of publishing trends in general, in being a paperback which sells at a modest price. Its publishers, Vintage Books of New York (who are among the better-advised publishing houses in Russian matters) have been reissuing in paperback successful old translations of Soviet novels, for instance Leonov's *The Thief* (translated by Hubert Butler, re-

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issued 1960). They have also had the foresight to commission new translations, in some cases of works which had already appeared in English. Thus *The Twelve Chairs* by Ilf and Petrov, in a new version by John Richardson, appeared in 1961, and its sequel *The Golden Calf* is promised shortly from the same translator. It has been excellent policy to make these classics of modern Russian humor available to a wide public.

WHICH SOVIET AUTHORS have enjoyed success in the West? Three names are outstanding—Sholokhov, Ehrenburg and Pasternak. Since it is a matter of dispute whether the last-named can properly be termed a "Soviet" author at all, he will be left until the end of this discussion, where an attempt will be made to survey literature of Soviet origin smuggled abroad.

In their lives, temperament and character, as in their impact on the West, Sholokhov and Ehrenburg form a sharp contrast. Sholokhov is unique as a Soviet author who has become a best-seller in the West, unaided by political accident and solely on the basis of his merits as a superb novelist. These merits are fully revealed only in one work, his *Quiet Don (Tikhy Don)*, that immensely long novel in four parts which is surely the greatest single achievement of Soviet fiction. Confusingly enough, it has appeared in English (tr. Stephen Garry; London, Putnam; New York, Knopf) under two separate titles: *And Quiet Flows the Don* (Parts I and II, first published in English in 1934) and *The Don Flows Home to the Sea* (Parts III and IV, first published in English in 1940). This masterpiece, still masquerading under two titles, has recently been reissued in paperback (1957 and 1960). Most of Sholokhov's other, much inferior, fiction has also been made available. *Virgin Soil Upturned* has been converted into another double-decker: Part I retains the title *Virgin Soil Upturned* (tr. Stephen Garry, 1935); Part II is *Harvest on the Don* (tr. H. C. Stevens, 1960). The latest volume of Sholokhov to appear is that rumbustious series of early sketches, *Tales from the Don* (tr. H. C. Stevens, 1961) on which *The Quiet Don* was based. The London publisher of all these titles is Putnam. Works by Sholokhov have also included one scraping from the very bottom of the barrel—the short story "One Man's Life" *(Sudba cheloveka)*, which has been translated twice and has appeared in two anthologies of selected Soviet material.

Ilya Ehrenburg has been translated even more extensively—he is a more prolific author—but no one could possibly call him a master of turbulent narrative like Sholokhov, or indeed a master of narrative at all. Yet even his weakest work—that trio of long, unreadable exercises in political self-hypnosis, *The Storm, The Fall of Paris* and *The Ninth Wave*—has been translated. Recently some of his earlier and infinitely more talented satirical writings have been revived: *Julio Jurenito* (tr. Anna Bostock; London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1958); *The Stormy Life of Lasik Roitschwantz* (tr. Leonid Borochowicz and Gertrude Flor; New York, Polyglot, 1960).

However, it is as a barometer of current Soviet intellectual life that Ehrenburg seems to arouse most interest. In addition to *The Thaw*, already mentioned, new translations (from Ehrenburg's main recent British publishers, MacGibbon and Kee) include *Chekhov, Stendhal and other Essays* (1962) and *People, Years, Life* (the first section of Ehrenburg's monumental autobiography, 1961; both tr. Anna Bostock and Yvonne Kapp).

NO ATTEMPT WILL be made to provide a comprehensive bibliography of new translations, retranslations and re-issues of all Soviet works to have appeared in English during the last few years. But some attempt must be made to indicate their range.

Among the older and more established Soviet writers whose works have been made available for the first time or in new translation, we find: Isaac Babel, *The Collected Stories of Isaac Babel* (ed. and tr. Walter Morison; London, Methuen, 1957; New York, Penguin, 1961); V. Katayev, *The Small Farm in the Steppe* (tr. Anna Bostock; London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1958); V. Kaverin *Two Captains* and *Open Book* (tr. Brian Pearce; London, Lawrence and Wishart, respectively 1957 and 1955); Yu. Olesha, *The Wayward Comrade and the Commissars* (tr. Andrew R. MacAndrew; New York, New American Library, 1960)[8]; V. Panova, *Span of the Year* (tr. Vera Traill; London, Harvill, 1957), *Time Walked* (originally *"Seryozha"*; London, Harvill; also Cambridge, Mass.; 1957), in addition to two earlier titles omitted in Struve's bibliography, *The Train* and *The Factory* (1948 and 1949; both London, Putnam). Among the most important new publications of established Soviet writers is the (partly bilingual) selection from Mayakovsky, *The Bedbug and Selected Poetry* (tr. Max Hayward and George Reavey, edited with an introduction by Patricia Blake; New York and London, 1960). Another important new project is the proposed publication of Paustovsky's autobiography by Harvill, London, and Pantheon, New

[8] This collection includes Olesha's brilliant novel, *Envy*.

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York. That Western publishers sometimes take in a wider range than their Soviet opposite numbers in reissuing important literary documents of the 1920's is shown by the appearance of *Literature and Revolution* by Leon Trotsky (tr. Rose Strunsky; Michigan University Press; London, Cresset; 1960).

Among works by younger and less well-known figures to be made available recently are the following: V. Nekrasov, *Front-line Stalingrad* (tr. David Floyd; London, Harvill, 1962) and *Kira Georgievna* (tr. Walter N. Vickery; New York, Pantheon, 1962); P. Nilin, *Comrade Venka* (originally *"Zhestokost";* tr. Joseph Barnes; London, Hutchison; New York, Simon and Shuster; 1959); V. Rozov, *In Search of Happiness* (tr. Nina Froud; London, Evans, 1961). Western interest in controversial Soviet material irrespective of its literary worth is further confirmed by the issue of Dudintsev's tiresome experiment, *A New Year's Tale* (tr. Max Hayward, London, Hutchinson, 1960; also tr. Gabriella Azrael, New York, Dutton, 1960). More exciting is the announced intention of the London firm Putnam to bring out two works by the young novelist V. Aksyonov, one of them his scandal-provoking *A Ticket to the Stars* (tr. Alev Brown, to appear in 1962).[4]

HAVING DEALT BRIEFLY with individual authors, we must now turn to recent anthologies, again many of them in paperback form, of selected works from various pens. These are also too numerous for full mention, and only a few of the more interesting can be indicated. They include *Modern Russian Poetry* (London, Vista, 1960) and *Russian Poetry 1917-1955* (London, Bodley Head, 1957), selected and translated by Jack Lindsay; *Soviet Short Stories* (ed. Avrahm Yarmolinsky; New York, Doubleday; London, Mayflower; 1960); *Fourteen Great Short Stories by Soviet Authors* (ed. George Reavey; New York, Avon Book Division, 1959); *Modern Soviet Short Stories* (selected and tr. George Reavey; New York, Universal Library, 1961); a selection by the present writer, *Soviet Prose: A Reader* (ed. Ronald Hingley; London, Allen & Unwin, 1959) which appeared as a bilingual text under the title *Modern Russian Reader* (New York, New American Library, 1960).

These and other anthologies vary in standard. At one end of the scale is the eccentrically edited *An Anthology of Russian Literature in the Soviet Period* (which nevertheless performed the service of making Zamiatin's controversial novel *We* again available, over thirty years after its first appearance in English translation; ed. Guerney, New York, Random House, 1960). On the other hand there are the impeccable standards to be found in the aforementioned *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature* (ed. Patricia Blake and Max Hayward; *The Partisan Review,* No. 3-4, 1961; to be published in book form by Pantheon, 1962). One could wish that such standards were more widespread, for there are still unfortunately too many amateurish editors and translators from the Russian who take the reader back in spirit to the days of Constance Garnett. One example which springs to mind is the literal rendering in a recent extract of the Russian exclamation *batyushki!* ("good heavens!") as "little fathers!" It is but one step from this kind of thing to the celebrated first translation into English of Turgenev's *Nobleman's Nest (Dvoryanskoye gnezdo)* under the title *A Nest of Hereditary Legislators.*

The *Partisan Review* selection gained the distinction of drawing fire from across the Curtain, provoking a long, hostile review by A. Dementiev in *Novyi mir* (New World) of December 1961.[5] Dementiev took two main lines of attack, the first being the principle of selection. He asked why English-speaking readers should be offered such "dissonant" rubbish when there were healthy works by Gorky, A. N. Tolstoy, Mayakovsky, and so on, which they might have been given (and, as the present survey has indicated, actually had been given, though Mr. Dementiev seemed unaware of this). The second subject of attack was Mr. Hayward's Introduction to the selection, described at one point as "all lies." "Max Hayward's essay," complained Mr. Dementiev, "repeats all the hackneyed concoctions of G. Struve, E. Simmons, G. Gibian and other 'specialists' in Soviet literature." As this quotation illustrates, it is now possible for the better-known Western authorities on Soviet literature to be awarded, in the shape of personal attacks in Soviet publications, a special kind of accolade or "inverted Order of Lenin" for disservices to the current official Soviet line on literature. The institution of this coveted award will no doubt spur lesser workers in the field to greater efforts. But the main interest of Dementiev's article lies in a question which it might be tactless to answer in so many words—why does he devote ten closely-printed columns to criticizing a work

[4] At a conference on ideology, held in Moscow in December 1961, Leonid Ilyichev, now Central Committee Secretary for Propaganda and Agitation, rebuked Aksyonov as one of a number of young writers who "feel attracted to cheap subjects and shoddy themes."

[5] Mr. Dementiev's article also appeared in the English-language monthly, *Soviet Literature* (Moscow), December 1961. A reply to it, by Max Hayward, appears in the current (Spring 1962) issue of *Partisan Review* (New York).

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which few Soviet readers of *Novyi mir* are ever likely to set eyes on?

One selection of translated Soviet stories deserves particular attention. This is *Winter's Tales* (various translators; ed. with an Introduction by C. P. [Sir Charles] Snow and Pamela Hansford Johnson [Lady Snow]; London, Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's Press; 1961). Here a somewhat mixed bag of Soviet short stories is to be found, of which the most worthwhile is Y. Tendryakov's "Potholes." But the book is most noteworthy because of the misplaced and paternalistic homily contained in its Introduction. Here the reader is told how to read Soviet stories; for example, he is not to read them "as though they were documents in the Cold War." He is informed that Soviet writers are united in enthusiastic support of their party and government, that they are "pillars of their society" and that he has "got to" (*sic*) read them as such. The reader is also told that he is to read these works "as Soviet readers do"—*i.e.*, as is made clear by implication, in a spirit of unadulterated reverence for Soviet "achievements". Sir Charles' introduction is really rather insulting to Soviet readers, suggesting as it does that they are a mass of undifferentiated automata.[6]

The instruction of Western readers in how they should or should not read the work of Soviet writers is an impertinence that is also commonly found on the lips of Soviet official cultural spokesmen. These frequently complain that too much attention is given in the West to Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago,* to the works of Dudintsev, and so on. They would prefer us to read such examples of orthodox "Socialist Realism" as, say, Boris Polevoy's *Story of a Real Man.* The point might scarcely seem worth discussing, since such run-of-the-mill Socialist Realist novels are works of literature only in name. They are in fact (as their few Western readers know well) merely examples of advertising copy. The plugging of a political and social system is not in itself necessarily more tedious than, for example, the advertising of different types of detergent. But no Western manufacturer of detergents has yet dared to suggest that his potential customers should plow through 300-page books illustrating the fact that his product washes whiter.

Run-of-the-mill Socialist Realism will never be more popular in the West than it is in Russia itself. But—and this is the main reason for introducing the topic—Soviet spokesmen cannot complain that the Western reader is denied access to such publicity material. The Soviet Foreign Languages Publishing House brings out a lot of it in English translation (including Polevoy's novel, mentioned above, and occasionally less deadly items such as the short stories of S. Antonov). There is no barrier to the distribution of these books in the West other than the Western reader's unwillingness to buy them, while the West enjoys, and probably desires, no comparable facility for distributing propaganda on Soviet territory. In addition to the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow, the Soviet authorities can also rely on Communist or fellow-traveling publishing houses in the West to issue the more routine specimens of Socialist Realism if they do not mind taking the financial risk.

IN MANY RESPECTS the Soviet reader is worse served with Soviet publications than is his Western opposite number. For the Western reader has access to a growing number of works which have been smuggled out of the Soviet Union because they have no hope of being published there.

The authors of this contraband material present a very wide spectrum. They include at least one well-known figure—N. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Party Central Committee, and author of the "secret speech" on Stalin's crimes delivered before a closed session of the 20th CPSU Congress on February 24th-25th, 1956. This was smuggled out of the country and first published in the United States after release by the U. S. State Department in June 1956. The contraband also includes writings by humble citizens such as Mikhail Naritsa (author of the smuggled novel *The Unsung Song,* published under the pseudonym "Narymov" in Russian by the Russian émigré magazine *Grani,* October-December 1960) and Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin (author of poems and a philosophical essay published in bilingual text as *A Leaf of Spring,* tr. George Reavey; London, Thames & Hudson; New York, F. Praeger; 1961). Some of these humbler authors of smuggled literature have been arrested by the authorities, and in two cases an attempt has been made to declare them insane, treatment resembling that applied by the police of Nicholas I to Pyotr Chadayev, author of the subversive "Philosophical Letter" published in 1836.[7]

Other authors of smuggled literature have contrived, for obvious reasons, to remain anonymous. These include "Nikolay Arzak," author of two stories, "Hands"

[6] See also remarks by Sir Charles Snow on Soviet society overtaking the West in material conditions (*Literaturnaia gazeta,* May 24, 1960) and on the lack of class differences and snobbishness in Russia (*ibid.,* September 24, 1960).

[7] This treatment was applied to Naritsa and Yesenin-Volpin.

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and "Moscow Speaking," which have so far only appeared in the Polish émigré magazine *Kultura.* Other smuggled items include the anonymous verses, "Poems from the Underground," published in *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1961, and—an especially exotic item—poems by an anonymous Soviet Jewish poet written in Soviet concentration camps, and recently published in bilingual form (Hebrew and Russian) in Tel Aviv (*Pridiot vesna moia,* Am Oved, 1961).

After Khrushchev himself, the most famous of the "smuggled" authors is undoubtedly Boris Pasternak. His tale has often been told, and there is no need to rehearse again the dramatic story of *Doctor Zhivago* and Pasternak's rejection of the Noble Prize, though the continued persecution of the poet-novelist's friends, Olga Ivinskaya and her daughter, is something which the Western public should not be encouraged to forget.[8] The great success of *Doctor Zhivago* (the only work out of Soviet Russia besides Sholokhov's *Quiet Don* to have become a best-seller in the West) has encouraged Western publishers to sift carefully the rest of Pasternak's *oeuvre,* some of which had indeed already been translated. As a result numerous new translations of shorter prose works (not all "smuggled") and of cycles of poetry have appeared in English. The poetry has sometimes been issued in bilingual texts, and of such publications one in particular is worth mentioning—Pasternak's *In the Interlude, Poems 1945-1960* (tr. Henry Kamen; London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press; 1962).

Among the less well-known smuggled authors the most remarkable writes under the pseudonym "Abram Tertz." His story *The Trial Begins* has appeared in book form (tr. Max Hayward; London, Harvill; New York, Pantheon; 1960). Two other stories, "You and I" and "The Icicle" have so far appeared in periodicals (also translated by Max Hayward). Others which will shortly appear, in the present writer's translation, are such studies of obsession, lunacy or incipient *delirium tremens* as "Graphomaniacs," "In the Circus" and "The Lodgers." Tertz, whoever he may be, is one of the most original and rewarding of recent Soviet authors. He stands firmly in the Russian tradition of Gogol, Dostoyevsky and Leskov, but without being in any sense derivative. Whether for reasons of camouflage or not, he invites his readers to infer that he is a Jew, and it is not difficult to detect characteristic elements of Jewish humor in the flavor of his irony. Tertz's available work is not on a big enough scale to qualify him as a major writer, though it will be remembered that Isaac Babel attained that status with writings of comparable volume. Like Babel, though in a very different mode, Tertz is a scrupulous stylist. Nothing in his work is accidental, and when his reputation has had time to settle it may well establish itself not far below the level of Babel.

IN CONCLUSION, Mr. Chakovsky's complaint, quoted at the beginning of this article, to the effect that "Americans are deprived of the opportunity of reading Soviet books in their own language," is not borne out by the evidence. On the contrary, American (and British) publishers have shown themselves keenly alert to the English-speaking public's interest in Soviet literature. It is true that one can think of worthwhile works which have still not been translated, true also that some of the earlier titles mentioned above may no longer be in print, and that others will remain in print only so long as there is a market for them. Furthermore, though our standard of editing and translating is steadily improving, it still has a long way to go.

Despite these reservations, Soviet literature is clearly enjoying a modest boom in the West. And so long as Soviet writers retain their present relative freedom to express themselves within the general framework of restrictions whose very rigidity lends even inferior works the enticing flavor of forbidden fruit, this trend is apt to continue. Indeed, such is the Western interest in the Russian enigma that many of the less distinguished examples of Soviet literature are likely to enjoy more vogue in the West than they deserve, judged purely on literary merit. But no matter how many homilies reach us from Moscow, nothing will ever induce the English-speaking public to read the uninspired advertising copy churned out by the more orthodox exponents of Socialist Realism. As for "smuggled" works, they will no doubt continue to give the English-speaking reader access to what is in some ways a wider range of Soviet literature than that available to the Soviet reader in his own country.

[8] Just as this issue went to press, the release of Mme. Ivinskaya's daughter from custody was announced by the Soviet authorities. No word was mentioned of Olga Ivinskaya herself, now serving an eight-year term for alleged illegal activities connected with the publication of *Doctor Zhivago* in the West. For further details on this case, see Robert Conquest, *Courage of Genius—The Pasternak Affair,* London, Collins & Harvill Press, 1961.

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Eternal Russia

Russia under Khrushchev,
by Alexander Werth.
Hill & Wang, New York, 1962.

Evolution of Soviet Society,
by Damodara Kurup.
Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1961.

Soviet Man and His World,
by Klaus Mehnert.
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

The Taproot of Soviet Society,
by Nicholas Vakar.
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1961.

Reviewed by Adam Ulam

OF BOOKS ABOUT Russia there is no end. Ever since the Elizabethan adventurers discovered Muscovy, the strange ways and colorful contrasts of the eastern-most European country have not ceased to fascinate the West. The emergence of Russia—and subsequently the Soviet Union—as a great power has gradually transformed the exploration of a seemingly exotic country and society into an explicitly political enterprise. With it there emerged a new type: the expert on Russian affairs. In Tsarist times, he was often a representative of a respectable foreign journal, with a smattering of Russian and a few acquaintances in the Court and society circles — a combination which somehow rendered him qualified to expound on the origins, development and future of Russian society.

Some of the disputes surrounding the credentials of the 19th century experts have a strangely contemporary flavor. The Marquis de Custine's unflattering picture of Nicholas I's Empire was attributed by his irate Russian hosts to his having fallen under the baneful influence of the Polish circles in Paris (always those Poles!).[1] The elder Kennan's exposé of the Siberian exile system under the Tsars was challenged by an English Protestant clergyman.[2] This spiritual predecessor of the Dean of Canterbury, having travelled the length and width of Siberia, found nothing undemocratic or otherwise disturbing in that part of the Empire. Today's expert who dazzles his class or a women's club with his knowledge of the peasant problem in the USSR has his prototype in the Victorian explorer who would explain to his enthralled audience that Russia, in addition to the nobility and the Nihilists, was peopled by the strange breed of natives called "Mujiks."

The Soviet era brought with it, along with the lingering penchant for the mysterious and exotic, also a new element—namely, a vehement (either favorable or hostile) reaction to the Soviet "experiment." The rise of fascism, World War II, and finally the cold war, have all produced further difficulties in the way of sensible and objective writing about Russia and the Russians.

The books here under review offer a good sample of some of the difficulties which are encountered by an interpreter of contemporary Soviet society. Werth's and Mehnert's books are impressions of the Soviet scene by two men who have long been students of Russian affairs. Vakar's work is an ingenious attempt to explain the Soviet system through a rather dubious use of social anthropology. Kurup's book is an interpretation of the Bolshevik system as seen by a militant social democrat. What links the books together, despite their authors' vastly different backgrounds, competence and approach, is their warm sympathy for the Russian people, and the awareness that a solution of the "Russian

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[1] Astolphe de Custine, *Russie en 1839,* 1943, Brussels, 1843, 8 vols.

[2] George Kennan, *Siberia and the Exile System,* New York, 1891, 2 vols.

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problem," or more accurately, some sort of understanding between the Soviet Union and the West, is vital to the future of civilization.

However laudable their motivation, it nevertheless tends to obscure and to hamper any efforts to arrive at a dispassionate and judicious analysis of the Soviet political and social system. Admittedly, we cannot discuss say, Soviet foreign policy, with the detachment which characterizes, or should characterize, the discussion of the origins of Greek art. Admittedly, too, what is happening and what will happen to the Soviet Union is of too great importance to our own lives to allow the emotional disengagement which lies at the roots of scholarly objectivity. But the task of the scholar and the observer alike (not that they are mutually exclusive categories) is to strive in the right direction, and to allow neither hope nor despair about the future to blunt his appraisal of what *is* actually happening in his field of study.

MR. WERTH'S BOOK sins rather heavily against this injunction. It is in its spirit and method reminiscent of many books written about Russia in the 1930's and 1940's. The challenge of fascism followed by the wartime alliance between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union had led many writers, some of them no more sympathetic to communism than was the late John Foster Dulles, to distort the reality of Soviet conditions: the USSR, while not a democracy in *our* sense of the word was still far from a totalitarian state; Stalin, while not *quite* a democratic leader à la Roosevelt or Churchill, was nevertheless a benevolent ruler full of genuine concern for his subjects—and so on and so forth. This tradition of tortuous reasoning whereby a spade becomes not *quite* a spade is followed by Mr. Werth through the medium of discussion with various representative Soviet "types." His interlocutors, for whose veracity the author does not vouch but who as a rule turn out to be extraordinarily voluble and candid, make comments which Mr. Werth passes on without qualifications to his readers. Here are some samples: Peter Ivanovich relates his postwar experiences. He spent a few years in Western Ukraine fighting the Ukrainian nationalists "who were still active under the command of German SS officers." Then followed a stint of military service in Poland fighting the AK [Home Army—controlled by the London Government-in-Exile] underground: "Funny people, the Poles—he said—as false and double faced as you make them." (Always those Poles!) Equally informative is Vasili Petrovich: "He [Khrushchev] personally regretted to have to get so tough with the Hungarians, but he had no choice after the defiant stand taken by the idiot Imre Nagy."

When Mr. Werth chooses to speak in the first person he reveals himself frequently as both an astute and perceptive observer of Soviet society. But even then he cannot bring himself to say anything about the negative aspects of Soviet life without going through sundry curious gyrations, and without hedging his comments with all sorts of qualifications. Take the problem of antisemitism in Russia. After making the perfectly justified observation that the Soviet campaign against Yiddish culture cannot in itself be taken as proof of official antisemitism, he is still constrained to admit that there has been a deliberate attempt to exclude or to limit the number of Jews in the bureaucracy and various professions. Yet—as if fearful lest this admission be taken as a reflection of anti-Soviet feelings—he goes on to list the numerous prominent Jewish artists and musicians in the Soviet Union and concludes rather lamely that it is "certainly excessive to speak of systematic antisemitism in the USSR." But surely if we were to use Mr. Werth's criterion of the incidence of musicians, authors, etc., we would be compelled to say that Tsarist Russia at the beginning of this century, the Russia of the Jewish civil disabilities and the pogroms was one of the most philosemitic countries in Europe!

All in all, Mr. Werth's book is a sad testimony to the confusion which still prevails among a sizable segment of the Western intelligentsia on the subject of communism and the USSR. We may—indeed, we must—share their hopes of a peaceful accommodation between the Soviet Union and the West; we can—for good reasons—share in their belief in a still further evolution of Soviet society away from Stalinism, but do these sensible desiderata require us to distort the present-day reality? Would Mr. Werth write in the same tolerant "let-us-look-at-the-positive-side-of-things"-tone about Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal?

MR. VAKAR'S AND MR. KURUP'S books suffer from another and yet more ancient intellectual sin: the frenzied search for a single all-embracing explanation of Russian behavior. According to Mr. Vakar, the key to Soviet totalitarianism is found in the inherent totalitarianism of the traditional Russian peasant household. "Legislative, judicial, executive and moral authority all merged in the head of the household. He disposed the tasks, judged the performance, flogged the recalcitrant." It does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Vakar that the characteristics of the Russian peasant household which he describes are fairly universal traits

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of peasant families from Sicily to Ireland, and in a way they are also found in milieus as different as that of a Victorian middle class household, or an orthodox Jewish family. How can they then provide the explanation of Soviet totalitarianism?

Mr. Vakar's tendency to appropriate universal human characteristics as the unique traits of the totalitarianism-prone Russian peasant reaches at times almost tragicomic proportions. What does a Russian peasant do when unjustly dressed down by a superior? ". . . he will be silent and will wear a face of guilt. But inside . . . he will be furious and hurt. . . . When he comes home he will drink . . . or he will fight with his wife." Why restrict oneself to the peasant family as the prototype and root cause of totalitarianism? Isn't a mother-infant relationship essentially totalitarian? And thus we can bridge the gap between Mr. Vakar's theory and the swaddling theory of the origins of Soviet totalitarianism which enjoyed a vogue some years ago.

When he departs from his unfortunate "taproot," Mr. Vakar has many sensible things to say. Even so, he is not free from the absurdities which beset most of our Kremlinologists. Mikhail Suslov, who for some unfathomable reason has gained the reputation in the West of a "dour ideologue" (unless it is because he is tall and thin, thus departing from the stereotype of the short and squat Soviet leader), is "reputed to have committed to memory every word of Marx, Lenin and Stalin." If the vision of Suslov reciting the three volumes of *Capital* is rather comical, then it is a more serious mistake to include among the Stalinists the poet Alexander Tvardovski, who through his literary magazine has been one of the main exponents of greater freedom and latitude for the Soviet writers. (The same error, unaccountably, is made by Mr. Werth.)

Mr. Kurup's hobby horse is his notion that the Bolshevik Revolution departed from its correct course because of the seizure of the party and state apparatus by the petty-bourgeoisie. It is therefore surprising that after a vigorous and at times very perceptive denunciation of the Soviet system, Mr. Kurup concludes resignedly that "as a higher stage in the historic progress of mankind state monopoly capitalism and petty bourgeois rule are to be welcomed. They are bound to come anyway." Even more puzzling than this homemade dialectic is the author's obvious familiarity with astute analysis of the history of the Communist Party coupled with his deplorable lapses on matters such as the history of pre-revolutionary Russia or of Marxist theory. In addition, the book represents unfortunately one of the worst printing jobs this reviewer has ever seen. Zinoviev is spelled consistently "Zenoviev" and petty-bourgeoisie as "petti," just to mention the two most glaring cases. Surely these are mistakes which a more thorough proofreading could have easily eliminated!

IT IS A PLEASURE to pass from these well intentioned but stumbling attempts at finding the magic key to the Soviet system, to Mr. Mehnert's unpretentious but searching reflections in *The Soviet Man and His World.* The author's conclusions, unsensational as they may be, impress one as sober and judicious: "I have met no Soviet citizen whose thoughts about the future run along Western democratic lines; but I know a great many who envisage and hope for the evolution of the Soviet state into a modern autocracy that will respect the needs of its people." One feels in the book the rhythm of change in Soviet society, but the author is too wise to conclude that because Russia and the Soviet man are changing—and rapidly so—the political regime must necessarily be transformed at the same pace. The book exudes nothing but sympathy and admiration for the Soviet people, but while the author wastes no time on extravagant denunciations, he offers no apology for the political system under which they live.

Indeed, to Mehnert as to many foreign observers the most striking characteristic of the Soviet scene is the growing political agnosticism of the young Soviet generation. Social and economic changes have engendered attitudes and aspirations which are not too dissimilar from those in the West. Will this transformation lead in turn to an erosion of totalitarianism itself? Mr. Mehnert, as stated above, does not pretend to read the future. But his work, with its moderation and its skill at distinguishing that which is essential from that which is transitory in a dynamic society, might well serve as a model to other writers.

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Sino-Sovietology

Unity and Contradiction—Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations,
edited by Kurt London.
Praeger, New York, 1962.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute,
by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar.
Praeger, New York, 1962.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961
by Donald Zagoria.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962.

Reviewed by Henry Pachter

EACH OF THESE three books has its special usefulness. The first is a collection of thirty-six papers presented by scholars from eleven countries at the Third International Conference on Sino-Soviet Bloc Affairs, which met in Tokyo in September 1960. Although some of the papers were brought up to date in 1961, none yet takes into account the events of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October 1961. The same is true of the second collection, which includes Mr. Richard Lowenthal's widely-read article on "Diplomacy and Revolution," first published in *The China Quarterly,* and thirty important documents bearing on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute from the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 through the Moscow Manifesto of 81 Communist parties in December 1960, briefly but lucidly annotated by Mr. MacFarquhar.

Some of the Tokyo conference papers dig deeply into the background of the conflict between Moscow and Peking, and in their entirety they cover the widest lateral range of questions. While it is impossible to name each of the outstanding essays, this reviewer found guidelines for further research especially in the contributions of H. F. Schurmann on "Organizational Contrasts between Communist China and the Soviet Union," Hugh Seton-Watson on "The Communist Powers and Afro-Asian Nationalism," Boris Meissner on the "People's Communes," and Leonard Schapiro, Allen S. Whiting, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski on "Conflict Resolution." Necessarily, all these reports are analytical rather than historical, and each contributor confines himself to one particular aspect of his allotted general problem. There also are valuable contributions by such well-known American authorities as Cyril E. Black, Robert F. Byrnes, Oleg Hoeffding, Paul F. Langer, Robert C. North and T. H. Rigby.

It remained for Mr. Zagoria to present the first full story of the Sino-Soviet conflict up to the end of 1961—an almost day-by-day account of events and comments, amply documented from Soviet and Chinese sources and ably presented with complete background explanations. By lucky coincidence, Mr. Zagoria ended his book at the height of Sino-Soviet dissension, and he deserves credit for having kept a cool head. While the newspapers were expecting a clean break between Moscow and Peking, he warned that for some time to come the unifying forces in the Communist bloc would remain stronger than the divisive forces. Most of the experts readily concur in this view, and a reader of these three volumes must congratulate the scholars on the wide area of agreement among them. If Sino-Soviet divergencies seem to be widening, those among Sinologists and Kremlinologists are narrowing.

Unfortunately, however, the gap between the scholars and the less informed still remains unbridged. Among American editorialists and others given to wishful thinking, one can discern something akin to a mathematical law: the less a person is capable of distinguishing nuances on the Left, the more he expects to see the Russians fight the Chinese; also, the more he expects the intra-Communist rivalry to benefit the democratic cause, the less he is inclined to favor the use of all available means to influence its progress. The scholars are much less sanguine. They see the controversy in the framework of the Communist alliance, as indicated by the titles of some of the essays in the works under review—*e.g.,* "Dialectics of a Dispute," "Unity of Opposites," "Con-

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Mr. Pachter, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the New School for Social Research, New York City, appeared previously in these pages with "The Meaning of 'Peaceful Coexistence'" (January-February 1961).

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flict Resolution in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," and "Problematics of Sino-Soviet Bargaining."

The dispute is more than a simple divergence over policies such as might occur between the British and American governments, and less than a conflict of material interests such as Marxists find characteristic of capitalist imperialism. The conflict does indeed arise out of policy differences, but it derives its peculiar features from the structure of the "socialist camp" or *sodruzhestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran,* based as it is on ideological discipline. Consensus among allies is difficult to maintain under the best conditions, but if the leading partner in terms of material power claims spiritual primacy, too, any disagreement over policy may assume the bitterness of schism. When the partners start quoting scripture at each other, they become unable to seek rational terms of accommodation, agreement becomes submission, discipline rules over principle, and the ideological lifeblood which once guaranteed unity turns into a poison which infects it.

On the other hand, though dogma provokes heresy, it also inhibits or suppresses defection. The truly "dialectical" relationship between unity and conflict appears in any discussion of centralism—the problem which is at the heart of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Paradoxical as it may seem, the more the Chinese differed with the Kremlin on the policy of coexistence, the more loudly they proclaimed Moscow's leadership and pre-eminence. It was Khrushchev who twice renounced this role, and it was Chou En-lai who again and again exalted the virtues of intra-bloc discipline—this at the very time when Peking was trying to rally Asiatic, African, and Latin American Communists around the banner of insurrection. Of course, Chou was covering up, tongue in cheek; and he was also following the Comintern tradition that leftism in policy must go with centralism in organization. But, as several authors have pointed out, Peking has a more serious reason for linking the two: if the Chinese wish to win the entire bloc over to their forward policy, they must allow the Russians to lead it. One can almost hear Khrushchev's plea to Chou that the lukewarm East Europeans prevent him from helping China reconquer Taiwan, and Chou's answer: then crush this revisionism and national communism in Eastern Europe, and we will help you do it.

Thus, to pull Khrushchev in their direction, the Chinese have to make his position stronger vis-à-vis the national fraternal parties, while at the same time, to increase their own standing in the socialist commonwealth, they have to restrain their expansionist tendencies. As Brzezinski puts it, the alliance moves within the limits of maximum permissible independence on the one hand and minimum necessary consensus on the other. The Chinese criticize Soviet leadership within the bloc not in order to weaken it but in order to change its position. They try to enlist help from other fraternal parties but will not allow outsiders to inject themselves into the Communist family quarrel. They are straining at the leash, but they also are conscious that this very leash holds together the team on which they depend.

The scholars also agree among themselves—and disagree with most newspaper writers—on a second important point. The Sino-Soviet conflict does not make life easier for Western statesmen; on the contrary, it puts pressure on Khrushchev to modify his policy of coexistence and might possibly irritate him to the point of irresponsible action. From this observation some advocates of "appeasement" draw the conclusion that the West should yield to Khrushchev's peaceful entreaties so that his success might silence the belligerent Chinese. Not so, say the scholars, for we should then seem to be yielding not to his charm but rather to his gesticulations, with the likely result that he would come back for more, demanding concessions to his other retainers who still might need to be appeased. "Weak responses in the West always have tempted Soviet statesmen to raise the margin of risk," writes Zagoria, and they also "deprive Khrushchev of the argument he has used against Mao, that the danger of world war is considerable. Western strength would give Khrushchev the argument he needs to convince Mao." This conclusion is concurred in by virtually all other experts in the field. Successes abroad strengthen Communist unity; failures create dissensions.

WITHIN THIS GENERAL consensus, however, we find considerable variations of emphasis and interpretation among the writers represented in the works under review. Some stress the structural and ideological differences between the Soviet and Chinese parties and the divergent characteristics of their leaders and cultural backgrounds; others emphasize the concrete issues between them. Mr. Lowenthal points out that ideological rivalry is one thing and actual conflict another, and he suggests that what precipitated the latter between Moscow and Peking was Khrushchev's summit strategy of 1958. Mr. Zagoria, on the contrary, places the beginning of the conflict in November 1957, when the Soviet and Chinese leaderships failed to agree on a common strategy.

The failure of Mao's "hundred flowers" experiment in the summer of 1957 led to a "left turn" in Chinese policy which manifested itself domestically in the "great leap forward" and externally in the advocacy of a Communist grand strategy of anti-imperialist war. Mr.

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Zagoria carefully notes that the Russians in the beginning recognized the "people's communes" as an "original contribution to the development of Leninist practice" and did not show any irritation until Mao, in an effort to justify his revolutionary strategy, claimed special significance for this creation of his. Mao asserted, in effect, that China had the right to lead the underdeveloped countries into a sacred war against imperialism because, by virtue of the communes, she was passing ahead of the Soviet Union on the road to communism. Obviously, no Russian Marxist could wait for the next harvest to disprove such a claim, and his immediate answer had to be not that the communes were economically unsound but that they were Marxistically wrong, undialectical. However, this assertion of Soviet dogma did not cause but rather was caused by the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership: fittingly enough, the ideological superstructure revolved *after* the political change.

The real crux of the dispute, therefore, is not the correctness of China's path to socialism or of her ideology. Nor can China's jealousy of Soviet primacy or Moscow's arrogance in dealing with its allies explain the depth of the rift. It is primarily a dispute over strategy and involves two rather old-fashioned notions of Chinese national policy: first the Peking government cannot feel secure as long as a rival government is sitting in Taiwan; and second, China's natural area of expansion lies southward, where she aspires to the reconquest of the tiny kingdoms that once were united under the scepter of the Heavenly Emperors.

Understandably, Soviet policymakers do not think this kind of expansion worth a world war. At the same time, their own immediate policy aim is to seal off the Soviet Union's western border, an aim which cannot be fulfilled by warlike acts but only by the kind of constant pressure which they have applied to Berlin. A further set of Soviet policy aims encompasses the liquidation of US trans-Atlantic bases and the erosion of the NATO alliance. These, too, can be attained more effectively by "peace offensives" than by warlike acts which, as experience has shown, tend to solidify the hostile alliance.

In other words, the Chinese may hope to gain territory by supporting partisan wars in Asia where they do not face the main enemy directly; but the Russians on the contrary do face the main enemy directly and therefore must try to divide his forces through a policy of "peaceful coexistence." All the differences between the two partners derive from this basic opposition of strategic conditions in which the one and the other must operate, and they can be explained without Marxist jargon and without any reference to world revolution. For this same reason, the reviewer is inclined to doubt that Sino-Soviet disagreement about sharing nuclear secrets *per se* could be a serious cause of schism. The local wars in which China is interested are sub-nuclear, and the contention of Peking is that no nuclear threat can deter them.

THESE OBSERVATIONS are supported by another on which several of the authors dwell: namely, that there is no such clear division of ideological viewpoints as there was in earlier disputes among Communists. Neither are the Russians consistently more "rightist," nor are the Chinese consistently more "leftist." Neither do the Chinese deny the theory of coexistence; nor do the Russians object to "wars of liberation" (they only differ about the likelihood of *local* wars). Both are against revisionism and recognize national differences in applying Leninism.

In this connection, it may be necessary to correct the widespread notion that a "Chinese faction" exists in the Kremlin, or that the Russians support a "Soviet faction" in Peking. This is not to say that in each of the two capitals or party organizations some functionaries may not be more sympathetic than others toward the other ally. These persons, however, may hold widely divergent views on such questions as the communes, priority of heavy industry over consumer goods, coexistence, the nature of nuclear war, agro-cities, etc. Moreover, the Chinese must know the working mechanism of Soviet communism well enough not to identify themselves with any Soviet party "group." Should the Chinese ever be impelled to back a losing faction in Moscow, then we might indeed have reason to rejoice; but the Sino-Soviet conflict is different from, say, Stalin's conflict with Trotsky precisely in that neither of the parties desires a showdown and that both in fact recognize the impossibility of breaking their alliance.

Whereas between Trotsky and Stalin one only could be Pope and Czar, between Khrushchev and Mao an accommodation must and most likely will be found after each periodic outbreak of ill will. They are rivals in a community of divergent but mutually interdependent interests. The Western press all too readily reports an "open breach" where there is only honest disagreement, and it tends to overlook factors which do not make news but are actually paramount—common interests and common enemies. The Sino-Soviet rift does not widen steadily; rather, it runs through an alternating cycle of intensification and relaxation, of Soviet ascendancy and polycentrism, of unity and divergence. At the time of writing the rift appears to be mending; at the time of printing it may be wide open again.

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Are the Russians Digging In?

Civil Defense in the Soviet Union,
by Leon Gouré.
University of California Press
Berkeley, 1961.

Reviewed by Gerd Ruge

IN HIS BOOK on Soviet civil defense, Leon Gouré presents what is undoubtedly the best compact survey of the subject to have appeared thus far in the West—or, quite probably, in the Soviet Union as well. On the basis of voluminous materials marshalled from a wide variety of sources, he draws an impressive picture of Soviet civil defense planning. While his book thus puts into the hands of Western experts in this field valuable data for their own guidance, it is also meant to enlighten the general public on the necessity of similar preparations in their own countries.

Mr. Gouré's selection of sources does, however, lead to certain pitfalls both for the evaluation of Soviet civil defense preparations and for the assessment of Soviet ideas about the nature of a possible nuclear war. The danger lies in the fact that the author's approach tends to give to purely theoretical considerations, which only partially reflect Soviet thinking in these areas, the appearance of objective reality. What is more, Mr. Gouré's painstaking compilation of nearly all the statements made about Soviet civil defense in the last several years tends to magnify this very danger. The author himself admits as much in his concluding chapter, but by the time the reader has reached this point in the book, the mass of earlier arguments has already oriented his thinking in such a direction that he cannot help but view the Soviet civil defense measures as an already integrated and completed program.

Anyone who has had the opportunity to make extensive observations in the Soviet Union will be unable to share such a view unreservedly. In fact, the average Soviet citizen is virtually unaware of the problems of civil defense. With a few possible exceptions, no instruction is offered in places of work or in schools about protective procedures in the event of a nuclear attack. The DOSAAF (Soviet Army, Air Force and Navy League), which naturally would shoulder the main burden of such work, actually displays relatively little activity. (The civil defense exhibit which it has maintained for a number of years is a pitiful, dusty affair which attracts little interest.) Indeed, when Mr. Gouré argues that the Soviet civil defense program represents a serious effort to prepare the population for possible nuclear attack and not simply to calm public fears, one cannot help feeling that he is on the wrong track. The truth would seem to be rather that the Soviet public has *not* been drawn into any large-scale and vigorously pursued program of civil defense precisely for fear that such a program would be psychologically disturbing to the population, with possible undesired repercussions on Soviet domestic politics.

IN ADDITION, the availability of public shelter facilities is minimal at present. It is not surprising that much of the data provided in the Soviet civil defense manuals cited by Mr. Gouré refer to protective measures of the simplest kind; other more elaborate plans mentioned in these same sources have probably not passed beyond the stage of theoretical discussion or experimental construction of prototypes. Moreover, most of the new housing developments in the USSR do not have the underground facilities advocated by Soviet civil defense experts. Such shelters as are in evidence date back to World War II and are generally in poor condition. To a large extent this neglect may be the result of industrial bottlenecks, particularly the shortage of reinforced concrete that is observable at large Soviet construction sites (including even bridges).

Indeed, the tendency of Soviet officials to play down the importance of civil defense may well be explained in

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large part by the economic problems they face. At a press conference only last February, for example, a representative of the Union of Soviet Architects characterized the construction of defense shelters in new residential projects as useless, and Mrs. Nina Khrushcheva, wife of the Soviet Premier, made a similar remark when she received the Western peace marchers in Moscow not long ago. In the opinion of this reviewer, it would be a gross oversimplification to interpret such statements as conscious deceptions. Both remarks represent in any case just about what the average Soviet citizen seems to think about the efficacy of shelters, and statements by official spokesmen generally support this skeptical view. Here, for example, is what N. Talensky, well-known Soviet military historian, recently wrote on the subject of the modern multimegaton bomb, which he refers to as the "absolute" weapon:

It has enormous explosive power. Theoretically it is of course possible to design special deep underground shelters to provide protection against a thermonuclear bomb or missile warhead, but in practice this idea cannot be taken seriously. Incidentally, the program of individual shelter-building now launched in the West serves nothing more than purely speculative purposes.

The radioactive fallout, which follows the explosion of a modern nuclear bomb, inflicts additional losses in an area that considerably exceeds the zone immediately affected by the nuclear explosion (shock wave, illuminous and thermal radiation, instantaneous penetrating radiation). Lack of dependable protection against radioactive fallout makes it almost impossible to carry out rescue operations, including evacuation from the danger area.

A modern nuclear bomb can lay waste vast areas. Several multimegaton bombs are quite sufficient to destroy any country in Europe.[1]

Talensky concludes that war has become unsuitable as an instrument of policy and that "the system of peaceful coexistence of states" and "general and complete disarmament" represent the only realistic solution. The choice, he says, is simply: "Either repudiation of war—or else a gigantic nuclear holocaust in which hundreds of millions of people would be slaughtered, the material and technical basis of modern civilization destroyed, and all the greatest cultural values created throughout the many ages of world history . . . consumed in the flame of nuclear explosion." [2]

It is entirely conceivable that when Soviet writers use the term "absolute" in describing the destructive power of modern nuclear weapons, they do so with a view to strengthening their position on a number of major international issues and, in particular, their thesis on "peaceful coexistence." By the same token, their discussion of civil defense possibilities may often be similarly colored by political considerations reflecting the play of various interests within Soviet society. A number of the statements cited by Mr. Gouré seem to fall in this category, especially those in which advocates of the decentralization of industry and urban development plead the higher interest of civil defense in support of their cause. Surely one may wonder whether the requirements of modern warfare are really their first concern.

MANY OF THE Soviet civil defense manuals are intended for use by instructors. Even assuming, however, that a very great number of DOSAAF and Komsomol members have received basic instruction in civil defense procedures to be followed in the event of nuclear

[1] *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1962, p. 23.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Recent Books Containing Articles From *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*

The Soviet Crucible—ed. by Samuel Hendel, New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1959.

Soviet Conduct in World Affairs—ed. by Alexander Dallin, New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.

People, Power, and Politics—ed. by L. J. Gould & E. W. Steele, New York, Random House, 1961.

Issues of the Sixties—ed. by L. Freedman & C. P. Cotter, San Francisco, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1961.

Arms and Arms Control—ed. by Ernest Lefever, New York, F. Praeger, 1961.

Soviet Society; A Book of Readings—ed. by Alex Inkeles & Kurt Geiger, New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961.

Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism—ed. with an original essay by John H. Kautsky, New York, London, John Wiley & Sons, 1962.

Power and Civilization—ed. by E. V. Walter & D. Cooperman, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1962.

Readings on the Soviet Economy—ed. by F. D. Holzman, New York, Rand McNally & Co., 1962.

The Many Faces of Communism—ed. by Harry Schwartz, New York, Berkley Books, 1962.

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attack, Mr. Gouré's book clearly shows that a preparatory period of several weeks would be required in order to activate a comprehensive system of civil defense that would afford protection to a substantial part of the Soviet urban population. And even then the protective measures would be relatively sketchy and improvised. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that Soviet nuclear war strategy assumes there will be a warning period of some length before any actual enemy attack. Conversely, of course, one would also have to infer that a sudden nuclear surprise attack by the Soviets, who still could not in any case completely rule out a retaliatory enemy blow at the USSR, does not fit in with the concept of the Soviet civil defense program. But while this inference may be correct insofar as the thinking of Soviet civil defense experts is concerned, it is nevertheless highly doubtful whether the thinking of these experts really coincides with that of the strategic planners.

Within the past year Soviet strategic planning has manifested a plainly discernible trend toward recognizing the possibility of Soviet recourse to a "preventive counter-blow." At the 22nd Party Congress, Marshall Malinovsky spoke of "developing means of foiling the aggressive plans of the enemy by timely and annihilating blows against him." In such a concept there is no place for a civil defense program that would start putting actual protective measures into effect and organizing the mass of the population only upon official command, since such action would warn the enemy in advance. This school of Soviet military strategy undoubtedly must assign greater importance to improving the means of warding off nuclear air attack than to protecting the population against actual bombs—a hypothesis which appears corroborated in fact by the increased emphasis being placed in the USSR on the development of anti-missile missiles.

It is noteworthy on this score that a series of four articles published in *Krasnaia zvezda* (November 29, December 14, and December 28, 1961; January 10, 1962) under the joint authorship of Colonel Sheltikov and Lieutenant Colonel Larionov (Candidates in Military Science) had nothing to say about the protection of civilians against nuclear weapon explosions (though there was a reference to the dispersion of troop units) while placing so much the greater stress on installations for fending off nuclear air attack. The two authors cited Marshall Malinovsky's statement at the 22nd Party Congress claiming that Soviet military technologists had successfully solved the problem of the in-flight destruction of missiles—a statement again quoted in an otherwise less sanguine article on this subject which appeared in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (The Armed Forces Communist, No. 6, 1962).

ONE MIGHT CONCLUDE from recent Soviet articles on military theory that the earlier concept of a balanced development of all branches of the armed services is giving way to a strategy envisaging the massive offensive use of nuclear missiles. There are, however, no clear indications that such a reformulation of strategy is generally favored by the Soviet military leadership: on the contrary—and here Mr. Gouré's book supplies well-documented evidence—indications are that Soviet military planning continues to envisage the possibility of various types of warfare.

Further, in assessing the implications of the fact that Soviet civil defense preparations have thus far consisted largely in training cadres and drawing up blueprints, it must be borne in mind that the various social mechanisms existing in the Soviet Union provide an essentially stronger groundwork for organizing the masses of the population than would generally be the case in Western democratic countries. Nevertheless, a critical analysis of the documents compiled by Mr. Gouré and of other Soviet publications permits the conclusion that the organizers of civil defense in the Soviet Union, while in a better position in some respects than their opposite numbers in the West, are also faced by a struggle to obtain the financial and industrial means for implementing their plans.

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Marx and His Critics

Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx,
by Robert C. Tucker.
Cambridge University Press,
London & New York, 1961.

The Tyranny of Concepts: A Critique of Marxism,
by Gordon Leff.
Merlin Press, London, 1961.

Marx—Penseur de la Technique,
by Kostas Axelos.
Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1961.

Reviewed by George Lichtheim

THE THREE BOOKS here under review exemplify in their different ways the truth of the statement that our age is a post-revolutionary one, at any rate so far as the Western world is concerned. The great upheaval of the Russian Revolution has been absorbed, and communism begins to fall into perspective. From the theoretical viewpoint this is a gain, not least if one is concerned with the enduring philosophical significance of Marxism. The advance, however, has to be bought at the cost of dissociating Marxian theory from Communist practice, which is why such intellectual investigations are possible only in the non-Communist world: one cannot well expect the Soviet Marxists and their pupils to display similar detachment, quite apart from the problem of developing adequate intellectual standards.

In the West, France and Italy are perhaps special cases since in both these countries intellectual sophistication of a very high order is still mobilized in defense of outworn political and social attitudes. Nevertheless, even there post-war neo-Marxism has already made a significant breach in the orthodox position.

M. Kostas Axelos, author of *Marx—Penseur de la Technique,* belongs to this company of European "revisionists." A Greek ex-Communist transplanted to France, he is currently one of the theorists grouped around the lively journal *Arguments,* which represents attitudes similar to those of the British "New Left." Perhaps "post-Marxist" describes their position even better than "neo-Marxist," but the borderline is difficult to draw. Socialists who start from Marx and then discover at a certain point that they have run out of intellectual ammunition are always in the embarrassing position of having to define themselves in terms that sound "Marxist" to one side and "revisionist" to the other. Be that as it may, it is now fairly generally accepted that the New Left represents an international movement stretching from Poland to the United States. Its internal tensions and tribulations are the subject of a recent volume of studies (*Revisionism,* ed. by L. Labedz, London, Unwin, New York, F. Praeger, 1962), which cannot be reviewed here but may perhaps be mentioned as a useful guide to the subject—not least because of the light it throws upon the connection between neo-Marxism and Existentialism in postwar France.

These hints must unfortunately be sufficient. For the rest, it may be said that Mr. Axelos is a learned and ingenious representative of this particular school, as may be gathered from the fact that he has performed, *inter alia,* the service of translating into French that manual of heresy, George Lukács's *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein.* With Maximilien Rubel, Lucien Goldman and others, he is an expositor and interpreter of Central European Marxism, as well as an erudite and sympathetic critic of Marx himself. Readers of his book cannot fail to perceive the advantage conferred upon a Marxologist by familiarity with the German language and the Central European background. Likewise they cannot fail to realize that to M. Axelos, as indeed to the whole of the New Left, it is the philosophical writings of the young Marx which furnish the real core of interest, while the author of *Das Kapital* recedes into the background. The term "alienation" makes its appearance already on the title page and does not remain absent very long thereafter; which is as it should be. If Marx is to be taken seriously as a philosopher, his Hegelian origins

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must be given due weight. There is no better way of establishing a link between his "existential" concern and that of the post-1945 generation of socialist intellectuals in Europe. There is also (need it be said?) no better way of enraging the guardians of Soviet orthodoxy.

The political ambiance of France is not on the whole favorable to philosophic detachment in these matters, and it is thus doubly noteworthy that Axelos, a libertarian socialist who long ago shed his Leninist blinkers, ends on a truly dispassionate note. Marx for him is at once the "last philosopher" and the first great thinker of the age of technology. "The wealth of his thought implies the questions about which he has not thought, which present themselves to us and impose themselves upon us." To which one may say Amen, even if one does not quite concur with the author's conclusion: "Marx a commencé a penser la technique. Il nous est dévolu maintenant de penser et d'experimenter la technique conquerante et planetaire." (Marx was the first to think seriously in terms of technology. It has fallen to us to think through and apply a technology that has conquered on a planetary scale.) Surely it won't do to revert to Saint-Simonism!

MR. GORDON LEFF, who represents the British wing of this international movement, is concerned with a narrower sector of the front. "This book has been largely prompted by the socialist rethinking of the New Left," we are told in the opening sentence of the preface. But in fact, Mr. Leff—a distinguished historian in the improbable field of medieval theology—has chosen for his topic the theme of dialectical and historical materialism. This enables him to concentrate on his own specialty, which happens to be logic and the analysis of philosophical concepts in general. The result is an extremely lucid and competent dissection of the weird medley of positivism and pseudo-Hegelianism which Engels (mostly after the death of Marx) fathered upon the movement. This has been done before—by Professor Sidney Hook among others, and more lately in Britain by Professor H. B. Acton—but Mr. Leff's viewpoint enables him to bring the discussion up to date. In addition to demolishing Lenin once more, he also lands some telling blows upon the surviving Leninists in Britain. Moreover—and this really calls for praise—he does so without succumbing to Professor Popper's doctrinaire dismissal of historical philosophy as so much rubbish. His book is thus likely to make a real impact upon a generation which has left Soviet Marxism behind but refuses to accept traditional British empiricism as the only possible alternative. To the present reviewer, who cannot quite get over the notion that writers on this subject should display some familiarity with Continental European philosophical thought, Mr. Leff, for all his academic learning and sophistication, sounds a trifle insular; but that is the only criticism of an excellent book whose tone and substance are in the best tradition of British philosophy.

Its concluding section, incidentally, states the ethical problem of every socialist movement descending from Marx with greater clarity and precision than is customarily the case in post-Leninist literature. This is done through an investigation of those familiar Hegelian terms "freedom" and "necessity." Mr. Leff is not the first to discern the ambiguities lurking behind the concept of historical materialism, but he is well equipped to analyze the moral implications of the belief that freedom lies in the recognition of necessity. "Clearly, then, there is no place for moral choice in such a procedure; at most we can call that moral which accedes to the demands of necessity." There is no Marxist ethics, or at least none that can be deduced from a determinist interpretation of history. The author here reverts to a topic that occupied two generations of German Marxists before Lenin settled it in his own fashion. Even so outstanding a radical as Karl Liebknecht—the proto-martyr of German communism—adhered to Kantian ethics because Hegelian determinism repelled him. The problem has never been solved. Lenin simply circumvented it, and his successors have surreptitiously smuggled their own moral standards —mostly derived from 19th century Russian radicalism and populism—into what they are pleased to describe as "the harmonious world-view of Marxism-Leninism."

TO TURN FROM these European authors to Professor Tucker's scholarly dissection of the young Marx is to experience a genuine sea-change. Both M. Axelos and Mr. Leff, in their different ways, are "committed" writers in the sense that their purpose is to revive socialist theory with the aid of that part of the Marxian heritage which has survived the upheavals of the recent past. Professor Tucker, by contrast, is concerned with Marx as a philosopher representing a viewpoint unsympathetic to his own, and (one gathers) foreign to America. This makes for a noticeable difference in tone. Whereas one may say that European socialism takes Marx for granted and proceeds from there, American liberalism offers an alternative model. Such an approach of course represents a commitment, and there is always some danger in establishing a close link between one's philosophy and one's politics. These perils are evident in some unfortunate observations in the concluding section of Pro-

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fessor Tucker's book, where "Christianity" and "capitalism" make a rather incongruous joint appearance—presumably because Feuerbach was concerned with the former and Marx with the latter. The effect on one reader at least was disconcerting. Capitalism may have a great deal to be said for it, but it is not the business of philosophers to spring to its defense. They should leave that to their colleagues of the economic faculty.

To be fair, this is a passing aberration. Professor Tucker has written an important study on the philosophical origins of Marxism, and it would require more space than is at my disposal to analyze both its considerable merits and its occasional lapses. Among the latter one must count the author's rather puzzled attempt to come to grips with humanism in its specifically German (*i.e.,* Goethean and Feuerbachian) form. There exists a radical critique of this position—most powerfully formulated in recent decades by Karl Barth—but to describe atheistic humanism as a form of self-aggrandizement, and to imply in all seriousness that it calls for a psychological explanation in terms of "neurosis" (p. 32), seems a trifle eccentric, at any rate to this reviewer.

Where Professor Tucker is likely to leave a permanent mark is in his analysis of Marx as the originator of a world view rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. "From a structural viewpoint," he writes, "Marxism invites analysis as a religious system." It is perhaps the chief merit of his work that this conclusion is firmly kept in view throughout, and rammed home in some striking passages of the early chapters. The notion itself is not altogether new: it has inspired a good deal of theological literature in postwar Europe—Catholic in France, Protestant in Germany. But it is well that the matter should also be discussed seriously in the Anglo-American world, where it has hitherto been neglected—possibly a commentary on the curious state of philosophy in both America and Britain. It is time for the metaphysical implications of Hegelian-Marxist thought to be faced, for the intellectual situation is changing fast. There are stirrings beneath the political crust in Eastern Europe, and even Soviet Marxists may not forever rest content with their present imbecile philosophy.

WHETHER PROFESSOR TUCKER has done full justice to his important theme is another matter. The core of his book is a searching and detailed analysis of Marx's early writings, notably the so-called "Paris Manuscripts" of 1844. These represent Marx's first and last attempt to come to grips with the subject of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind.* Had he continued along this course, he might have produced that systematic anthropology which modern Existentialism—partly under his influence—has been trying to work out. It would of course have been a "materialist" anthropology (in the Marxian sense of the term "materialist," which is rather different from that intended later by Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin): *i.e.,* a continuation of the work of Feuerbach. But— the point is worth stressing—had he done so, he would have remained a philosopher and left to others the task of "changing the world" to which he was already committed. The Marxian "union of theory and practice" required a rupture with the contemplative attitude. However "total" his view of the world—on this point the reviewer is quite in accord with Professor Tucker—Marx had no intention of staying at the level of philosophical speculation. To say then that "like medieval Christianity, Marx's system undertakes to provide an integrated, all-inclusive view of reality" (p. 22) is to obscure his intent, which was practical and revolutionary from the start. The "system" was an unintentional by-product of what Marx called "criticism," the latter signifying at once theoretical and practical activity. Just because it has become rather fashionable to stress the Jewish-Christian ancestry of Marxism, one must be on one's guard against the temptation to suppose that this heritage had an altogether unequivocal significance. Insofar as he was a Jew (though a rather anti-Semitic one) Marx can hardly have failed to sense that Christians were excessively given to contemplation. That at any rate is the bu den of his well-known polemical remarks on the subject. Professor Tucker, it is true, regards the "union of theory and practice" as a Christian inheritance, but surely the only practical activity enjoined on believers was of a moral kind?

The other strand in Professor Tucker's argument has to do with the peculiar world view of German idealism, starting with Kant. Here he is on more familiar ground, and his analysis of Hegelianism relates it firmly to its Kantian ancestry. His own criticism of Kant likewise falls into a definite and recognizable tradition: that which already during the First World War saw the root of all German failings in German metaphysics. When he says of Kant's philosophy that it "transformed what had always been regarded as the radical fault in man, the pathology of selfhood, into a universal norm" (p. 38), he reminds us that Kant had broken with traditional theology, and that the theologians have not forgiven him. Yet to say that this philosophy "identified the neurotic personality as the normal man, and pride as the requirement of 'reason' " is to indulge in theological passion, not to say odium.

It is nevertheless just as well that these profound differences between the religious and the human-

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ist position, should be clearly brought out, for the discussion usually gets stuck at the point where someone repeats that Feuerbach generalized Goethe's pantheism and that Faust—the first "modern man"—is equally the hero of Goethe and of Marx. All this is true, and Professor Tucker duly notes the continuity. But he goes further and traces the whole development back to Kant, which is as good as saying that the repudiation of religion is at the origin of our contemporary world upheaval. Well, it is a tenable position, but two points are worth making: first, German liberalism is unthinkable without Kant; and second, those Socialists who tried to overcome the positivist narrowness of Engels and develop an ethical philosophy were mosty Kantians. To be consistent, therefore, Professor Tucker must write off the entire German humanist tradition as a departure from a norm whose meaning he does not state but merely implies. It is praiseworthy that he has in fact achieved this degree of consistency, for now the discussion can at last be conducted in terms which relate back to the central problems of philosophy.

As indicated above, M. Axelos—like practically all the neo-Marxists and revisionists in contemporary France, Italy, or Poland—is an adherent of existentialism; a school which does not argue the case for humanism, but rather takes it for granted that "man makes himself." Mr. Leff is troubled by the problem of discerning a generally acceptable moral standard without falling back into theology. The solution he comes up with is that "the humanist position must rest upon a belief in man as the measure of all things human; that is to say, it must take its start from man as a human being with human needs, not as a mere unit in the historical process." This is substantially the position of Feuerbach and the young Marx. To Professor Tucker it is heresy, for he holds that it is presumptuous to dispense with a supernatural standard. The implication of his argument is that, since secularized Christianity has culminated in humanism, and finally in Marxism, we must retrace our steps to the point reached before "the movement of thought from Kant to Hegel" had brought about "a radical departure from Western tradition." His book has the great merit of relating the conservative position firmly to its religious assumptions, which are indeed essential to it, for their abandonment—on this point the reviewer is quite in accord with the author—leaves conservatism exposed to inconsistencies which ruin it as a system of thought. Whatever one's own ultimate commitment, it is well that this should be made clear.

A Spoonful of Soviet Medicine

The Achievement of Soviet Medicine,
by L. Fridland, M.D.,
edited in English by W. Horsley Gantt, M.D.
Twayne Publishers Inc., New York, 1961.

Reviewed by Mark G. Field

AS THE WESTERN WORLD reads about "sputniks," "luniks," Gagarins and Titovs, the thought must sometimes intrude: what of Soviet accomplishments in other areas of scientific endeavor? Are the Soviets, for example, about to surprise us with a sputnik against cancer, a lunik against mental illness, a breakthrough in the cure of heart disease? According to the statement on its fly-leaf, the book under review—written by a Soviet author and now published in an English edition—purports to "provide the means for an objective determination of whether the Soviet push for supremacy has achieved another breakthrough on the scientific front," specifically in the field of medicine. Unfortunately for us and the rest of mankind, and in spite of the author's

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roseate picture, the answer must be largely in the negative. Notwithstanding a few spectacular achievements such as the use of cadaver blood for transfusions and the development of a stapling device for sewing blood vessels together, Soviet medical scientists appear to be as baffled as our own by the major problems in medicine —and probably no nearer to their solution.

In one sense, Fridland's book belongs to the strange category of intellectual production that was quite popular in the Soviet Union five to ten years ago, and the aim of which was to prove the superiority of "Soviet progressive" over "foreign bourgeois" science. In an attempt to wean the population away from a centuries-old inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West (particularly in technology), the regime spared no effort to "prove" that almost every major invention had been the product of Russian genius, and that the credit had been unfairly stolen by an unscrupulous and mendacious West. The attitude of kowtowing to "bourgeois science" was mercilessly attacked as a national disgrace—and woe to the Soviet scientist who said something good about Western science and technology!

In medicine no less than in other fields the campaign was waged with vigor and enthusiasm. One could read, for example, in *Meditsinskii rabotnik* (Medical Worker) for November 29, 1951, that one of the essential duties of Soviet medicine is to "establish the priority of Russian scientists in the different areas of medical science." The credit for many medical discoveries had allegedly been misappropriated by Western physicians, and it was therefore the task of Soviet historical research to set the record straight. For instance, the Kummel operation (named after a German surgeon) was said to have been first proposed by a Russian, Zerenin; consequently, whenever this type of procedure was referred to in the future, whether in learned journals or operation-room registers, it was to be called the "Zerenin operation."

EARLY IN HIS BOOK, Fridland tells a story in the same vein under the caption, "Foreign Visitor." It refers to an event that took place in St. Petersburg in 1913 when the "Austrian" Professor Enderlen was called to the bedside of a famous Russian singer dying of pernicious anemia. Enderlen is said to have advocated a blood transfusion, and shortly thereafter the patient died because her blood and the donor's were incompatible. The foreigner thus committed a blunder and caused a Russian to die needlessly. But even worse, writes Fridland, "the invitation of a foreign specialist showed how slavishly Russia's ruling classes of the day worshipped all things foreign and scorned their own native science. Yet in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even long before that, progressive Russian scientists substantially contributed to the advance of science." And so on.

Fortunately, this kind of chauvinistic nonsense belongs largely—though obviously not entirely—to the past. Soviet Russia now has more substantial scientific and technological achievements to its credit and need not indulge in fishing expeditions into the past to come up with dubious (and often ludicrous) claims of having preceded the rest of the world in every field of scientific advance.

The aim of Fridland's book originally was to popularize the wonders of contemporary medicine for the Soviet audience, and the purpose of its translation into English is to offer a glimpse into the Soviet medical world to outsiders. In line with the general outlook and philosophy just described, the author seeks to glorify Soviet medicine as something more or less unique, the peculiar product of the "progressive" nature of the Soviet social system and of Soviet science. As a consequence, the book not only exhibits the predictable biases and distortions, but also mirrors the relative insularity and parochialism of Soviet medicine, which remains to this day somewhat detached from the mainstreams of world medicine.

It is true, of course, that top Soviet medical scientists keep up with the Western literature in their fields, but the exchange and circulation of medical personnel that commonly takes place between non-Communist countries does not involve the Soviet Union. Indeed, apart from the few who visited the United States during World War II, almost no Soviet medical scientist—or any other kind of scientist for that matter—was allowed to work or study abroad from the early 1930's until Stalin's death and shortly thereafter—something which certainly had not been the case before the Revolution. This enforced isolation of Soviet medical science, in combination with political and ideological interference, has contributed toward removing its achievements from the scientific scrutiny of world medicine as well as toward the development by Soviet medical scientists of theories that sometimes smack of charlatanism, such as Filatov's "biogenic stimulators," [1] or are in the Lysenko tradition, such as Lepeshinskaia's theory that

[1] Filatov's theory attributes curative properties to tissues that are removed from one organism, kept under unfavorable circumstances (thereby causing certain biochemical changes), and then reimplanted into the human organism. See Vladimir Filatov, *My Path in Science,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1957.

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cells, instead of being derived from other cells (as Virchow demonstrated many years ago), also originate from undifferentiated organic matter.

THE BOOK UNDER REVIEW purports to detail Soviet medical achievements, particularly in the fields of research and clinical practice. It is, however, bound to be disappointing in this respect, for two main reasons. One is that the book is out of date: although there is no indication of the year in which it was originally published, it is at least ten years behind the times and presents very little that is new to the informed Western reader. The second is that it contains many errors which indicate a lack of sophistication and knowledge on the author's part. Indeed, as I read the book, I became curious about the simple validity of statements made by Fridland with respect to specialized clinical matter. I decided to make a test by asking a prominent cardiologist to examine and evaluate the book, particularly Chapter 11 on "Blood Pressure and Heart Disease." This, in part, is what he had to say:

It is my impression that the author presents a confused picture of cardiovascular disease, in which certain established facts are freely intermingled with half-truths, misconceptions and even nonsense . . . I do not get the impression that the author is at all well trained in the cardiovascular field, and believe he has picked up a few nuggets of information here and there, and has put in a certain amount of filling in between. The net effect is a rather indigestible presentation . . . On page 215, the author seems to equate a rise in blood pressure with a rise in the heart rate. On page 317, the reference is made to an increase in blood pressure as being a symptom in itself. On page 318 he suggests that thrombosis in a vein impedes the circulation and may produce high blood pressure . . . he confuses heart rate, blood pressure, and the flow of blood in their relationship to the genesis of hypertension. On page 319, he makes the flat statement that hypertension begins with spasm which is first evidenced in the "larger arteries of the heart." . . .On page 324 and subsequently, he gives an elaboration of his thesis of the nervous system origin of hypertension. This thesis is presented with so little factual documentation that it is most unimpressive. He complicates this by introducing the role of malnutrition and what he calls "strong" and "weak" types of nervous activity. He complicates this even more by suggesting that cold climates constrict the arteries and produce high blood pressure also.

Finally, in his section on treatment, he mentions a number of measures of, so far as I know, no value whatsoever and gives no scientific documentation for their use (inhalation of oxygen with a certain humidity, avoidance of alcohol, etc.)[2]

[2] Extracted from a personal communication to the reviewer from Oglesby Paul, M.D., dated December 13, 1961.

It may be that Chapter 11 is an exception, but I doubt it. The more important question, however, is whether Fridland's book reflects his own ignorance (and failure to keep abreast of developments) or the actual state of Soviet medicine at the time the book was written. To some degree his work mirrors the general tone of official Soviet medicine about a decade ago, with its compulsive emphasis on Pavlov, its provincialism, isolationism, and chauvinism. Indeed, it is quite probable that the book does an injustice to many capable Soviet medical scientists by failing to mention their work, possibly because they were at the time under attack by the regime's medical-ideological watchdogs. It is probably also conducive to an unfair impression of the contemporary state of Soviet medical research and clinical practice.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it is my own general impression, derived from interviews with many American and other physicians who have been to the Soviet Union and observed the situation there, that Soviet medical science, with a few exceptions, has as yet added little of value to the world's storehouse of medical knowledge. In other words, the medical sputniks and luniks are still to come. As good an index as any is the list of Nobel Prize awards in Medicine and Physiology from 1901 through 1960. Only one Russian received the prize for work done in Russia, and this was Pavlov in 1904. (Mechnikov received it in 1908 for work done in Paris.) No Russian has received it for work done in the postrevolutionary period, unless one stretches the definition and includes Selman Waksman, who was born in the Ukraine in 1888 and emigrated to the US before the Revolution. He received the prize in 1952.

If Soviet medicine does have one important achievement to its credit, that achievement receives surprisingly little attention in Fridland's book. This is undoubtedly the Soviet blueprint for socialized medicine, a blueprint which, incidentally, is especially germane to the needs of the economically underdeveloped countries. Soviet success in increasing the supply of physicians, in eradicating certain diseases and mitigating the impact of others; the expansion of medical facilities in the countryside; the lowering of infant mortality and lengthening of life-expectancy at birth—these are undeniable achievements of Soviet medicine. They are successes which derive from the quantitative application of generally available medical knowledge, rather than from pioneering advances in medical research and its qualitative clinical application. Under Soviet conditions, such an approach makes eminent sense.

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At the same time, there is little doubt that should the Soviet regime decide to inject the same kind of vigor, energy, and resources into medical as it has into space research, Soviet medical scientists could yet make important qualitative contributions to world medicine. And from the propaganda standpoint alone, what would be more significant and impressive than a Soviet breakthrough in cancer or heart disease?

For the present, Soviet medicine's best medicine would be greater scientific intercourse with the West, expanded personal contacts between Soviet and Western scientists and physicians, and removal of the barriers to the exchange of medical-scientific personnel. This would imply freedom for Westerners to visit and work in Soviet laboratories, clinics, and hospitals, and the same freedom for Soviet medical scientists to circulate in the West. There is evidence that some progress has been made in this direction since Stalin died, and it can only be hoped that the two-way traffic can be maintained and increased. There may even be a time when books on the achievement of Soviet as against American, Austrian, or Andorran medicine will become superfluous.

Hungarian October Revisited

The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising,
by Paul Kecskemeti.
Stanford University Press, California, 1961.

Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism,
by Ferenc A. Vali.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge; University Press, London, 1961.

Reviewed by Paul Ignotus

IT MAY BE BORING to be reminded again and again of the Hungarian Revolution, yet how can one forget it? Indeed, formal reminders—the publication of the books under review coincided roughly with the fifth anniversary of the October revolt—are quite unnecessary since the unexpected uprising in 1956 and the international implications of its initial success and ultimate defeat continue to haunt the Communist rulers as well as those who watch for new "rifts and revolts" in the Communist world.

The Hungarian revolt was an event that was unique in some respects and typical in others; and Mr. Kecskemeti, in his analytical study, is careful to stress its distinctive features as well as those which it shared with all mass movements aimed at national independence. In a most enlightening chapter, he draws analogies between the sequence of events in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary during the period starting with Stalin's death and ending symbolically with Imre Nagy's execution. All three countries made noteworthy efforts in the course of those years to rid themselves both of Soviet domination and of Communist party oppression. Of the three attempts only the two which had been initiated by reformers within the Communist party itself (Poland and Hungary) succeeded temporarily. And only in Poland, where qualified Soviet tutelage and Communist party supremacy were eventually accepted by the people, did the insurgents' program escape total defeat.

While it would be mistaken to conclude that no liberation movement in the Communist orbit could ever bring about a change more radical than that envisaged and achieved by Gomulka, it does seem clear that, ruling out war, no significant reform can be accomplished unless it is sponsored by political elements which are close to the broad masses of the population as well as to what Mr. Kecskemeti calls the "elite"—in short, that a significant segment of the party leadership, and especially the Communist intellectuals, must spearhead the movement. In Hungary, says Mr. Kecskemeti,

There were two separate processes contributing to political instability before the revolution, one confined to strata

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within, or close to, the center of the Communist power apparatus itself, the other spreading throughout the broad anonymous masses. . . . The elite process was a gradual one. It manifested itself in various ways ranging from personal and clique rivalries (found at all times in all Communist parties) to violent purges and their repercussions, and novel, exceptional forms of defiance from within the apparatus. . . . The mass process took a discontinuous, jerky course: a long period of incubation, during which popular bitterness found practically no overt, public expression and was subdued even in its private manifestations, gave way abruptly to a period of total insubordination.

This is why, in the author's words, "the Communist regime would have been eliminated for good if it had not been for Soviet military intervention."

The revolution could be defeated, but not lived down. It was an event unprecedented in Communist experience, and its triumph lay in the paradoxical nature of its origins: the protagonists of the revolt represented the moral elite of the ruling Communist party, while the most active mass support came from the industrial workers of equally Marxist (mainly Social Democratic) traditions who turned the classical proletarian weapon of class warfare, the general strike, against those who pretended to rule in the name of the working class. Hungary in 1956 revealed what deep contradictions there can be under Communist rule between the interests of the working class and Marxist intellectuals on the one hand, and the Communist Party, which purports to act as their *porte-parole,* on the other. Mr. Kecskemeti can indeed safely assume that "this discrepance between the key symbols defining the party's mission and the available possibilities for practical developmental work is bound to lead to political frustrations and conflicts."

IN HIS BOOK *Rift and Revolt in Hungary,* Professor Vali makes a scholarly attempt to follow up the conflicts in that country step by step, from the establishment of Soviet power after the German defeat until its second consolidation after the Hungarian defeat. The volume of documentary evidence he uses is enormous, and a lifetime would not be enough to check on the accuracy of every statement he chooses to rely upon. In view of the recent flood of publications on Hungary, Mr. Vali's difficulty must have consisted in selecting his sources rather than in finding them, and his determination to be as thorough and impartial as possible cannot fail to disarm even a critical reader.

Yet the overabundance of materials did not help him to elucidate the factual background of all relevant events. The Stalinist "liquidations," in particular, are still as unexplained in their details as they are clear in their tendencies, methods, and results. We know that Rakosi, the Hungarian "Stalin," assisted by Gabor Peter, the Hungarian "Beria," liquidated Rajk as the Hungarian "Tito," and later Kadar, known today as the Hungarian "Khrushchev"; we also know that as late as 1952, still in Stalin's lifetime, Rakosi reorganized his own set of "Berias" and liquidated "Gabor Peter and his gang." All this fitted in perfectly with the style of those years, and with Rakosi's character. But as to the reason why he picked on one comrade rather than another at any particular moment, we still depend on conjecture and hearsay for an explanation. Not all statements in every eye-witness report can be equally true. (As to facts that can be checked, incidentally, Professor Vali errs when he states that prison sentences of "between two and four years" were passed on writers after the revolution [p. 441]. Actually, Tibor Dery was sentenced to nine years, and Gyula Hay to six.)

Rift and Revolt in Hungary, detailed as it is, is not meant to be a comprehensive account of postwar Hungarian history (though a chronological table would have been helpful). The author deliberately concentrates on what he judges to be the main areas of conflict, and he quite rightly devotes much space to a discussion of what Mr. Kecskemeti has called the "elite process." In particular, Professor Vali stresses the difficulties of the revisionists who sought to lead a reform movement without breaking openly with the party:

This fighting the party "from within" had its disadvantages. . . . It was not easy to convey to out-and-out opponents of the system the expediency of resorting to the devious tactics of concealed opposition cloaked in Communist ideological terms. Unsophisticated elements—outright enemies of the Communist system—were often reluctant to join writers and students who, compelled to fight on ideological ground, were outwardly professing loyalty to the regime itself.

Here it might be added that not all the revisionists who expressed themselves in the Communist idiom did so disingenuously. Some truly did believe in the political establishment of "pure" Marxism-Leninism; others, however, had clearly come to the conclusion that their whole ideological edifice would have to be pulled down together with the Stalin statue; and most of them avoided the problem by demanding first of all democratization and national independence, and leaving further decisions to the future. Indeed, it was this order of priorities that united, at the peak of the Hungarian drama, the revolutionary Communists and the non-Communist bulk of the nation.

Only a massive outside intervention could defeat a people thus united in revolution, and Professor Vali,

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without national self-pity and overdramatization, goes on to show how Western indecision helped the Kremlin to overcome its own early hesitation, reenter Hungary with superior force, and crush the revolt.

THE MOST DEBATABLE part of the book is the final chapter, entitled "Nationalism *versus* Communism," where Professor Vali propounds the view that the Hungarian uprising of 1956 was a nationalist revolution *par excellence*. This conclusion is not borne out either by the rich factual material included in the work itself or by other available evidence. The author may indeed be right in saying that "the most powerful motivation leading to a rift within the Communist Party of Hungary was a conscious or unconscious national sentiment . . . [which] hopelessly divided a narrow Communist leadership from the rest of the population." But national sentiment is one thing, and nationalism as an ideology another.

To some extent Professor Vali appears to be aware of the importance of this distinction. "The gobal competing ideologies, communism and nationalism," he writes, "differ so basically that we might well consider it nothing more than a convenience to use the same term—'ideology'—for both of them. If so, it would seem rather misleading to accept the convenience. Nationalist ideologies do, of course, have an existence in history, and they played a decisive part in the moulding of the political, economic and intellectual life of pre-1945 Hungary. But as can be seen from Professor Vali's narrative, they had virtually no role either in bringing about the 1956 revolution or in nourishing its spirit for months after the Soviet reoccupation. National sentiment, on the other hand—or patriotism, as I should prefer to call it—was one of its dominant features all along.

This is why the difference between national sentiment and nationalism as an ideology must be of more than academic interest to anyone reexamining the Hungarian October. It should be kept equally firmly in view by those who study nationalist trends in the underdeveloped countries, to which Professor Vali also devotes a subchapter. While this again is a phenomenon of a somewhat different character, the similarities are sufficiently important to justify Mr. Vali's emphasis on the real kinship between the newly-emerging countries of Asia and Africa and the peoples of East Central Europe.

French Studies of the USSR

Le Gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S.,
by Michel Mouskhely and Zygmunt Jedryka.
Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1961.

Les Paysans soviétiques,
by Jean Chombart de Lauwe.
Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1961.

La Nouvelle Orientation du commerce extérieur soviétique,
by Louis Kawan.
National Center for Research on Communist Countries,
Brussels, 1958.

Aspects juridiques du commerce avec les pays d'économie planifiée,
compiled by René David.
Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence,
Paris, 1961.

Reviewed by Henri Chambre

IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, the body of French-language studies devoted to the examination and analysis of the Soviet system has been enriched by several works of value.

Among them is the study of Soviet government written by Michel Mouskhely, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Research on the USSR at the University of Strasbourg, in collaboration with Zygmunt Jedryka, Research Associate at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. Its appearance last year was an important event for French readers interested in Soviet affairs since there had hitherto been

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no French equivalent to the studies of the Soviet political system by the well-known American scholars, J. N. Hazard and Merle Fainsod.[1]

The work by Mouskhely and Jedryka is of interest chiefly because of the author's method of approach. It is not what might be termed a "neutral" exposition of facts but rather a "comprehensive" study in the definition of S. Dilthey or Max Weber, as Marcel Prélot, now Senator and former President of the University of Strasbourg, has pointed out. In other words, the two authors have endeavored to comprehend the Soviet governmental system not from an external but rather from an internal point of view, by probing into the fundamental *raisons d'être* and justifications of the system in order to assess its value and scope. The analysis thus avoids an approach based on any undue preconceptions, and by so doing it appears all the more critical when it brings out—from the inside, so to speak—the contradiction between theory and reality.

Messrs. Mouskhely and Jedryka rightly recognize, moreover, that the Soviet system of government can be correctly analyzed and understood only to the extent that its roots in the Russian character, mentality, and environment are brought to light—a point which Mr. N. Berdiaev convincingly underlinled in his study, *Les Sources et le sens du communisme russe (The Origins and Meaning of Russian Communism, Gallimard, Paris, 1938)*. At the same time, they are well aware of the specific character which the system derives from the fact that it was molded by the Marxist-Leninist ideology and by the Communist Party. The authors are thus to be congratulated for having grounded their analysis of Soviet government in a comprehensive study of the Russian milieu (the territory, the people and their mentality, the social structure) and the Communist Party.[2]

However, the most interesting and informative part of the work is the authors' study of the institutionalization of the Soviet state. Here, they trace the formation and present an anaylsis of the institutions of political and judicial power and of local administration, as well as the machinery of economic administration and control which is peculiar to the Soviet governmental system and which makes it as inflexible in its administration of physical things as in the governance of men. Lastly, the authors' discussion of Soviet federalism in terms of both theory and practice brings into focus the wide discrepancy between Communist doctrine and Soviet reality by showing the narrow limits within which the theoretrical autonomy of the federated republics is actually exercised.

THE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET society presented by Mouskhely and Jedryka comes to mind again in reading Jean Chombart de Lauwe's study of the Soviet peasantry. The author, who is Professor of Rural Economy at the National Agricultural College at Grignon, shows that in spite of the steadily increasing industrialization and urbanization of the USSR, the rural population still constitutes an important and basic element in present-day Soviet society. And one of the principal questions which engages his attention is whether or not the Soviet regime has succeeded in transforming the traditional Russian peasant into a worker of a new type.

In attempting to answer this question, Professor de Lauwe relies not only on his own first-hand observations made during several recent visits to collective farms in European Russia, but also on an analysis of ample Soviet documentation. After retracing the history of the Russian peasantry from the end of the last century up to the present, he examines the functioning of Soviet agricultural institutions: the *kolkhoz*, the *sovkhoz*, and the Machine Tractor Stations. But the value of the study derives, above all, from the keen perception which the author, as a rural economist, brings to the judgments he formulates.

One interesting point made by Professor de Lauwe is that the "industrialization" of agriculture, which the Soviet leaders have been striving to achieve for more than thirty years, is in itself not an altogether original and unique undertaking. On the contrary, he says, "the application of the same forms of production organization in both agriculture and industry is in keeping with a general long-term tendency." The Soviet leaders, however, erred in several respects, chiefly in trying to effect the transformation of agriculture too rapidly, in imposing collectivization by force, without the support of the masses, and in adopting unsuitable methods such as the excessive emphasis placed on agricultural mechanization and the attempt to apply industrial

[1] Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, Chicago, 1957, (2nd edition, 1960); Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953.

[2] Mention should be made of the documented and thought-provoking study of the Soviet Communist Party published last year by Mr. N. Rutych (*Le Parti communiste au pouvoir en URSS, 1917-1960*, Editions de la Table Ronde, Paris, 1961), which provides a valuable supplement to Mr. Leonard Schapiro's earlier study (*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Random House, New York, 1960).

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planning methods to agriculture. Other mistakes were the inadequate organization of agricultural research and inefficiency in disseminating agricultural information.

In spite of all this, the author points out, Soviet agriculture is expanding and probably is capable of still further development. He maintains it to be nonetheless true, however, that the Soviet leaders, while striving to liquidate the old traditional rural civilization, have not yet succeeded either in developing viable substitutes for the two essential pillars of rural economy—the farm and the village—or in creating the envisioned new type of man. The disappearance of antagonism between city and country, which is supposedly one of the distinctive features of full communism, thus still remains beyond the Soviet horizon. But the industrialization of agriculture, while it does not pose the question of urban-rural relations in new terms, does lend it great urgency, for it is not fitting that under new industrialized forms of agricultural exploitation the farmer should be penalized in comparison to the city dweller.

THE WORK BY Mr. Louis Kawan focuses attention on a problem of great current interest to Sovietologists: the reorientation of the foreign commerce of the USSR. Whereas Soviet external trade between the two World Wars was chiefly with the countries of Europe and a few countries of the Middle East, it has been marked since the death of Stalin by a gradual shift of direction toward the raw-material producing countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa—or, broadly speaking, the economically underdeveloped countries. Mr. Kawan dates the beginning of this reorientation back to an international meeting held in Moscow in April 1952. After examining the organization and structure of Soviet foreign commerce, he analyzes the development of trade between the Soviet Union and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He shows that the USRR is concentrating its commercial effort on countries which are politically independent but at the same time dependent economically on their export trade and desirous of industrializing rapidly. In many cases, says the author, these countries can find no solution of their economic problems other than that proffered them by the USSR. And in conclusion, he urges that the economically advanced Western countries should endeavor to formulate a new approach to trade relations that will enable them to meet the Soviet challenge effectively. In the reviewer's opinion, a vital preliminary step in this direction would be to make a concrete analysis of international trade from the standpoint of its significance in the framework of the competition between rival economic systems, such as was proposed by Mr. F. Perroux in the second volume of his *La Coexistence pacifique* (P.U.F., Paris, 1958).[3]

In the last of the books under review, the focus is on juridical problems posed by trade relations between free-enterprise countries and those having planned economies. Compiled under the direction of Professor René David, of the School of Law and Economics of the University of Paris, the volume consists of reports presented by jurists of various countries (United States, Sweden, Great Britain, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and France) at the 1958 meeting of the International Association of Legal Science held in Rome under UNESCO auspices.

For example, one of the reports is the work of Professor H. J. Berman, of Harvard University, and deals with the legal framework of trade relations between the United States and the USSR (covering the Soviet system of foreign commerce and American controls on both the importation of Soviet goods into the United States and the exportation of American goods to the USSR). The reports of J. N. Hazard and M. Domke examine the bearing of the most-favored-nation clause, in which the USSR has always shown great interest: their analyses suggest that the clause has lost its utility as a means of promoting international trade and that a substitute must be devised. L. Kopelmanas, A. Tunc, and T. Ionesco devote their attention to trade agreements and techniques for their implementation. With particular reference to Yugoslavia, A. Goldstein considers the solution of international trade disputes by arbitration. Taken as a whole, the study serves to bring home the many complex difficulties inherent in establishing and improving trade relations between countries with different economic systems and, in this respect, provides a useful supplement to Mr. Kawan's economic analysis of Soviet foreign trade commented on above.

[3] Mr. Perroux has been directing the preparation of a series of bulletins published by the Institute of Applied Economic Science (Paris), analyzing various planned economies *(Cahiers de l'I. S. E. A., Série G: Economie planifiée)*. Recent issues have been devoted to the Soviet Seven-Year Plan and the economic thought of Oscar Lange.

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Hooliganism—and How (Not) to Deal with It

SOME OF THE EPISODES from the brief history of the "people's volunteer" movement in the USSR since its inception in 1959 recall the best writing of Saltykov-Shchedrin. At once well-intentioned but quite impracticable, the whole undertaking was one that might well have been thought up by one of the novelist's more eccentric mayors of Glupov.[1]

The reasons for its launching are not far to seek. A good deal of evidence suggests that from about the middle 1950's the Soviet Union experienced an increasing wave of "hooliganism," the blanket term officially applied to a host of petty crimes. The sharpening of the laws against various misdemeanors including drunkenness, the simplification of legal procedures for handling hoodlums, the institution of scholarly studies into the causes of crime, and the establishment of special commissions to deal with juvenile delinquents, not to mention the creation of the "comrades' courts," all point to this conclusion. The official claim that the motivation for these moves was the unwillingness of the Soviet people to carry over "survivals of the past" into the Communist society seems, somehow, unconvincing.

The prevention of petty crime previously fell within the province of the militia. It is no secret, however, that owing to neglect in Stalin's time the militia long failed to attract the best specimens of Soviet manhood, and the observations of foreign visitors confirm that this sizable force is not generally respected by the Soviet public even to this day. It therefore seems highly probable that the Khrushchev leadership considered the militia incapable of handling the worsening situation. Under Stalin a high incidence of crime had not mattered; but now it did. Khrushchev evidently thought that by starting the people's volunteer movement he could find a way out of the dilemma.

The solution was neat and immediately appealing to the simple mind, for it seemed to envisage nothing less than a popular drive against all criminals. The organs of the militia would be supplemented by a public volunteer force, and the healthy elements in Soviet society would thus be turned against the diseased. On March 10, 1959, *Pravda* gave top place of honor to a résumé of a party-government decree entitled "On the Participation of the Workers in the Maintenance of Public Order," which incorporated this new idea. Groups of crime-fighters—*druzhiny*—were to be organized all over the country. They would be controlled through the existing party, soviet, trade-union and Komsomol networks.

The duties of the groups, as formulated later,[2] were extensive. Besides patrolling the streets and public places to "keep order," they were to combat hooliganism, drunkenness, theft of government and private property, swindling, speculation, illegal vodka-distilling, and violations of traffic regulations. They were also called upon to help in the duties of frontier guards, to struggle against neglect of children, and to seek out "persons leading a parasitic existence." Offenders caught by the groups were to be handed over to the militia or to a comrades' court for punishment, or could even be fined on the spot. *Druzhinniki* were also given the right to set up "Boards of Shame" which would subject violators of law and order to public humiliation.

IT APPEARS THAT the *druzhiny,* initially at least, enjoyed a measure of popularity. No exact membership figures have been published for the whole USSR, but a Soviet lawyer, writing early in 1960, put the total at over two million.[3] The novelty of the work must have been very attractive to Soviet young people, who apparently made up the greater part of the force—and the Soviet leadership probably thought the move a good way of pumping new life into flagging Komsomol organizations.

Moreover, a movement of such huge dimensions (even allowing a generous margin for bloated statistics) could hardly fail to have some impact on the number of viola-

[1] Glupov, or "Stupidville," was the name given by Saltykov-Shchedrin to the town in his story, "A Tale of a Town." Its citizens were oppressed by successive mayors who invented fantastic and unworkable schemes to improve the well-being of the town—or rather their own positions.

[2] *Sovetskaia yustitsia,* No. 5, 1960, p. 30.

[3] *Ibid.,* No. 2, 1960, p. 11.

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tions of the law. Since the formation of the *druzhiny*, significant decreases in offenses have in fact been claimed for cities as different and far apart as Leningrad and Nebit Dag (Turkmen Republic), or Kirov and Alma Ata.[4] In some places people reportedly were able for the first time in years to venture out into the streets at night without fear of attack. Doubtless, too, this vast army has been responsible for many good deeds in the best Baden-Powell tradition. Witness the following account of an incident in the town of Ivanovo, a few miles northeast of Moscow:

A woman was trying to lead a tall, dark-haired girl of about fifteen years of age out of the public garden [which the *druzhinniki* were patrolling]. The girl did not want to go and was resisting tearfully. The volunteers invited them both to come along to their headquarters. "I don't want to live with them, I don't! I won't go home!" cried the girl. It turned out that she had not slept at home for several nights past. Her father, who had recently been released from jail, was a drunkard and debauchee, and her stepmother (the woman with her) was leading an immoral life. The volunteers consulted together and decided to take the girl under their care. Lyuba Styenakina took her back to her hostel for the night, and soon afterwards a place was found for her in a boarding school. . . . It would be possible [the account concludes] to find many more examples of how sensitively the volunteers treat people, how delicately and zealously they watch over their fates.[5]

BUT DESPITE SUCH touching interludes, the *druzhina* movement deviated in many respects from the proclaimed tenets of socialist legality and was bound to cause trouble before very long. This was evident from the astonishing flaws and omissions in the regulations covering its formation and activities. Not the least alarming of these was *the lack of control over the selection of the volunteers themselves.* According to the statutes, persons over 18 years of age could be admitted "on the basis of their personal applications and the recommendations of the trade union, Komsomol, or other social organization or of a meeting of the collective (*kolektiv*) at their place of work or residence." Obviously, the movement was wide open to any roughnecks who thought there was something to be gained by joining. And the training given to those admitted, consisting of a few lectures, was hopelessly inadequate. More important, the *extent of the druzhinnik's power* was not clearly defined: for instance, no indication was given as to how far he could go if the person he was apprehending offered resistance. Nor was the private citizen granted any *specific right of appeal* against wrongful actions by the *druzhiny.* Very disturbing also was the fact that extensive legal responsibilities were conferred on persons untrained to exercise them.

[4] See, *e.g., Izvestia,* February 24, 1960; *Turkmenskaia Iskra,* March 12, 1962; *Komsomolskaia pravda,* May 20, 1961.

[5] *Molodoi kommunist,* No. 2, 1960, p. 86.

Thus it was only natural that complaints about the activities of the *druzhiny* soon began to appear in the Soviet press. In some places, it seems, they did not hestitate to resort to criminal action against innocent citizens, especially when this was to their own benefit. Rather than delve into the morass of reports telling of minor incidents, let us look at one particularly revealing account which illustrates some of the worst excesses committed by the *druzhiny.*[6] The events described took place in Nikolaev, an industrial town situated near Odessa. Arrangements had been made to televise a football match being played at the local stadium. The television engineers had some difficulty in finding a suitable place to set up their cameras, finally positioning them on the running track encircling the field. The account continues:

Just at this moment some brave lads with red armbands appeared on the scene and ordered the engineers to move the cameras "in two ticks." But where? Anywhere they liked. The spectators declared in a friendly way that the equipment was not in the way. But Arkadii Mednik, the head of the municipal *druzhina* organization, was annoyed and would not listen to anyone. "Throw the cameras over the fence!" he ordered. Naturally enough, Zasukhin, the senior engineer and secretary of the primary Komsomol group at the television center, began to protest. "Seize him!" cried Mednik. They twisted the young engineer's arms behind his back, and Mednik struck him in the face with his fist. In vain did the engineer try to defend himself. A rain of blows was showered on him at Mednik's order. Zasukhin was placed under arrest for more than an hour, and the *druzhinniki* would not even allow militiamen near him. It required intervention by the secretaries of the party *gorkom* to get Mednik to stop making mock of the senior engineer.

The account later tells us that the whole town was intimidated by Mednik and other leading *druzhina* officials. The volunteer groups under them did not limit themselves to an occasional beating-up. For instance:

It might almost be said that the *druzhina's* main job is to peep into people's bedrooms and savor the details of their intimate relations. It is nothing for the volunteers to knock at someone's door at night and wake up young and old "to check up on the conduct" of Tamara, Zinaida, or Larisa. If a young girl in Nikolaev wants to go into a restaurant with her boy friend, the doorman will stop her at the entrance—without ceremony—and demand that she obtain Mednik's special permission. But the *druzhina* leader will refuse it, with cynical hints and an impudent and offensive laugh.

Some of Mednik's other antics were even more unpleasant:

He is especially proud of his "secret" lists and albums of photographs. The *druzhina* devotes much effort to assembling "albums of women of easy virtue." These even include photographs of some young women of Nikolaev whose clothes or coiffure did not please the head of the

[6] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* October 6, 1960.

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druzhina. **. . . When I [the newspaper correspondent] was at the headquarters, a middle-aged woman came in, bowed down with grief. The *druzhina* was persecuting her twenty-year-old daughter, who worked at a local boot factory. Photographs of the girl had been put into the album of shame, and she was being abused and insulted at every turn.**

In the best tradition of Russian roguery, Mednik had done very well for himself materially. He had obtained a spacious flat in the center of town and the use of a state-owned car. He lived on wages received from an enterprise where he actually did not work. His own personal morals, too, left much to be desired.

The writer of this account blamed the situation in Nikolaevsk on the laxity of "local organizations." However, evidences of similar experiences elsewhere all point to the conclusion that the real fault lay in the flaws that were inherent in the movement from its inception. "Unfortunately," commented a high party official in the autumn of 1960, "instances of *druzhinniki* insulting citizens, taking them to their own headquarters or to the militia without legal justification, and even beating them up, have recently come to light in many places. We cannot put up with such acts; they do great harm to the cause for which the people created the *druzhiny*."[7]

NO LESS DISTURBING THAN the social abuses to which the *druzhiny* lent themselves were the political ones. A press account of what happened at an informal poetry-reading gathering in Tambov in June 1961 provides a revealing case in point.[8] The affair came to light when a correspondent of *Komsomolskaia pravda* was sent to Tambov to find out why a young man called Vyacheslav Gogin had been expelled from the Komsomol. According to her published report, it had all started when Gogin told his friends and passers-by on the street that he would give a poetry recitation the following day at the statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. The report went on:

More than two hundred people came to listen to Gogin. In addition to readings from Mayakovski, Blok, Whitman, Yesenin, he recited works of Yevtushenko and some of his own verse. . . . Little by little the passers-by gathered round. . . . Someone brought some lilacs which were placed at the foot of the statue. . . .Then the *druzhinniki* came along. Taking Gogin by the sleeve, they said, "Come along with us." We may leave aside the details of their statement of charges, which for instance alleged that Gogin "was dressed like a caricature" (he was wearing a white shirt with a black bow tie) and criticized his behavior and that of his listeners (they were smoking and this did not please the guardians of the peace) . . . What, then, was Gogin's crime which had led the *gorkom* of the Komsomol to take such a decision [*i.e.*, expel him]? What is left of the accusation? . . . Our long conversations at the *gorkom* of the Komsomol always brought us back to the same old thing: "he did not ask," "he did it spontaneously, without permission. . . ."

This incident suggests that the *druzhiny* have served on occasion as a kind of Komsomol police force used against politically undesirable elements. Nor is it surprising that they should have acquired such a role, for the Soviet regime has always been careful to blur the distinction between petty crime and political disaffection. Swindlers, parasites, loafers, and *stilyagi* have habitually been lumped together with political skeptics and dissenters.[9]

But notwithstanding the criticisms that have been directed at abuses of authority on the part of the *druzhiny*, there has been no sign of any intention to abandon the movement. On the contrary, in fact, recent comments in the Soviet press suggest that the authorities are less concerned over the excesses of the volunteer groups than over their *lack* of activity and the fact that the movement seems to have lost it vitality. One such comment by N. Mironov, published in a party journal last March, declared:

In many places the *druzhiny* are acting extremely passively and sometimes just fall to pieces. *Raion* and town leaders are unperturbed when only a few volunteers show up for duty, and the activities of the volunteers are usually limited to patrolling the streets or appearing at mass gatherings. The *druzhiny's* links with the population are poor; they sometimes do not know what is going on in the *micro-raions* and do not study the conditions which lead to violations of the law. Shortcomings such as these are to be found, for instance, in the Kalinin *raion* of Tiflis, several districts of Latvia, and in certain towns of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other republics.[10]

Officially, most of the blame for the failure of the movement to hold the popular imagination has been laid at the door of local party and state *apparatchiki* and workers in public organizations. The latter, it is claimed, lost interest in it and sometimes even tried to shift their responsibilities onto one another.[11] This criticism clearly suggests that in the eyes of the local authorities the movement was not justifying its existence. Sometimes, too, the militia and judicial organs have been accused of unwillingness to cooperate with the *druzhiny*, and the comrades' courts have been criticized for dealing too leniently with offenders handed over to them by the volunteer groups. Wrote one correspondent of *Komsomolskaia pravda*:

The people's volunteers should have more active support from the militia, the procurator, and the courts. . . . Strange as it may seem, some militamen show surprising

[7] *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 21, 1960, p. 20.

[8] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, October 1, 1961.

[9] See *ibid.*, November 25, 1961, p. 2, for another interesting case.

[10] *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 5, 1962.

[11] *Izvestia*, February 24, 1960; *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 21, 1960, p. 18; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, August 22, 1961.

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laxity towards violators of law and order. . . . Why is this so? Because, if there aren't any violations in the *raion*, it is presumed that the militia station is working well. "Why," militia officials ask themselves, "should we start a new case? Everyone knows that once something is written down, you can't carve it out even with a hatchet." And that's how the hooligan gets away with it.[12]

THE REAL CAUSES OF failure, of course, lie much deeper. As we have seen, the positive aspects of the activity of the *druzhiny* were all too often offset by their abuses of authority. These abuses inevitably made them unpopular among the honest citizenry, and the unpopularity of the movement became in turn a big disincentive to joining. Even in Moscow, where one would expect exemplary work, such an attitude has become evident. According to one press report: "Militia officials complain that some *druzhinniki* do not face up to their responsibilities honestly. Some of them are somehow embarrassed about wearing the red armband and badge. Someone like that takes his insignia off as soon as he gets into the [*Krasnopresenski*] park. If he wants to go onto the dancing veranda, he leaves them on [at first] because the doorman will not stop anyone wearing an armband; but then he will remove it—things are quieter that way." [13]

A no less weighty obstacle to the popularity of *druzhina* duty has been evident from the very beginning. The last sentence of the March 1959 decree stipulated that "the *druzhinniki* fulfill their duties outside working hours . . . ." Since they were also to receive no pay for their services as volunteers, this provision virtually ensured that, after the first wave of enthusiasm had passed, the movement would sink into a state of chronic anemia. Thus, for instance, a press comment in the Ukraine remarks:

Whereas formerly assignment to duty in a *druzhina* was accepted as an honorable commission, it has come to be conducted in some places almost by compulsion. The people on duty now are workers; you rarely see a director, a foreman. . . , the secretary of the party organization, or an engineer.[14]

This would seem to indicate that the "people's volunteer" movement has become something less than voluntary. *Druzhina* duty has inevitably come to be thought of by the man in the street as just another unpaid, state-imposed burden, another intrusion upon his leisure time, and it is only natural that he should be doing his best to avoid it—with the apparent result that the duty is being foisted upon those who cannot manage somehow to get out of it.

Like many of Saltykov-Shchedrin's Glupovian campaigns, the *druzhina* movement contained the seeds of its own decay. The institutional framework established for it in 1959 was quite unrealistic on a number of counts,

—I think, comrades, that we shall not be severe in considering the open-hearted recantation of citizen Bottleson! (Sign reads: Comrades' Court.)

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), Sept. 20, 1961.*

and the implementation of the provisions laid down then has meant a good deal of hardship for many a Soviet citizen. Since the movement never was either practical or popular, it could not be expected to have any sustained effectiveness in reducing the incidence of crime. Indeed, in his previously cited article of last March, N. Mironov complained that there had recently been a sharp rise in the number of persons receiving prison sentences, and Khrushchev's obvious preoccupation with the problem of crime in his speech to the 14th Konsomol Congress in April was still another sign that the situation has been causing the authorities real concern.

It remains to be seen how the Soviet government will now go about tackling the old problem. In spite of their shortcomings, there has been no indication so far that the *druzhiny* will be reformed or replaced by a better-controlled and more effective force. On the contrary, the fact that the volunteer groups have recently acquired added legal protection in the performance of their duties—putting them on the same footing as the militia—would seem to indicate that the regime is still unwilling to admit the undesirability of investing untrained, loosely disciplined groups with punitive powers. In his speech to the Komsomol Congress, it is true, Khrushchev seemed much more preoccupied with the militia than with the *druzhiny*, suggesting the possibility that the standing of the former may henceforth be improved at the expense of the people's volunteers. Still, one may surmise that few Soviet citizens yet feel able to breathe a sigh of relief.

A. Morris

(A. Morris is the pseudonym of a young British scholar currently engaged in studying Soviet social problems.)

[12] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* August 15, 1961.
[13] *Ibid.,* June 28, 1961.
[14] *Pravda Ukrainy,* October 5, 1961.

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

PLATE I.

Peking's Picture Puzzles

POLITICAL ANALYSTS have hitherto found much of their evidence of antagonism between Peking and Moscow in the monotonous and longwinded exchanges of ideological polemics between leading organs of the Soviet and the Chinese Communist press. China's Mao Tse-tung, however, has also been making use of another kind of weapon —lighter perhaps, yet no less trenchant—in his political feud with Khrushchev. He has been employing his stable of writers and artists to drive home his criticisms of the Soviet leader to the Chinese public through the medium of various popular, homespun forms of allegorical satire, including "writing between the lines" of traditional Chinese folk tales. One might say that Mao is using an old Chinese looking glass to project before the people at home a satirical—even contemptuous—image of his adversary in the Kremlin.

The allegorical technique suits Mao's purpose nicely, for though he has disputed Khrushchev's policies since 1956, he has obviously deemed it impolitic, for reasons of state, to attack the Soviet leader openly, by name—so long, of course, as Khrushchev shows equal restraint. It is no secret, however, that the Chinese are simply disguising the target of their crticism when they name no names (merely disagreeing with "some people") or name other names (*e.g.*, opposing the revisionist views of "Bernstein" or "Kautsky"). Nor is the disguise really intended to deceive the Russians, who know the technique well; it is used only to keep up the thinnest pretense of continuing Chinese good will toward Khrushchev and to preserve formal interstate amenities. To go further and name names, as the Albanians have done, would be to commit an irreversible act and precipitate an open break. As a Chinese folk saying has it, "Wrong words, once spoken, can never be recalled." Hence, published Chinese criticism of Khrushchev continues to be presented only "between the lines."

The Chinese, it may be noted, have a long tradition of indulgence in esoteric and allegorical writing. For example, the Taoist philosopher Chuang Chou, who lived in the age of Epicurus, penned a laconic allegory to convey his thoughts about the virtues of "inaction" and the folly of "action." He tells of two gods who were sincerely determined to repay a debt of kindness to a third, the God of Chaos. Struck by the fact that the body of the latter had no orifices whereas all the other deities had seven—

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for seeing, hearing, eating and breathing—they decided to reward their benefactor by boring the seven orifices. "Each day," concludes the tale, "they bored one hole. And on the seventh day, Chaos died." The idea Chuang wanted to convey by his allegory was simply that men should learn to leave nature alone, that they should blend in with it rather than stand against it.

In the China of later centuries, allegorical language similar to that employed by Orwell in his *Animal Farm* came to be used as a vehicle of veiled political criticism. Thus, the 11th-century statesman and poet, Su Tung-po, following the established Confucian tradition of attacking rapacious government, alluded to it in one of his poems as a "tiger." Later, in another poem, he ridiculed the ruling authorities in the guise of an "owl" whose only concern is with trivia and who tries, for example, to decide whether the day begins with sunrise "as the swallows claim," or with sundown "as the bats insist." The targets of Su's satire, one may add, were readily identified by his many readers in the imperial China of his day.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS have of course repudiated much of the imperial past, but they have preserved the time-honored technique of allegorical presentation. In particular, they have been using various traditional folk-tale themes to get in some veiled, yet quite transparent, digs at Khrushchev. One example is furnished by a collection of ancient Chinese fables published in Peking in March 1961 under the title of *Stories About Not Being Afraid of Ghosts*. The Communist editors in this instance provided readers with a partial clue to the intent of the allegory by explaining in the preface[1] that the "ghosts" represented the "imperialists" of today, who are always making trouble. The preface further stated:

Our aim in compiling this booklet was not to use these stories to illustrate the materialist ideas of ancient China. Our intention is mainly to present them to readers *as fables and satire*. . . . The ghosts described in the tales, like paper tigers, are frightful in appearance; but many of the old ghost-defying stories show that in reality there is nothing frightful about them. [Italics added]

The real message of the collection, then, is that "the true Marxist-Leninist dares to despise and strike back at ghosts" (imperialists) whereas only a "revisionist" recoils before them in fear and timidity. Now, the Chinese have often criticized "some people" (*i.e.*, the Soviet leadership) for being too soft toward the Western powers and for being afraid to lend vigorous support to anti-imperialist struggles in colonial and underdeveloped areas. Aided by the editors' preface, rank-and-file Chinese Communist readers of the fables could thus have had little difficulty in discerning who stands firm against the Western imperialist "ghosts" ("true Marxist-Leninists" like Mao) and who is afraid ("revisionists" like Khrushchev).

Since early 1962, moreover, the Chinese have for the first time extended this sort of allegorical criticism of Khrushchev to other domestic propaganda media—notably motion pictures and newspaper cartoons, again utilizing ancient folk themes. One of the films, picturesquely entitled "Sun Wu-k'ung's Three Blows Against the Dead-Bones Spirit," is based on an episode from the classical Chinese novel *Hsi Yu Chi* (Pilgrimage to the West). It depicts the story of a clever monkey (Sun Wu-k'ung) who accompanies his master, a Buddhist monk, on a journey and valiantly saves him from falling victim to the schemes of an evil female spirit (Dead-Bones). Three times in the tale the naive monk is about to succumb to Dead-Bones' ruses to capture him by disguising herself in various innocuous human forms, but each time the astute Sun Wu-k'ung sees through her disguise and turns her back by force. The monk, however, remains blind to the real identity of the evil Dead-Bones spirit and, feeling

[1] Preface to *"Stories About Not Being Afraid of Ghosts,"* published in Peking Review.



PLATE II.

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compassion for her in her assumed human forms, punishes Sun for his severity by sending him away. Without his clever protector, the monk soon falls prey to Dead-Bones and is about to be devoured by her and other assorted demons when Monkey Sun comes back to rescue him and expose the evil spirit. The naive monk is thus saved and enlightened by his steadfast, clearseeing follower, and Dead-Bones is destroyed.

Here again, the political message conveyed through allegory is easy to detect, and the *dramatis personae* readily identifiable. The naive monk can be none other than Khrushchev, while the perspicacious Monkey Sun just as patently portrays Mao. The monk (Khrushchev) courts destruction by refusing to see the true nature of the disguised Dead-Bones spirit (US "imperialism" with its "two-faced" policies) but is finally saved in the nick of time thanks to the level-headedness, courage, and loyalty of Sun (Mao). Lest anyone miss the point, a Chinese movie magazine, reviewing the film, emphasized that the allegorical tale had *realistic content* in that it demonstrated "the fighting spirit of Sun . . . and makes a piercing criticism of the monk's *unprincipled* compassion and mercy [for Dead-Bones until she was at last exposed]."[2] This plain hint could only have been meant to suggest the film's relevance to Peking's continuing attacks on "some" unnamed Communist leaders' "unprincipled" and "illusory" belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the "imperialist" powers through diplomatic negotiation and their unjustified pressures against the Chinese for exposing the "demonic" character of the Western capitalist governments.

治虎告示　　吳　耘

PLATE III.

CARTOONS, too, have recently made their debut as another medium of Chinese allegorical attack on Khrushchev. Starting last January, the Chinese Communists' central party newspaper *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily) has published a cartoon of this kind once each month (except in May[3]) on the back page of one of its issues—all under the title "Ancient Tales in Modern Form" and bearing the signature "Wu Yun" (probably a pseudonym, translatable as "Wu the Weeder"). In contrast to the examples of allegorical criticism described above, the cartoons have appeared without benefit of any editorial comments or clews to their political meaning and purpose.

This being the case, it may be asked what *explicit* evidence there is to show that these cartoons were in fact intended to satirize Khrushchev's policies. Admittedly, none can be offered. But if we were to defer judgment until actual proof in black and white should appear in the Chinese press, we might have to wait a long time. Moreover, when one studies the cartoons, it quickly becomes apparent that they cannot be taken simply at face value, that their real meaning must be sought "between the lines"—by interpretation. Indeed, the most curious thing about them is precisely that their full meaning is not immediately evident but emerges only upon second consideration. This in itself is a hint that they contain a veiled political message inasmuch as all other cartoons published in the *People's Daily* habitually make their point clearly and openly: here, the very ambiguity of the message suggests to the reader that it concerns a sensitive subject. At

[2] *Shanghai Tien-ying* (Shanghai Films), No. 2, February 1962. While thus hinting at the political significance of the film for adult viewers, the review added in conclusion, "As for children, they will be enlightened and will learn a lesson when they see the film."

[3] Although Wu's cartoon series was interrupted in May, the May 5 issue of *People's Daily* did carry an apparent substitute in the form of a brief allegorical fable entitled "A Coin as Dear as One's Life." Its central figure, a miserly landlord known as "Tiger Chin," seemingly represented Khrushchev, and the evident intent of the allegory was to attack the Soviet leader's unjust and shameful behavior toward Albanian Communist chief Enver Hoxha.

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the risk, therefore, of being accused of overanalysis—or perverse ingenuity—the author shall proceed to translate Wu the Weeder's first five cartoons which appeared from January through June (and are reproduced on these pages) and shall venture interpretations of their probable anti-Khrushevian meaning.

The first of Wu's cartoon strips appeared on January 13, 1962, and had as its theme "a blind man drinking his soup" (see Plate I). The man is pictured tossing a live fish into a cooking pot to make his soup. The fish promptly jumps out, but the blind man, not knowing it, later tastes the soup and comments on its excellent flavor. Finally he discovers, by touch, that the fish hasn't been in the pot after all. So he tries to put the best face on the fiasco by remarking, "Lucky, indeed, that the fish wasn't in the pot, for if it had been, the soup would have been too rich for me."

This simple theme is hardly very meaningful if taken by and for itself, but it promptly gains significance when viewed as an allegory applicable to Sino-Soviet relations. Seen in that context, Wu's cartoon can quite easily be construed as a subtle satirization of Khrushchev's quickness to rationalize a foreign policy defeat or a retreat from a hard international position. This was precisely what the Soviet leader did at the 22nd CPSU Congress last October in connection with the withdrawal of his own deadline for the conclusion of a Soviet-German peace treaty. The Chinese Communist leaders undoubtedly looked upon the withdrawal as a disgraceful retreat by Khrushchev, and their closest supporters, the Albanians, implied as much in their post-Congress attacks on the Soviet leader.

Wu's second cartoon was carried in the *People's Daily* of February 27 (see Plate II). The strip bears the caption "No Concern for Life," and its central character is a quack who treats hunchbacks. The rascal is seen inviting a passing hunchback to come behind the screen and have his back straightened. The hunchback accepts but soon is heard calling for help from behind the screen. A villager responds to the cries, only to find the unfortunate hunchback stretched out, dead, under a wooden plank which the quack has tied to the victim's back and is standing on in order to straighten it. The would-be rescuer evidently accuses the quack of brutal murder, to which the rascal replies by pleading, "I was only trying to straighten him out."

Here, too, it requires very little imagination to perceive in Wu's cartoon an allegory with more than accidental relevance to a recent bone of Sino-Soviet contention. Through the quack in his picture story, Wu the Weeder seems to be aiming his barbs at Khrushchev, whose views the Chinese (without naming him) have condemned as tantamount to Marxist-Leninist quackery, and who earned their intensified enmity during and following the 22nd Congress by resorting to what Peking considered *crude methods* in his attempt to "straighten out" the deviant Albanians (the hapless hunchback)—and, in-

PLATE IV.

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PLATE V.



directly, the Chinese themselves. The Albanians, more outspoken than their Chinese backers, have explicitly accused Khrushchev of exerting "crude pressures" on the Albanian party to prevent it from raising its voice against his "anti-Marxist views and actions."

The anti-Khrushchevian message of Wu's third cartoon, published March 14 under the caption "Controlling the Tiger by Proclamation" (see Plate III), emerges even more clearly. At the beginning we see a commoner imploring a short, fat, heavy-jowled Mandarin to do something about a man-eating tiger in the nearby mountains. The Mandarin writes down on paper a proclamation stating: "Notice: The tiger is prohibited from eating commoners. By our order."—and gives it to the man. Returning to the mountains, the commoner is just posting the proclamation on a rock when he is surprised by the tiger, and in the final scene only the man's hand, still grasping the proclamation, is seen protruding from the tiger's gullet.

In view of Mao's celebrated characterization of "US imperialism" as a "paper tiger," the very presence of the beast in Wu's sardonic tale is an immediate tip-off to the import of the allegory. Instead of entering into negotiations with the United States with a view to stopping Western imperialist aggression by paper agreements, Wu the Weeder seems to be saying, Khrushchev ought to cast aside his illusions about "peaceful coexistence," mutual compromise, and closer contacts with the West, and should embrace the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist position of the Chinese who insist upon a militant blow-for-blow struggle against the Western powers and active Communist-bloc support of all anti-imperialist liberation uprisings.

It may be noted that Wu's approach here diverges slightly from the more customary Chinese Communist application of the "paper tiger" concept, for his tiger is real and cannot be tamed by proclamations. On occasion, however, Peking itself has acknowledged that the American "paper tiger" can, at least temporarily, become "a real tiger that can still bite." It is also interesting to note that Khrushchev has deliberately borrowed the Chinese "tiger" to retort to Mao in kind. At the 22nd Congress, the Soviet leader sarcastically referred to certain African and "Asian" potentates who are brave in hunting tigers only because they are doing it from the back of an elephant (the USSR), which no tiger dares to attack.

The fourth in Wu's series of cartoons appeared on April 2 under the title "The Wild Goose That Flew Away" (see Plate IV). We first see two archers in ancient Chinese warrior's attire taking aim with drawn bows at a goose flying overhead, while a Mandarin (this time not fat and round-faced) looks on. As the archers are about to shoot, one says that the goose should be "red-roasted" (cooked in soy sauce), and the other that it should be "clear-steamed" (steamed without sauce). Instead of shooting, the warriors lower their bows and fall to quarreling, each insisting upon cooking the goose his own preferred way. Then the Mandarin steps in and gets the disputants to agree that half the goose should be "red-roasted" and the other half "clear-steamed." But when the archers look skyward to take aim again, the goose has flown away.

It seems most likely that the message contained in Wu's little allegorical homily relates once again to the Soviet-Albanian altercation. Through his tale of the quarrelsome archers, Wu is apparently making the point that when fellow Communists fight among themselves they risk losing the ability to strike at their common target, Western "imperialism"; that there must be unity in the face of the enemy instead of open denunciation of a fraternal party. This was generally the line taken by Chou En-lai at the 22nd CPSU Congress following Khrushchev's public attack on the Albanian Communist leadership, and Peking probably still takes the view that the fight between Moscow and Tirana ought to be thrust back behind the scenes rather than carried on in the open. It would seem somewhat paradoxical, however, that the Chinese themselves are apparently not letting Wu's allegorical exhortation against intra-bloc wrangling inhibit them from continuing their own determined—if subtly conducted—feud against Khrushchev.

The fifth and most recent of Wu's cartoon allegories (*People's Daily*, June 7) is captioned "Seeing Only One End" and portrays a hypocritical Mandarin who is willing to pay the wages of only two of his four bearers on the ground that two are all that he can see through the front opening of his palanquin. The first scene (see Plate V) shows the bearers carrying the planquin, with the Man-

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darin's face—once again conspicuously rotund—visible through a curtained side-window. Next, we see the two front bearers requesting that they and their fellows in the rear be paid their wages, saying, "Excellency, as it is the end of the month, the bearers tender their bill." But, in the last scene, the Mandarin is shown angrily pointing two fingers at the front bearers and remonstrating, "I see only two bearers! Why do you present a bill for four?"

There can be scant doubt that the Mandarin here caricatures Khrushchev and that the intent of the allegory is to excoriate the Soviet leader for treating only those Communist parties that clearly and unequivocally support his policies as worthy of reward (*i.e.*, Soviet economic aid). It is a well-known fact that the Soviet leadership has cut off virtually all economic assistance not only to the Albanians—who now are actually, if not officially, excluded from the Communist bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—but also to Communist China. Significantly enough, Wu's latest cartoon jibe at Khrushchev was timed to coincide remarkably closely with the recent top-level CMEA meeting in Moscow, to which the Albanians complained that they had not been invited, and which bitterly offended Peking by extending CMEA membership to Outer Mongolia, presumably as a reward for the Mongolian CP's strong support of Khrushchev in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

WHAT CONCLUSIONS, then, are to be drawn from the Chinese resort to these new, popularly-oriented methods of lampooning the Soviet leader and his policies? In the first place, their adoption would seem to suggest a deliberate campaign to demean Khrushchev in the eyes of the Chinese public at large, and not just among the politically more sophisticated party members capable of grasping the import of abstract ideological polemics in the party journals directed against "modern revisionists." It is easy to imagine that such polemics (for example, the series of articles in *Hung Ch'i* [Red Flag] some months ago, ostensibly attacking the revisionism of Bernstein, Kautsky, and Kardelj, but really aimed at Khrushchev [4]) could well be over the head of the Chinese man in the street—even if he had the stomach to struggle through them. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that he would fail to comprehend the fairly simple anti-Khrushchevian message allegorically conveyed by the film about the stalwart Monkey Sun Wu-k'ung or Wu the Weeder's cartoons about the quack's method of treating hunchbacks and the "Mandarin" who thought to subdue the man-eating tiger by proclamation. And if some readers of the *People's Daily* should occasionally have difficulty in deciphering the intended meaning of Wu's cartoon allegories, one can safely assume that the party cadres stand ready to provide helpful hints to put them on the right track.

The Peking leadership thus appears to be carrying its personal feud against Khrushchev to the people. And if this hypothesis is correct, then the development could well signify that Mao and his associates have abandoned hope of a viable working relationship with the present leader of Soviet communism, and that the rift between the two Communist leaderships, instead of mending, is on the contrary becoming still deeper and more difficult to resolve.

[4] See issues of February 10 (against Bernstein), March 1 (against Kardelj), and April 25, 1962 (against Kautsky).

Arthur A. Cohen

(An American student of Chinese Communist affairs, Mr. Cohen last appeared in these pages with "How Original is Maoism?" (November-December 1961).

Correspondence

RESISTANCE IN CHINA

TO THE EDITORS: I do agree with Prof. Michael Lindsay, who in reviewing *Awakened China* (published here in Hong Kong as *The Wall Has Two Sides*) wrote that the author, Mr. Felix Greene, is not an outright propagandist of Chinese communism but an enthusiast who thinks that "reason is and ought to be a slave of the passions" [March-April 1962]. This is borne out by the fact that he makes claims on behalf of Mao's regime which the [Communists] never did, and denies facts which have been umpteen times admitted in official party and government statements.

A case in point is Hu Feng. In 1955, when Hu Feng was arrested, there were scores of articles both in *Jen-min Jih-pao* and in all provincial papers not only about Hu Feng's "crimes" but about "Hu Fengists" who were arrested by the hundreds all over China. In 1958 and in 1960, the Peking government and party spokesmen (Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, *etc.*) told foreign journalists that

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Hu Feng would be released from prison if he admitted his erroneous stand. Writing about Hu Feng, Mr. Greene states that he and Ting Ling "fell out of favor, but neither was imprisoned." As the official line was and still is that Hu Feng and "people of his ilk" should be in prison, it is difficult to believe that any Chinese Communist denied to Mr. Greene that Hu Feng was in prison. I could quote Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Liu Shoa-chi and others who repeatedly spoke about the large-scale resistance to their regime by Chinese intellectuals.

Yang Shih-chan, Professor at the Central-South Institute of Finance and Economics, wrote in a "10,000-word letter to Chairman Mao":

We have applied to intellectuals methods of punishment which peasants would not apply to landlords and workers would not apply to capitalists. . . . The intellectuals who chose to die by jumping from tall buildings, drowning in rivers, cutting their throats, swallowing poison, or by other methods, were innumerable. The aged intellectuals or pregnant women among them were not given pardon either. . . . Comparing our method of massacre with that adopted by the fascists at Auschwitz, the latter appeared more clumsy and childish (at any rate they hired executioners) but more prompt and "benevolent."

This letter was published in the July 13, 1957, issue of the Hankow *Ch'ang Chiang Jih-pao,* and it was one of many hundreds of similar letters. (Mr. Roderick MacFarquhar's documentary study, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign,* gives a number of other instances, but they are only a few out of many.)

"The names of intellectuals who . . . are wholeheartedly supporting the regime read almost like a roll of honor," writes Mr. Greene (British ed., p. 342-43), and he mentions twelve names. Two of them are party functionaries. Among the others he mentions Fei Hsiao-t'ung (misspelling his name), the famous sociologist, author of *Peasant Life in China* and *Earthbound China.*

According to the Peking *Jen-min Jih-pao* (July 4, 1957) Professor Fei Hsiao-t'ung had this to say at a conference on June 6, 1957:

I have declared that I will not join the Communist Party as an expression of my attitude. . . . The trouble today was mainly the product of the system. . . . We intellectuals cannot tolerate such things. Things are simply too dark. . . .

Professor Fei, who according to Mr. Greene wholeheartedly supports the regime, was one of the principals accused in the famous "anti-rightist forums." He was always described as a rightist, and people were persecuted for the "crime" of having associated with Professor Fei's favorite students. (New China News Agency, July 26 and 29, 1957).

Any student of the Chinese Communist press could quote scores of other instances where Mr. Greene's propagandist fervor brings him into direct contradiction with official declarations and the Chinese Communist press.

One can only throw up one's hands in astonishment at learning from Mr. Greene that only "misfits" and "losers" opposed the regime—"perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the population." In 1950 Mao Tse-tung said that "about eight percent oppose it." And in 1961, after twelve years of rule, it was officially stated that roughly ten percent of the population is against communism, but that the rest, too, "has to be remolded."

In these days when the flight of the refugees to Hong Kong is being reported day after day, Mr. Greene's smug contempt for them is simply revolting.

Mr. Greene might be subjectively a "slave of his passions." Objectively, his book is a sustained and consistent attempt at total misrepresentation. It is calculated to rob the suffering millions of any outside help in food and consumer goods which they might get if the truth were known.

Please excuse my bad English, and my request to withhold my name in case you are willing to publish my letter. I have some relatives on the mainland. They are, incidentally, not "losers" but former coolies.

A FORMER HONG KONG REFUGEE

YUGOSLAVIA TODAY

TO THE EDITORS: As one who holds an LL.B. degree from the University of Belgrade (1955) and is writing a Ph.D. dissertation on the Yugoslav economy . . . I feel obliged to extend my sincere congratulations to Mr. Paul Landy on his article "Reforms in Yugoslavia," published in the November-December 1961 issue of *Problems of Communism.*

The article contains three important elements rarely found together: (1) it is well-documented; (2) the author has successfully freed himself from any ideological bias—often the most difficult obstacle in presenting a realistic picture of so controversial a subject as the dynamics of a Communist state; and (3) its conclusions show, clearly and correctly, that Yugoslavia is now at the crossroads. Further decentralization of the Yugoslav economy may lead toward a weakening of political control, and . . . as time goes by, it may become increasingly difficult for those who have been in favor of bureaucratic control . . . to effectuate a return to rigid centralism.

Which way the country goes in the future will depend on a number of internal and external factors. Mr. Landy's greatest contribution lies in bringing to public attention the complexity of the problems faced by the Yugoslav government today.

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Where to Obtain *Problems of Communism*

NOTE: In the United States, *Problems of Communism* is available on sale at the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price per copy: $.35; subscription price: $1.50 a year; additional $.50 for foreign mailing if orders are placed in the United States. Outside the United States, single copies or subscriptions may be obtained free of charge through requests addressed to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. Following are the locations of USIS offices:

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HONG KONG
INDONESIA—Djakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Jogjakarta
JAPAN—Tokyo, Kobe, Fukuoka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Sapporo, Osako, Niigata, Sendai, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Kanayawa
KOREA—Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju
LAOS—Vientiane, Pakse, Luang Prabang, Savannakhet
MALAYA—Kuala Lumpur, Penang
NEW ZEALAND—Wellington
PHILIPPINES—Manila, Cebu
SINGAPORE
TAIWAN—Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung
THAILAND—Bangkok, Chiengmai, Korat, Songkhla, Udorn, Ubol
VIET NAM—Saigon, Hue, Can Tho, Dalat

AFRICA

ALGERIA—Algiers
BURUNDI—Usumbura
CAMEROUN—Yaounde
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC—Bangui
CHAD—Fort Lamy
DAHOMEY—Cotonou
ETHIOPIA—Addis Ababa, Asmara
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND—Salisbury, Blantyre, Lusaka
GABON—Libreville
GHANA—Accra
GUINEA—Conakry
IVORY COAST—Abidjan
KENYA—Nairobi
LIBERIA—Monrovia
LIBYA—Benghazi, Tripoli
MALAGASY REPUBLIC—Tananarive
MALI—Bamako
MOROCCO—Rabat, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, Tangier
NIGER—Niamey
NIGERIA—Lagos, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna, Kano
REPUBLIC OF CONGO—Brazzaville
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO—Leopoldville, Stanleyville
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA— Pretoria, Johannesburg, Capetown
SENEGAL—Dakar
SIERRA LEONE—Freetown
SOMALI REPUBLIC—Mogadiscio
SUDAN—Khartoum
TANGANYIKA—Dar-es-Salaam
TOGO—Lome
TUNISIA—Tunis
UGANDA—Kampala
UPPER VOLTA—Ouagadougou
ZANZIBAR—Zanzibar

LATIN AMERICA

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